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Abstract 
The words'Disarmament'and 'Arms Control ' have been 
conveniently used interchangeably, and even the UN Charter 
t a lk s of ' regulat ion of armaments'. Sometimes disarmament 
i s used as a synonym for 'arms reduction'. Disarmament i s 
sometimes forced on a defeated nation or i s based on 
b i l a t e r a l or mu l t i l a t e r a l agreement but has, o f t e n , f e l l 
short of expecta t ions . Some regard armaments necessary 
as i t works as a deterrent while others regard t r u s t as 
the most important element in negot ia t ions for disarmament 
which also aims at peace and secu r i t y . 
The degree of arras reduction r e s u l t s in the quantity 
and qual i ty of arms reduction by a pa r t i cu l a r nat ion and 
i t s consecjuence affects other nations who rec iprocate 
such attempts. The highest degree of arms reduction i s 
the complete disarmament in which no nation keeps more 
arms than are necessary for in t e rna l peace and secur i ty 
of a na t ion . I t denotes complete t r u s t in other na t ions . 
Therehave been many proposals for i t but with l i t t l e 
success. The other type i s p a r t i a l disarmament which 
covers, (1) incomplete reduction in some categories of 
arms, (2) complete reduction in some categor ies , (3) a 
combination of the two. 
The reciprocal disarmament connotes whether a nation 
disarms unconditionally and u n i l a t e r a l l y or iays a precon-
di t ion for a similar behaviour from other na t ions . Bi la te ra l 
or m u l t i l a t e r a l disarmament i s a measure in which there i s 
a clear cut give and take s i t u a t i o n . In such a measure, 
r e l a t i v e mi l i t a ry strength i s maintained. 
/o:ms control , on the other hand aims at reducing the 
chances of war, and reducing casu l t i e s in case of a war, by 
various measures. Major thrust in such measures i s not on 
quantity of arms but on the i r use . Neutral izat ion may also 
be ternned as a measure of arms con t ro l . 
The major difference between arms control and 
disarmament i s tha t the l a t t e r fixes for i t s e l f a greater 
goal tha t the former but both seek to reduce chances of 
war. 
Mostly, the attempts at disarmament after the second 
world war have been based on GRIT Scheme which supports 
gradual reduction of weapons in a control led manner which 
wil l help t o create an atmosphere of t r u s t . These attempts 
bas ica l ly involve the following po in t s : 
(i) r e s t r i c t i o n s on nuc lea r weapon t e s t i n g , 
( i i ) s t r a t e g i c arms l i m i t a t i o n / 
( i i i ) n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuc lea r weapons, 
(iv) p r o h i b i t i o n of weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n , 
(v) c r e a t i o n of t ens ion t r e e zones, 
(vi) measures of p revent ion of war, and 
(v i i ) obeyance of humani tar ian laws of war. 
Disarmament and arms c o n t r o l have a l so been l inked 
t o development and p r o g r e s s . I t has been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
t he economic problems faced by the t h i r d world c o u n t r i e s 
and the ^^oject pover ty c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g in under-
developed c o u n t r i e s could be overcome and wiped out i f 
disarmament measures could be adopted. A major i r r i t a n t 
i n the disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s i s t h e con t roversy 
whether disarmament or s e c u r i t y should be t h e aim. Another 
cont roversy i s on t h e po in t of, p a r t i e s t o disarmament 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , whether t h e r e should be u n i l a t e r a l or 
m u l t i l a t e r a l or should i n c l u d e only nuc lea r powers . 
Disarmament has t o be achieved not only through 
nuc lea r disarmament but a l s o through r educ t ion in 
convent ional weapons, armed f o r c e s , m i l i t a r y budgets , 
p r o h i b i t i o n of t r a n s f e r of weapons and t r o o p s in t h e 
foreign countr ies and putt ing a ban on the use of weapons 
of mass des t ruc t ion . 
For the attainment of ul t imate goal of general and 
complete disarmament^ negot ia t ions have been going on in 
the area of the most dangerous area of armaments i . e . 
nuclear arms and the i r del ivery veh ic l e s . 
There have been many examples and ins tances of 
disarmament measures adopted by nat ions e i ther through 
negot ia t ions or imposed on defeated na t ions . 
The Antarctica Treaty of 1959 which created a zone 
to be used only for peaceful purposes i s supposed to be 
the f i r s t major agreement after the second worlc war. 
Pa r t i a l Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited nuclear t e s t s 
in the a i r , space or under water capable of affecting 
atmosphere with rad ioac t iv i ty outside the t e r r i t o r y of 
s t a t e s conducting such t e s t s . Outer Space Treaty of 
1967 also recognised the fact tha t i t does not belong 
to anyone^ so should not be pol lu ted . The ENMOD convention 
of 1967 bans any h o s t i l e attempt which may modify environ-
ment. 1972 ABM t rea ty bans development or deployment of 
space based a n t i - b a l l i s t i c miss i le systems. The Tlate lolco 
Treaty of 1967, created a nuclear weapon Free Zone in 
Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 banned 
nuclear weapon t ransfer by nuclear club to non-nuclear 
powers, with assurances to non-nuclear powers signing the 
t r ea ty , for secur i ty . Attempts to avoid accidental war 
were made through the 1971 t r ea ty between the USA and the 
USSR. In the same year Sea-bed was also banned for use 
of nuclear weaponthrough an agreement. Indian Ocean States 
have been making attempts t o free t h e i r area from super 
power r iva l ry in the Ocean and thus creating conditions 
of t r u s t . The 1972 resolut ion attempts to ban chemical 
weapons from use in wars. The super posers have t r i ed to 
create^ through talks^ an atmosphere of t rus t for the 
of 
prevention/war by including the i r a l l i e s in i t s scope. 
The US-USSR threshold Test Ban Treaty limited the quanti ty, 
of nuclear power to be t e s t ed under ground-in 1973. The 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty between the super power 
allowed nuclear explosions outside the usual t e s t s i t e s . 
Regular t a lk s between the USA and USSR have been 
conducted since 1967 to l imit t he i r nuclear arsenals 
aiming for v e r t i c a l as well as horizontal disarmament. 
The Palme Commission submitted i t s report in 1982 for 
the creation of nuclear weapon free zone in cent ra l 
Europe. START and INF (LRTNF) talks also aim to reduce 
tensions through reduction in armaments. The Central 
American States also started negotiations in 1983 for 
.^eace in Central America. In 19B5, the South Pacific 
became the second populated area to be declared a 
nuclear VJeapon Free Zone through the treaty of Rarotonga. 
The cold war conditions eased a little when the NPT Review 
Conference was held in 1985, where US-USSR and their 
allies avoided to criticise each other and created more 
favourable conditions for disarmament. India offered her 
jood offices for the detection of any violators of an 
-agreement, it signed, in this regara. 
Under such conditions where so much was being done 
in the field of disarmam.ent and arms control to curb the 
menace of .a nuclear war and the rising cold war conditions, 
In'-:ia could not remain aloof from the scene. Since 
independence, India has been following a policy of utmost 
caution and stability. India has been taking keen interest 
in the iisarmament scenario withiout being aligned to any 
bloc. This is more creditable as the start of the cold 
war coincided with her independence. Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru, in early 1950s, announced in the Lok Sabha that 
India was not interested in making nuclear bombs. Not only 
tha t , she was also in te res ted in creat ing conditions 
congenial for cringing the two super powers clpse enough 
to crea te conditions of t r u s t . This was considered by 
Nehru vilfal for making India s e l f - r e l i a n t . He rea l i sed 
the immense p r o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the nuclear technology and 
how i t could be used for peaceful purposes t o drag the 
nation out of the conditions of shortages and poverty, 
riydro-electric power was considered inadequate for rapid 
s t r i d e s , India wanted to take, in order to progress and 
stand on her fee t . Rapid i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was regarded 
a must for the removal of the conditions of aoject 
poverty. Atomic power was soon recognised as e s sen t i a l 
for such measures. So, the i n i t i a l stance taken by India 
determined two important po in t s of focus i . e . nuclear 
weapons sha l l not be made and nuclear technology has 
to be fully u t i l i s e d , b u t only for peaceful purposes. 
Lai dahadur Shas t r i , af ter Nehru, ful ly endorsed 
h i s predecessor ' s policy of l inking nuclear technology 
to development and renouncement of nuclear weapons t o 
subdue other na t ions . 
Mrs. Gandhi, i n sp i t e of being faced by a different 
p o l i t i c a l climate within the country and a"lobby working 
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to opt for nuclear weapons, sided with her predecessors . 
She was also faced by the fac ts tha t a h o s t i l e China 
had already gone nuclear and other major nations were 
jo ining the NPT. She had to take a decision whether to 
join NPT or to. opt nuclear weapons for Ind ia . Her strong 
leadership and vision brought India out of the dilemma 
by clear ly ident i fying I n d i a ' s stand/ the i n i t i a l one. 
For economic growth and progress, i t i s necessary t o use 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without any 
dictak by the nuclear powers and at the same time s t ress ing 
the age old maxim of I n d i a ' s policy of ' l ive and l e t live'. 
She did not join NPT 6or reasons of p r inc ip l e , i . e . , i t 
i s par t isan and on unequal terms with r igh t s for 
nuclear powers and duties for non-nuclear ones. India, 
during Mrs. Gandhi years, followed a consistent policy 
of non-alignment with h o s t i l i t y towards none and friendly, 
no to any attempts to i n t e r f e re in our i n t e rna t iona l 
matters , including our uses of nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes. Mrs. Gandhi went ahead with a nuclear 
explosion at Pokhran which s t i r r e d a storm through out 
the nuclear world and h o s t i l e neighbours.Mrs. Gandhi 
remained unaf-fected by the controversy and offered our 
nuclear i n s t a l l a t i o n s to be inspected only on the condition 
that other nations also rec iprocate in similar manner. 
India has cal led upon nuclear weapon powers to give up the 
use or th rea t of use of nuclear weapons under any 
circumstances, suspend a l l nuclear weapon t e s t s and 
production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to 
resume disarmament tglks with determination to reach 
agreement. India considers nuclear war as 'barbarism' 
and has suggested the following points for the attainment 
of the goal of disarmament. 
1. The United Nations Special Session on disarmament 
should negotiate a binding convention of the non-use 
of nuclear weapons. 
2. As a f i r s t step towards the eventual elimination of 
exis t ing s tockpi les , there must be a freeze on nuclear 
weapons and the i r further production, 
3. Suspension of nuclear weapon t e s t s . 
4 . Focus on attainment of the goal of general and 
complete disarmament within a specified t ime. 
5. Educating the public about the dangers of a nuclear 
war, Mrs. Gandhi s ta ted tha t development, peace, 
independence and disarmament are i n t e r - r e l a t e d and 
as long as there are nuclear weapons, there can 
not be any peace. 
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Indian policy on disartnament nas j^een consis tent as 
she considers disarmament as a precondition for securi ty 
as against the super powers opinion tha t secur i ty l i e s 
in armaments. India did not become a party to NPT as i t 
did not safeguard the in tegr i ty , sovereignty and correspon-
ding r igh t s of developing na t ions . I t does not guarantee 
l imi t s to v e r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
India also holds the opinion that glooal secur i ty 
depends on disarmament^ and humans have remote chances of 
survival in a nuclear war. Mrs. Gandhi advocated the theory 
tha t in case of a nuclear war, any regional measures for 
disarmament wil l become meaningless. Even though she held 
such a view, she did not r e j ec t al together such measures 
when such proposals were proposed voluntar i ly by a l l the 
nat ions of the region without any persuat ions by foreign 
powers. If one nation in the region remains nuclear, the 
area declared a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone becomes pol luted 
and meaningless. She i s also averse to the presence of 
super powers and the i r colonial designs in the Indian Ocean 
region. Supporting the peace sione in the Indian Ocean and 
re jec t ing the Nuclear Weapon free Zone in South Asia i s 
very much in line with I n d i a ' s policy as her stand i s clear 
that proposals for creat ing such a zone must come from the 
11 
s t a t e s of the region. Another factor re jec t ing the move 
was the presence of a nuclear China in the region and for 
securi ty reasons, India can not be a party to any such 
proposal . India has supported a l l through, every such move 
which i s d i rected towards disarmament and arms control with 
equal r i gh t s and obligat ions for a l l . 
Mrs. Gandhi, with some of the other leaders on the non-
aligned world i n i t i a t e d a peace i n i t i a t i v e , in 1984 aimed at 
reducing tensions in a bipolar world by s t ress ing on the need 
to take firm and boldsteps to curb armaments by the super-
powers. This i n i t i a t i v e known as the Delhi-Six Peace Proposals 
were followed up after Mrs. Gandhi's death, by her successor 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The proposals were welcomed 
not only by the super powers but also Dy others prominent 
leaders of the world. 
The Indian policy in t h i s regard i s based on cer ta in 
guiding p r inc ip l e s : 
1. Peaceful coexistence should be the motto-of in te rna t iona l 
r e l a t i o n s . 
2. Supremacy of human l i f e must be recognised, 
3. Non-violence should be widely accepted. 
4 . Fear and suspicion must be replaced by understanding 
and t r u s t . 
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5. Political and economic independence of all states 
must be secured. 
6. A new international economic order must be created 
through savings from disarmament measures. 
7. Individual's harmonious development must be safeguarded. 
8. Intellectual potential of mankind should be exploited 
to solve world problems. 
9. 'Balance of terror' must be replaced by'universal 
security'. 
10. A nuclear weapon free and a non-violent world must be 
aspired, which i s possible through disarmanient only. 
India pleaded that the massive expenditure on arms i s 
the cause of a very large number of i l l s and def ic ienc ies , 
in larger par t of the world, including, r i s i ng pr ices , i n f l a t i on , 
i l l heal th , poverty, hunger, unemployment and other problems. 
India places, disarmament as the casic requirement for world 
peace, and new in te rna t iona l economic order. In t h i s , I n d i a ' s 
stand has been clear and consistent and the framework framed 
by the founding fathers of the Indian foreign policy i;^ 
s t i l l adhered to , with a near universal appreciation and 
recogni t ion. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The most- talked about and pressing problem of today, 
undoubtedly, is to find a solution to the unending arms 
race by adopting measures for disarmament and arms control. 
The problem becomes even more difficult to solve when 
nations, which very well realise the gravity of the arms 
race, which may culminate in the extinction of mankind, 
fear the possibility of a situation when a few nations 
may have striking capability and superiority over others. 
This inherent fear was very aptly described by one author 
attempting to find out problems confronting disarmament 
and arms control measures, by saying that "disarmament is 
like a party; no one wants to arrive until every one else 
is there". 
An analysis of the world's nuclear arsenal clearly 
indicates the sure destruction and extinction of mankind 
from the face of the earth, if we ever have a third 
world war. Human's survival rests between man's success 
and >iis failure in achieving genuine disarmament and ending 
the arms race. 
All this talk of arms control and disarmament is 
bound to come a cropper unless it is read, studied and 
analysed by our intellectuals. Way back in 1960, Henry 
Kissinger wrote an article in which he said that no 
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aspect of American policy had received less systematic 
a t tent ion than arms coht ro l , Suostant ia l i n t e l l e c t u a l , as 
well as mater ia l resources have oeen devoted to the study 
of s t ra tegy . i:et arms control which i s i t s reverse side, 
has lacked a tocus of a t t e n t i o n , . . . rietore there can be a 
successrul negotiat ion on arms control (we) must get our 
i n t e l l e c t u a l house in order. 
In t h i s age of nuclear arms race, i t i s becoming 
c learer every day that the de s t i n i e s of nations of the 
world depend on the two super powers, and how they conduct 
the i r a f fa i r s with each other and with other count r ies . 
No matter, how cordial are the r e l a t i ons of other countr ies , 
there i s a constant fear of regional h o s t i l i t i e s in which 
super powers might come face to face, siding with opposite 
p a r t i e s . A writer claims that war i s inherent in the 
p o l i t i c a l in tercourse of nations giving us the hope that 
i t can be prevented by the same in t e rcour se . 
Another, opinion that "wars are fought for peace" 
i s re jected by otherswho c i t e the exampleg-of the two 
world wars and the ever growing and advancing technologies, 
after 1945. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a th i rd war brings j i t t e r s 
among the people who v i sua l i s e a scenario of a nuclear 
I l l 
war in which i t wi l l not be a concern of the two a l l i ances 
only, but the p o s s i b i l i t y of non-aligned countr ies get t ing 
bumped by nuclear countries due to the i r inherent fear^ of 
today 's smaller nations becoming super powerS/ when the 
present ones are destroyed in the war. 
This fear which Churchill cal led the "balance of 
t e r r o r " i s the basis of the uneasy peace in the world 
today. The only hope, in t h i s s i tua t ion of complete lack 
of fa i th and conditions of fear, i s the message sent by 
Sigmumd Freud, in 1932, to Albert Einstein, "All tha t 
produces t i e s of sentiment between man and man serve us 
as war 's an t ido te" . 
This study i s pr imari ly aimed at I n d i a ' s policy 
towards arms control and disarmament. No nation or 
individual can claim immunity or the luxury of laziness 
to the problem of arms race. In a world fraught with the 
constant fear of outbreak of nuclear war, tha t too where 
some nations have the capabi l i ty while Others don't^ where 
some nations have dropped bombs on c i t i e s and have forced 
surrender, where some nations want t o dominate others , 
where nations want to become guarantors of providing 
protect ion, for a p r i c e . 
I V 
The study consis ts of f ive chapters, tackl ing the 
problems in great de t a i l , not only I n d i a ' s stand on the 
issue but also the problem i t s e l f . The f i r s t chapter aims 
at a close study of the problem of arms control and 
disarmament, i t s h i s to ry and origin and the reasons why 
i t should be a t ta ined . The concepts of Arras Control and 
Disarmament, kinds and various theor ies regarding them. 
The second chapter deals with various attempts made 
in t h i s f i e l d . The events and the means adopted to achieve 
p a r t i a l and complete disarmament. 
The th i rd and fourth chapters consider in great 
d e t a i l the policy of the Indian government regarding the 
measures adopted for disarmament and arms control in various 
in te rna t iona l forums and also on b i l a t e r a l bas i s . I n d i a ' s 
policy on these i ssues has been put in two chapters due to 
the fact tha t the consistency in I n d i a ' s stand on the i ssue 
s l i gh t ly changed after Krs, Gandhi assumed Office of the 
Prime Minis ter . The Chinese invasion caught us canpf^frtely 
unawares and suddenly j o l t ed India from dreams of a beautiful 
and peaceful world based on universal brotherhood. While in 
1952, the f i r s t Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru said, "No man can prophesy the fu ture . But I should 
l ike to say on behalf of any future government of India that 
whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances we sha l l 
After 
never make nuclear weapons",/the Chinese debacle and the 
subsequent death of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and a brief 
period with Shas t r i j i in power there was a s l i g h t , but 
marked change in I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e when Prime Minister 
Mrs. Gandhi s t a r t e d talking of p o l i t i c s never being s t a t i c . 
So, the two chapters have t he i r cut off l ine on the Indian 
a t t i t ude before and after Mrs. Gandhi came to power: 
Mrs. Gandhi's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, after 
keeping away from Non-proliferation Treaty; and the events 
after her debacle when Janata Party assumed power in New 
Delhi . I n d i a ' s nuclear policy remained unchanged during 
the Janata Party scint at the centre and the thumping come-
back of Mrs. Gandhi ref lected the mood of the Indian masses 
of fa i th in strong leadership of Mrs. Gandhi. 3e i t domestic 
p o l i t i c s or the in te rna t iona l arena, she dealt with super 
powers and the so-called nuclear club, on equal terms. 
The l as t chapter deals with I n d i a ' s stand on Indian 
Ocean area, to be free from power r i v a l r i e s or domination, 
and to develop i t in to an area of peace and coordination, 
as India was aware of the th rea t which the mi l i t a ry 
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presence of the big powers could cause to I n d i a ' s secur i ty . 
Most of the Indian a i r - f i e l d s , por t s , dockyards, communi-
cation net-works and mi l i t a ry i n s t a l l a t i o n s f a l l within the 
range of the long range a i rc ra f t and submarine plying over 
and under the surface of the Indian Ocean. 
Lastly, the study contains the concluding remarks. 
An analysis of I n d i a ' s role in attempts, and her a t t i t ude 
towards disarmament measures within the framework of i n t e r -
nat ional nuclear scenario. Some of the countries with 
whopping mil i tary budgets are present around the sub-continent 
while India herself i s surrounded by h o s t i l e na t ions . Pakistan 
being the most potent enemy acquiring, or very close to 
nuclear capab i l i ty . In t h i s scenario what h.as been I n d i a ' s 
pos i t ion and stance i s also mentioned in the conclusion. 
At the end of th i s t hes i s , I have included some selected 
appendices, containing t r e a t i e s and agreements important from 
the point of view of global disarmament e f fo r t s . I t does not 
mean tha t other t r e a t i e s , not included in the appendices, are 
less important or are of l i t t l e s igni f icance . But, for lack of 
space due to my intent ion to keep the thes i s from turning too 
bul}<y , I have not included some disarmament measures. The 
1967 Treaty Governing Act iv i t i es of S ta tes and Use of Outer 
Space including Moon and Other Ce le s t i a l Bodies; Treaty for the 
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rrohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed in 
the same year, are of equal importance, but could not "pe 
included for the same reasons. The text of these treaties 
is available in the UN Publications on the subject. 
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v.'ithout the most sincere, readily available, friendly awu 
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C H A P T E R - I 
DISARMAI^ENT AND ARF^ C0N1P0L: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
Hvuaansdiscovered one o£ the nature 's roost awesome 
and powerful s e c r e t s - atomic energy - and force and 
v io lence soon fol lowed as atomic power was immediately 
put to work as an agent of death and destrt ict ion. Since 
then, our nuclear knowledge has tortured us with the 
omnipresent threat of nuclear war and doomed the e n t i r e 
human race to c o e x i s t with weapons powerful enough to 
destroy whole c i t i e s in a matter of minutes. 
Human beings have always depended on the use of 
physical coercion or threat* to inf luence the behaviour 
of other groups. The s i z e of these gro\;5)s have large ly 
depended on the des truct iveness of the t o o l s possessed 
by these groi¥>s. Slowly, but gradually, in t h i s century, 
the contro l l ing group has come to be c a l l e d as nation 
s t a t e and posses s the too l s l i k e , nuclear arms, m i s s i l e s 
of a l l types and chemical weapons, Ihe contro l l ing 
groups are now preparing themselves to engage in wars 
in the outer space* Another ancient phenomena which 
continues even now, i s that , there has always been 
e f f o r t s to reduce or e l iminate these armaments. 
1. Christopher J . Lamb, How To Ihink About Arms Control 
Disarmament And Defense, Prentice Hall , New Jersey , 
1988, p . 2. 
Why Nations Artti 
The s i z e and capab i l i ty of armed forces has always 
been the symbol of national power and independence. 
Secondly, the armed forces are a l so used by the government 
to maintain internal peace and order. Thirdly, i t provides 
huge potent ia l for uneitployed youth to be absorbed in l e g a l 
employment. Another incent ive to arm i s the considerat ion 
by the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e of a nation to be able to pursue 
i t s i n t e r e s t s in the internat ional community. I t i s not 
always the actual use of arms but the threat to use them 
that makes p o l i t i c a l leaders to continue to increase armed 
Capabi l i ty . Ihe threat to use coercive capabi l i ty i s 
considered as a tool to bargain in internat ional diplomacy. 
Last ly , armed forces are a l so used to carry out miss ions 
and commitments of internat ional organisat ions l i k e the 
League or the UNO or s inply to occupy and control a 
defeated s t a t e . 
Why Nations Disarm; 
^ e r e i s a sharp d i f ference in a n a t i o n ' s armed 
forces during peace and war time. 2he number of armed 
forces usual ly depend on the number of armed forces of 
the enemy, -niere i s a l i t t l e chance for a nation J ^ • 
to arm unless Its enemy has also done so or la likely to 
do so. The idea of keeping the nations armed forces to 
the bare minimum finds impetus by two internal considera-
tions. First, joining the army voluntarily is never very 
popular, especially during peace time and secondly, the 
research and development of military weapons is usually 
quite high, v*iich needs huge amounts of money to be raised 
through taxes levied on the public resulting in resentment 
for the government. If it is acquired from outside under 
military aid program, the price is laid by some inroads 
into the nations' sovereignty. 
It is under these two tendencies that nations arm 
or disarm. Ihere are possibilities that nations vAiich are 
at war or are on the verge of outbreak of war may start 
considering the idea of reduction of arms or nations 
which are traditionally or for quite sometime in the 
phase of absolute peace may start arming themselves. 
Both the tendencies depend on the pressxjre ^plied by 
the two alternatives. 
The cost and danger of an arms race, or the actual 
consequences of one, usually produce the incentives for 
disarmament. If we bear in mind the contrasting economic. 
p o l i t i c a l and mi l i tary consideration at work, i t becomes 
evident that an arms race i s a h ighly rec iprocal s o c i a l 
process , involving in teract ion not only between tiie 
governments of the nations involved but a l s o c o n f l i c t i n g 
fac t ions within and across the national boundaries. In 
the absence of e f f e c t i v e internat ional government, nat ions 
have no real source of securi ty other than their own power. 
In seeking to maximise such powers v i s - a - v i s others that 
might threaten the ir secur i ty , nat ions conpete with one 
another for p r e s t i ^ , markets, raw mater ia ls , water-ways, 
t e r r i t o r y , a l l i e s , and spheres of in f luence . The 
pursui t of such goals by one nation i s often detrimental 
to the i n t e r e s t s of another, which can r e s i s t by using 
various diplomatic^ economic and psychological techniques. 
Most often these c lashes of i n t e r e s t s are temporarily 
resolved by t a c i t or negotiated conproraise, but occas iona l ly 
both p a r t i e s commit themselves to goals that are c l e a r l y 
incompatible and not suscept ib le to such se t t l ement , ^ e 
goal seems important enough to one t o j u s t i f y an 
abnormal a l l o c a t i o n of i t s resources , or mi l i tary 
c a p a b i l i t i e s , and thwarting that e f f o r t seems equal ly 
important to the other . At t h i s point the normal l e v e l 
of internat ional competition i s exceeded, and one or both 
p a r t i e s try to improve their bargaining p o s i t i o n by 
seeking temporary a l l i e s , or by some combination of the 
two. Once e i ther party does t h i s , the other must e i ther 
make ser ious concessions or try to counteract by increa-
sing i t s own bargaining power. As each inves t s further 
in i t s own strength, i t s dec is ion makers f e e l j u s t i f i e d 
in increasing tlieir demands, making the c o s t of capitxila-
t ion that much higher for the o ther . If that c o s t then 
seems prohib i t ive , i t s dec i s ion makers must improve the ir 
Capacity to r e s i s t or to win. 
This e f f o r t for increase in n a t i o n ' s power through 
armament needs to be supported by the c i t i z e n s . Public 
has to be mobilized to r a i s e the money^ material and human 
resources for sudi a program and a f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y 
( in the absence of s u f f i c i e n t armament) has to be inculcated 
in to the minds of the p u b l i c . The hopes and asp irat ions 
of the people , both the public and the poXlt ica l opposi t ion, 
i s ra ised to such a he ight that i t becomes extremely 
d i f f i c u l t for the government to undo i t s programme. In 
the event of such pressures from external and Internal 
forces becoming exceedingly tough to negot ia te the 
atmosphere i s wri t large with c r i e s for war. Over the 
centur ies , i t has been found that most of the arms races 
1, David L. S l l l i s , Ed, Internat ional Encyclopaedia of 
of Soc ia l Sciences , v o l , 4 , The Macmlllan Co, ^ Free 
Press , New York, 1968, p , 193. 
and the quest of man to subdue others takes this pattern. 
It stillholds good in modern arms races. 
CONCEPT OF DISARMAMENT; 
The words disarmament and arms control have been 
used interchangeably. The UK charter also talks more of 
regulation or limitation of armaments. Article 47 of the 
UN Charter creates even more confusion when it says 
"There shall be established a military staff committee to 
advise and assist the security council on all questions 
relating to the regulations, of armament and 'possible* 
disarmament. 
Disarmament is commonly used as a synonym to 
reduction of armament. Nevertheless, international efforts 
to achieve general voluntary reduction or limitations of 
national armaments have fallen short of their objectives. 
Success rate in these efforts have been very low, though 
partial and local disarmaments have resulted in some 
cases. This also is due to two forces, one, by bilateral 
agreements and two, as a result of compulsory disarmament 
imposed from time to time upon a defeated power as a 
sequel to conquest or as a condition of peace terms. 
1. Basic facts about the United Nations, United Nations 
Publication, New York, 1975, p. 26, 
"The words of the wise heard in quiet are better 
than the shouting of a ruler among fools. Wisdom is better 
than weapons of war, but one sinner destroys much good". 
One writer calls the search of absolute security 
2 
as "disarmament by extermination". 
Some element of trust is necessary among rival 
groups of nations to go to the negotiating table. Absolute 
security strategy rests on strong militarism and pacifism. 
On the other hand< limited security strategy accomodates 
some degree of trust. "The level of trust assumed by 
limited security strategies ranges from the minimum trust 
assumed in supposing the enemy is rational enough to be 
deterred by sufficient defense preparations, to the 
greater amounts of trust required by various types, 
3 
of negotiated arms control and disarmement agreements". 
There are two kinds of possibilities in these 
negotiated agreements. In the first, some countries are 
trusted by a rival more than others. Like the USA has 
less reason to trust USSR with the result that its forces 
1. Oiristopher J. Lamb, op. cit., p. 8. 
2. Henry Forbes, The Strategy of Disarmament, Washington, 
D . C Public Affairs Press, 1962, p. 4. 
3. Christopher J, Lamb, op.cit., p. 10. 
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are facing USSRs in a large number in Eiarope. The USA 
does not have to defend i t s f r o n t i e r s with Mexico or 
Canada, the countr ies i t t rus t s more. 
In the second, the countr ies which seem untrust-
worthy a l so have some l e v e l of trustworthiness . Unless 
there i s some degree of t rus t between even absolute 
r i v a l s , there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of going to ttie negot ia -
t ing t a b l e . I t must be c lear in the minds of both the 
p a r t i e s that the other i s entering negot ia t ions in good 
f a i t h and not for gaining un i la t era l advantage on ly . 
A dialogue between c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s always i s 
fraught with the fear that the other party might gain 
some advantage by the agreement. Even af ter an agreement 
through dialogue, i t i s not always s t r i c t l y adhered t o . 
So, degrees of t r u s t and risk are always foxuid in a 
negot iated agreement. All negot ia t ions have a degree 
of r isk involved but they are s t i l l pursued for the 
sake of peace or in other words, i t may be more dangerous 
not t o negot ia te than n e g o t i a t e . Negot iat ions are entered 
i n t o for the simple reason that they might lead to peace. 
Absolute secur i ty s t r a t e g i e s l i k e mi l i tar i sm and 
paci f i sm assume that e i ther no t rus t or absolute t rus t 
i s p o s s i b l e between nat ions while l imi ted secur i ty 
s trategy opine that some degree of t r u s t i s p o s s i b l e 
and a l s o i s a must for peace and secxiri ty . 
Most disarmament and arms control agreements are 
based on th i s opinion and hence are l imi ted secur i ty 
s t r a t e g i e s . A new dimension has come in th i s question 
of l imited or absolute secur i ty s trategy due to the 
r i s e of nuclear energy and a l l i t s connected r i s k s . 
The best exanple of the b i l a t e r a l agreement i s the 
Rush-Bagot Agreement of April 8, 1817, in which Great 
Britain and the United States l imited the naval armament 
on the Great lakes to three v e s s e l s for each power. As 
i s ev ident from the h i s t o r y of armaments in these two 
countr ies , nei ther of them stuck to the treaty , par t ly 
due to non-revis ion of the agreement, though, the Rush-
Bagot agreement prevented the construction of large and 
h o s t i l e f l e e t s on the Great Lakes. One reason at tr ibuted 
for the success of Hiis agreement has been tJiat the two 
countr ies had no ser ious c o n f l i c t during the per iod . Ohe 
agreement ind ica te s one s ing le f a c t that disarmament 
and e f f e c t i v e machinery must go hand in hand. 
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A large number of agreements have been concluded 
which have provided for the razing of f o r t i f i c a t i o n s on 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y located t e r r i t o r y . For exanple, the Peace 
of Utrecht of April 11, 1713 (Art IX) provided that the 
king of Prance should demolish the f o r t s of Dunkirk. 
Disarmament - And i t s Kinds: 
I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to give a firm d e f i n i t i o n 
of disarmament as i t tends to take too many forms. An 
attenpt, however, can wel l be made to ^classify i t in to 
two broad categories» (1) Degree of arms reduction, 
(2) Others jo in ing in at such attempts. Ihe f i r s t r e s u l t s 
in the quantity and qual i ty of arms reduction by a 
part icu lar country and the second category w i l l include 
the r e c i p r o c i t y of such measvures by other nat ions . 
Degree of Arms Reduction: 
The degree of disarmament continuumis not, in 
fac t , l imited to disarmament measures in the l i t e r a l sense . 
In accord with diplomatic custom and scholar ly usage, we 
include arms control as well as a number of intermediate 
r e s t r a i n t s that f a l l well short of reduct ion. 
1. Ib id . 
2. Ib id . 
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Complete Disarmament: 
The h ighes t point of the degree i s complete 
disarmament where nation keeps what i s absolute ly e s s e n t i a l 
for i t s internal peace and order. Reduction of armed forces 
and equipment to the degree of e l iminat ion i s what i s 
supposed to be t o t a l disarmament. Total disarmament 
w i l l not mean absence of a l l weapons and personnel but 
the motive should be only for the maintenance of law 
and order within the country. I t means complete t r u s t 
in other nations or even ers twhi le r i v a l s to the l e v e l 
of cotiplete obsolescence for arms race . 
The proposals for complete disarmament have been 
too many but had very l i t t l e e f f e c t on the concerned 
nat ions . I t has been p o s s i b l e , temporarily, on few 
occasions in the case of some defeated nat ions . At 
the other end of the sca le of such a degree stands 
the Arms Control measvires. These measures do not aim 
at reduction of any weapons but r e s t r i c t s a s t a t e from 
acquiring f u l l development of a weapon system. Arms 
control measures do not d i r e c t l y prohibi t the production 
or possess ion of that weapon type but rather seek 
to work i n d i r e c t l y by l imi ta t ions or p r o h i b i t i o n s on 
12 
the -testing,deployment, or use of I t . Though t h i s l<ind 
of disarmament i s c r i t i c i s e d on the groiinds that once 
weapons are made and deployed, any commitment not to use 
them i s . un l ike ly to survive even the mi ldest temptation 
after h o s t i l i t i e s begin. 
Another kind of disarmament i s known as p a r t i a l 
disarmament. They may cover, ( l ) incomplete reduction 
in a l l ca tegor ies of weapons, (2) conplete reduction in 
some ca tegor ie s , (3) some combination of the two. In the 
case of incoiqplete reduction, i t i s general ly negot iated 
cuts or l i m i t s based on a budgetary or manpower c e i l i n g , 
to compel other nat ions to keep armaments down. Normally, 
the plan i s to permit each nation to a l l o c a t e i t s 
mi l i tary resources within the budgetary r e s t r i c t i o n s , 
to which ever weapon types i t sees f i t . The negot ia t ions 
are based usual ly on r a t i o s of the budgets in preceding 
per iods to preserve the ir previous r e l a t i v e s trength. 
Par t ia l> Disarmament; 
Another type i s par t ia l reduction in which complete 
prohib i t ion , in a few categor ies i s put . S ignator ies are 
allowed to arm in those categor ies which are not contro l led 
1. Ib id . 
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by the partial reduction. This kind of disarmament is also 
called qualitative disarmament. This can be imposed, 
unilaterally or negotiated, to: ^  (1) avoid expenditure on 
expensive weaponry, (2) destroy weapons with vast fire 
and destructive power, (3) less number of arms, (4) maXe 
aggression unattractive by maKe defence in comparison to 
offence attractive, and (5) condensate for the asymmetries 
arising out of the different geographical or technological 
security needs of particular nations. 
All of the above considerations have been explicitly 
noted either in formal proposals or in actual agreements. 
Qualitative measures might include the prohibition, 
elimination, or putting a limit on motOrised artillery, 
certain calibre of rifles, , but Lets above a certain 
weight, railroads within a certain distance of a border, 
ships of more than a certain length or tonnage, ships 
with qualities of submerging, armour plates of a given 
thickness, bomber aircrafts, chemical weapons, nuclear 
weapons mounted on satellites and also certain categories 
of trained soldiers. All these measures belong to 
disarmament. 
1, David J. Singer, Deterranee. Arms Control and 
Disarmament, Columbus, Ohio Univ. Press, 1962, p,200. 
2. Ibid. 
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Reciprocal Dlsarroaioent; 
3he basic question regarding r e c i p r o c i t y I s whether 
a nation disarms u n i l a t e r a l l y and uncondit ional ly or gets 
or expects s imilar behaviour from other nations as a 
precondit ion of disarming I t s e l f . 
Uni lateral Disarmament; 
One kind of disarmament i s when a nation e l iminates 
i t s armaments and demobilizes i t s mi l i tary personnel wihout 
any expectat ion or a precondit ion of a s imi lar behaviour 
from i t s r i v a l s . Such a u n i l a t e r a l move by the government 
of a nation may be based on the b e l i e f that* ( l ) i t 
considers immoral to maintain, use or threat of armed 
forces^ 
(11) they can not afford tiie establishment of a powerful 
army, 
( i l l ) public opinion favours such a move, 
(Iv) there I s / p o s s l b l l l t y of war in near future , 
(v) diplomacy i s very success fu l and does not require 
such a move, 
(v l ) p r e s t i g e , wealth or s k i l l become strong t o o l s of 
Influence, 
( v l l ) other nations have already done i t vml later a l l y . 
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( v i i i ) Oto provide an opportunity to other nations to 
follow s u i t . 
(Ix) There Is no exploitation poss ib i l i ty , after they 
disarm, by other nations. 
(x) Presence of third parties to intervene if any nation 
tr ies to exploit the new s i tuat ion. 
(xl) Surity of being defended by others in case of an 
attack. 
(x l l ) Other measures, such as, non violence and non-
cooperation considered as more effect ive tools of 
defence. 
There can be any number of reasons why a nation 
may disarm unilaterally* 
Multilateral or Bilateral Disarmament! 
By formal negotiations nations could come together 
b i lateral ly or multi laterally to disarm. In such a case 
there i s a clear cut give and take situation vrtien there 
are corresponding cuts in armaments among the s ignatories . 
The most Important thing in such situations i s that 
re lat ive military strength v i s -a -v i s other nations i s 
kept Intact. Negotiating parties in such situations are 
usually of almost equal strength and may have some 
standing conf l ic ts and almost surely there la a lack of 
16 
t rus t between them. In these negot ia t ions p a r t i e s are 
usual ly very tough and r i g i d in the ir stand and hence 
negot ia t ions are d i f f i c u l t and conplex. Ihe agreement, 
i f i t i s reached/ i s normally very d e t a i l e d . 
There i s another kind of disarmament, which may 
be termed as ' forced disarmament*. Although i t i s an out> 
come of formal negot ia t ions but i s usual ly between 
nations of unequal strength, may be temporary. The extreme 
form of t h i s type Of disarmament i s the one accepted by 
a defeated nation fol lowing the defeat In a war. The best 
example i s the disarmament of Axis powers after the 
World War I I . I t i s a form of d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . 
Some examples of these types of disarmament 
agreements may be found in, the Treaty of PariS/ February 
10, 1763, in which Great Britain ceded the i s l ands of 
S t . Pierre and Miquelon to France on condit ion that they 
should not be f o r t i f i e d and allowed a guard of f i f t y 
men to perform only p o l i c e funct ions . By the a r t i c l e s 
of same treaty . Great Britain a l so agreed to demolish 
the f o r t s b u i l t by i t s subjects on Spanish t e r r i t o r y 
in the Gulf of Hondviras. German f o r t i f i c a t i o n s in 
cer ta in regions of the Ba l t i c and of a l l f o r t i f i c a t i o n s 
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within f i f t y ki lometers e a s t of the Rhine were prohibited 
by the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , F o r t i f i c a t i o n s and bases 
in certa in possess ions of the USA, Great *iritain and 
Japan in the Paci f ic were prohibi ted by a r t i c l e 19 of 
the Naval Treaty of February 2, 1922 at the Washington 
Conference. Both the shores of the Dardanelles and Bosporus 
except for Constantinople, were demi l i tar ized by the 
S t r a i t s convention of 1923. The A l l i e d Powers agreed to 
protect , "by a l l the means", that the League Coioncil 
may decide for t h i s purpose", ^ Turkey, i f any power had 
in ten t ions against i t . 
One of the e a r l i e s t exanples of conpulsory d i s a r -
mament was the one that was forced on Carthage by Rome 
a t the end of Second Punic War. Under the prov is ions 
of the treaty Carthage had to surrender her war v e s s e l s 
and a l l her e lephants . More recent example of t h i s type 
of disarmament i s the famour A r t i c l e s Separes, concluded 
during the Nepoleonic wars. Prince William of Prussia , af ter 
h i s defeat by Nepoleon, signed in Paris in Sept . 1808 
1. Raymond L e s l i e Buel, Internat ional Re lat ions , 2nd ed. 
New York, p . 294. 
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an agreement which required the reduction of h i s army 
to 4 2000 men for a period of ten years . The a l l i e d powers 
imposed d r a s t i c disarmament prov i s ions , at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919/ upon the defeated .powers, Ihere were 
prohib i t ions imposed on Germany on the number of army 
personnel, ca l ibre of guns. Howitzers, number of b a t t l e -
ships and mi l i tary a i r c r a f t . Similar prov is ions were 
imposed on Austria, Hungary and Bulgria. 
Most of the important powers have esqpressed the ir 
w i l l ingnes s to disarm but only on condit ion that their 
neighbours do the same t e s t they be attached by a 
superior f o r c e . This argument may have some v a l i d i t y 
with regard to two super powers but i t cannot be the 
same with a small nation l ike Belgium or Denmark to 
develop as powerful as the ir neighbovirs. Another view 
may be that such small powers should not try to arm 
themselves and should depend on p o l i t i c a l guarantees by 
International organisat ion, whereby they can show their 
earnest desire for peace. The same argument was responsible 
for passing of the b i l l which provided for near conplete 
disarmament by the lower house of Danish Parliament in 
1926.^ 
1. Wheeler and Bennet, Information on the Reduction of 
Armaments, London, 1925, p . 191. 
2. Ib id . 
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•Opponents argued, however, that even though 
Denmark could not maintain an army as powerful as that 
of r ich neighbours, neverthe less at times of invasion an 
in fer ior force would be better than no force a t a l l . 
Moreover, cer ta in foreign commentators declared that as 
a member of the League Denmark was bound to a s s i s t in 
the carrying out of a r t i c l e s x and xvi of the Covenant 
and therefore should not reduce her armaments except in 
connection with a general in ternat ional reduct ion. These 
l a t t e r arguments prevented the passage of the b i l l by the 
Danish senate . Nevertheless , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to specu-
l a t e as to v*iether or not in timesof war the population 
of a coxintry as small as Denmark woxald not be bet ter 
off i f i t made no mi l i tary re s i s tance to an invader 
but merely fol lowed a p o l i c y of pass ive non-res is tance 
s imilar to that applied by Gandhi and h i s fo l lowers against 
Br i t i sh rule in India".^ 
"If and when nations disarm, therefore, they need 
to arrange in a cautious and gradual manner, both the 
diminution of their own c a p a b i l i t i e s and the accret ion 
of the internat ional organ i sa t ion ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s " . 
1. Wheeler and Bennet, o p . c l t . , p . 195. 
2. David J . Singer, o p . c l t . , p . 200. 
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There may be l e s s radical paths to disarmament, 
but they are unliXely to be i r r e v e r s i b l e ones . H i s t o r i c a l l y / 
nothing approximating global disarmament has been success -
f u l l y negotiated, and the more r e s t r i c t e d attempts have 
tended to be shortllv»ed. With no a l t e r n a t i v e means of 
s e l f - p r o t e c t i o n and c o n f l i c t r e so lu t ion , the nat ions 
have c o n s i s t e n t l y returned to armament, regardless of 
the ir peaceful i n t e n t i o n s . 
D i s t i n c t i o n Between Arms Control and Disarmament; 
Hie reason why 'arms contro l ' and 'disarmament' 
are of ten used interchangeably i s that there are more 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between them, than d i f f e r e n c e s . Ihe major 
d i f ference between the two i s that disarmament f i x e s 
for i t s e l f a greater goal than arms control but at the 
same time hoth seek to reduce the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of war. 
Disarmament aims at reducing the number of weapons as 
an attempt to minimise the chances of war, v^ereas arms 
control aims to maintain s ta tus quo in the mi l i tary 
conpet i t ion between nat ions , and t r i e s to reduce fear 
of each other. Moreover, disarmament and arms control 
a l so attenpt to reduce mi l i tary budgets and the c o s t 
of war, i f i t occurs . The d i s t i n c t i o n between the two 
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i s very well broughtcnit ^y James E. Dougherty, "the term 
'arms control* in contrast to 'disarmament' (which has 
as i t s goal the e l iminat ion or reduction of armaments)^ 
re fers to a broad range of p o l i c i e s which presupposes the 
continued ex i s t ence of nat ional mi l i tary establishments 
and other p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y organisat ions (such as 
revolutionary g u e r r i l l a movements). Arms control p o l i c i e s 
usual ly aim at some kind of r e s t r a i n t or regulat ion in 
q u a l i t a t i v e design, q u a l i t a t i v e production, deployment, 
protec t ion control , transfer , and planned, threatened, 
or actual use of arms for p o l i t i c a l - s t r a t e g i c purposes. 
Advocates of arms control assume that a general and complete 
disarmament (GCD) for a number of coraplex reasons . . . l i e s 
beyond the world's reach, at l e a s t under present 
condi t ions . 
When one ta lks of disarmament and arms control 
and the d i f ference between the t w o , i t i s d i f f i c u l t but 
important to concentrate on human nature or on technology. 
In other words, whether technology or the human nature i s 
the cause of wars and ^ny talk of disarmament should be 
based on moral or material aspect of i t . 
1. James E. Dougherty, How to Think Arms Control and 
Disarmament, Crane, Russak, and Co*, New York, pp.29-30, 
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Genghis Khan, who i s supposed to be one of the most 
notorious and gruesome ru le r i s said to have k i l l e d about 
18 mill ion people in China alone and razed to the ground 
a moslera c i v i l i z a t i o n in Central and South-east Asia. 
"The (Khan's) sack of Bokara served as a f i r s t 
object lesson. The few who survived t h a t horror bore 
t a l e s of infamies which made death seem a reward. As a 
climax of terrorism, the great c i ty was burned to the 
ground, with the loss of a p r i c e l e s s her i tage of Islamic 
a r t and manuscripts. Even the outstanding gardens of 
apr icots , cher r ies , melons, roses , and poppies were l a id 
waste leaving the s i t e a wilderness" .^ 
Ihe physical e f fec ts (of Genghis Khan's campaigns) 
l e f t permanent s ca r s . Today, only an ar id region and a 
few du l l provincia l towns survive from a f lour ishing 
c i v i l i z a t i o n which once supported several c i t i e s 
2 
claiming a mill ion people each. 
Genghis Khan calmly said t ha t h is own safety 
depended on such mass k i l l i n g : "The vanquished can never 
be the fr iends of the v i c t o r s ; the death of the former 
1, Christopher J , Lamb, op. cit,, p . 5 . 
2, Lum Montross, War through Ages, Harper & Row, 
New York, 1960, p . 145. 
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i s necessary therefore for the safety of the l a t t e r " . 
In h i s opinion, t o t a l destruct ion was necessary for the 
safety of the aggressor.He seems to be the only ru le r 
who does not claim h i s act ions as react ions to the 
aggressor. He accepts that he i n i t i a t e d war on many 
occasions . Even Temur, the lame, famous for h is co l lec t ions 
of human sku l l s in pyramids and columns to show to h i s 
next victims and to claim surrender by them, always 
j u s t i f i e d h i s barbarism and k i l l i n g s of mil l ions of 
pr i soners (for co l lec t ion of skul l s ) as a measure in 
self defense. So, the t o t a l des t ruc t ion acted as a , 
in some people ' s opinion, kind of de te r ren t even 
at tha t t ime. On Dec. 12, 1398, after hundred years of 
Genghis Khan, Temur the lame sa t a t the gates of Delhi 
watching the butchery of 1,00,000 humans and claiming, 
"I am not a man of blood, and God i s my witness t ha t 
in a l l my wars I have never been the aggressor and my 
enemies have always been the authors of their own 
2 
calamity". 
Ihough, such behaviour cannot be Jus t i f i ed in any 
case, these vicious r u l e r s were ac tual ly following a 
1. Ib id . 
2. Edward Githon, The Decline and Fall of Roman Empire, 
cited in Hans J, Mongethau, Politics Among Nations, 
New York,p. 249. 
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r a t iona l policy of deterence, woses passed th i s e d i c t to 
I s r a e l i t e s . "When you draw near a c i t y to f igh t against 
i t , offer terms of peace to i t . And if i t s answer to 
you i s peace and i t opens to you, then a l l the people 
who are found in i t shall do forced labour for you and 
shal l serve you. But if i t makes war against you, then 
youshall beseige i t ; and when the Lord yourGod gives i t 
into your hand you sha l l put i t s males to the sword, 
but the women and the l i t t l e ones, the c a t t l e and every-
thing e l se in the c i t y , a l l i t s spo i l s , you sha l l take 
as booty for y o u r s e l v e s , , , , 
" . , , 'highly c ivi l ized* soc ie t i e s as diverse as 
Periclean Athens (400 B,C) and modern Germany (both 
considered the most refined cu l tu ra l centres of the i r 
tiroes) have deemed the extermination of whole c i t i e s , 
even whole nations, both j u s t i f i a b l e and necessary for 
their s ecur i ty . I t would also be a mistake to think 
tha t the quest for absolute secur i ty i s necessar i ly a 
r e l i c from our unelightened past , or to assume tha t a 
preference for peace i s deeply entrenched in contenporary 
soc ie ty . Previous generations have made the mistake 
of an overly sanguine assessment of mankind's prospects 
2 for peace". 
1, Denteronomy 20, cited in Leon Friedman, ed. The Law of 
Wart A Docximentarv History, Rar.don House, New York, 
1972, p, 4. 
2. Christopher J. Lamb, op.cit., p. 6. 
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Arms control has been defined by Ihomas Schell lng, 
who i s considered to be an author i ty on the subject by 
including in Arms Control, a l l kinds of m i l i t a r y cooper-
ation between prospective foes for reducing chances of 
war, i t s des t ruc t ive and comprehensive nature and the 
pr ice payable for i t , p o l i t i c a l l y and economically. The 
main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of arms control i s the i d e n t i t i c a t i o n 
of common i n t e r e s t between two prospect ive enemies with 
regard to reciprocat ion and cooperation and the i r 
mi l i t a ry establ ishments . 
Hedley Bull says, "arms control in i t s broadest 
sense, comprises a l l those ac ts of mi l i t a ry pol icy in 
which antagonist ic s t a t e s cooperate in the pu r su i t of 
common purposes even while they are struggling in the 
pursu i t of conf l ic t ing o n e s . . . . I t i s a restrairit, i n t e r -
na t iona l ly exercised on armaments pol icy, whether in 
respec t of the level of armaments, tiieir character , 
development or use . 
2 Ken Booth includes in i t s scope 'any measure 
l ike ly to deter war, i f there i s any , make i t less 
1. Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order", Inter-
nat ional Security, Summer 1976, p . XIV, 
2. Ken Booth, o p . c i t . , p . 102. 
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and 
d e s t r u c t i v e / t o cut down expenses on i t . Arms control 
focusses on the f a c t that armaments generate war hence 
should be c o n t r o l l e d . I t puts r e s t r i c t i o n s on nat ions 
and their mi l i t ary programmes, advancement of technology 
used for development of weapons, their uncontrolled 
production, use, lending, actual deployment, threat or 
use ofarms for p o l i t i c a l or s t r a t e g i c ga ins . 
Ihus, major thrust in arms control i s not on 
quantity of arms but contro l s on their use . I t aims at 
ensxiring s t a b i l i t y in the disturbed or p o t e n t i a l l y 
disturbed area. 
Arms control measures do not n e c e s s a r i l y have 
e f f e c t s on quantity or qual i ty of a n a t i o n ' s mi l i tary 
might. Ihese measures, usual ly , aim to ge t information 
about mi l i tary c a p a b i l i t y rather than capabi l i ty i t s e l f . 
Iheir primary aim i s to g e t more information than i s 
supplied by other i n t e l l i g e n c e channels. For example, 
the USA and the USSR es tab l i shed a d i r e c t cormnunication 
link between their two c a p i t a l s in 1963 to g e t r e l i a b l e 
Information during a c r i s e s , so that accidental war, 
due to misreading of iladar or son«r d isp lays , may be 
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avoided. The intention behind all such type of measures 
is to reduce the likeluhood of war by reducing the chances 
of offence by the rival. The objective is to preserve the 
relative military 'Status ijuo*. 
Neutralization may he called another form of arms 
control. This does not mean that a neutralized state or 
region is debarred from acquiring or diploying armed forces 
but is kept out of a military alliance. Such a territory 
is either out of the area of influence of rival parties 
or their interests clash in the region. Such an arramgement 
require either negotiated or implied agreement between 
the two concerned powers. "Although the enforcement of 
neutralization may be assigned to an international 
organisation or an adhoc multinational commission, its 
continuance depends on the major powers' willingness to 
merely deny the region to the other rather than acquire 
it for themselves." 
There are some generally accepted methods to 
ensure compliance to disarmament negotiations. 
Inspection; 
Disarmament negotiations generally take place 
in an atmosphere of mistrust and fear, therefore, it is 
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also qui te natural t h a t compliance i s a lso suspected, i f 
agreements are reached, a t a l l . Unless tiiere are some 
assiirances that o thers are also doing the same, i t i s 
qu i te foolish to expect a nation to weaken i t s secur i ty 
by reducing or l imit ing arms. 
"Such inspection may be carr ied out by other 
s igna to r i e s , by ad hoc in t e rna t iona l commissions, or 
by in te rna t iona l organisa t ions , and the objects of such 
inspection may oe oudgets, war plans, t ra in ing f a c i l i t i e s , 
weapon i n s t a l l a t i o n s , f ac to r i e s , t ranspor t jxinctions, 
or e n t i r e regions, depending upon the a c t i v i t i e s 
prescribed by the agreement". ... 1 
Often, the hitch in reductions is the agreement 
on the schedule of phases. Another hurdle may be the 
phasing of the inspection schedule also. The method, 
type and stages of inspection becomes a point o£ failure 
"In order of increasing intrusiveness, inspection 
may focus upon (a) the destruction or dismantling process 
1. Henkin Luis, Arms Control and Inspection in American 
Law, Columbia Univ. Press, N.Y., 1958, p. 158. 
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to ensure tha t the reduction schedule i s being followed, 
(b) t e s t or production f a c i l i t i e s to i n h i o i t or prevent 
the acquis i t ion of a weapon type; or (c) present 
inventor ies (or a sample thereof) to ensure tha t a given 
ce i l ing has not been exceeded. 
Enforcement and pro tec t ion : 
A major problem confronting disarmament agreements 
i s to find ways and means to deal with suspected or ver i f ied 
evasions. One opinion i s to look out for ways to punish 
the gu i l ty and the other opinion suggests u n i l t e r a l 
abrogation. Both the opinions are l ike ly to remain on 
paper only as to punish the gu i l ty there i s no such a 
powerful in te rna t iona l body to execute i t and the other 
a l t e rna t i ve also seems unfeasible . All arms reduction 
or l imi ta t ion agreements may crea te suspicions, r ea l or 
fa l se , may be accidental , and need to oe tackled 
appropriate ly . The purpose of inspection i s to crea te 
confidence among adversar ies . Real evasions or supectea 
evasions cal l for more s t r ingent inspect ions, not 
renewed arms race, or severe punishment, as i t can be 
an accidental or unintent ional evasion. 
1. Ib id . 
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"When such a s i tua t ion develops, of course, the 
s igna tor ies are at a c r i t i c a l turning point , the outcome 
of which wil l depend on the in ten t ions and fears of the 
respec t ive decision makers, the distance already 
t r ave l l ed toward fulfilment of the agreement and the 
s trength of the in te rna t iona l i n s t i t u t i o n s es tabl ished 
in conjunction with the arms arrangements, 
can and should we r e s t r i c t technology? 
Technological progress can both hinder and f a c i l i -
t a t e arms l imita t ion negot ia t ions . For example, the develop-
ment of reconnaissance s a t e l l i t e s and more accurate 
seismic recording devices have made monitoring arras control 
agreements eas i e r . l4oreover, e lec t ronic lAcks (called 
permissive action l inks) , which make i t impossible for 
one person alone to f i r e a nuclear weapon, have reduced 
the chances of accidental nuclear war. An example of 
hindrance created by new technology i s the more advanced, 
smaller, highly mobile nuclear del ivery systems such as 
c ru ise miss i les tha t are d i f f i c u l t to monitor and so 
are a i t r i c u l t to oe included in arms l imi ta t ion 
agreements. Another school thinks otherwise as they 
1. David J , Singer, o p , c i t . , p . 200, 
2, Ihe Los Angeles Times, Feb. 18, 1986, 
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argue that a l l technologies are not hindrances to arms 
contro l . I t i s to be seen s i g n i f i c a n t l y and to ident i fy 
as to which technologies are bene f i c ia l and ought to oe 
developed and which are counter productive and ought to 
be contro l l ed . 
CJiristopher J . Lamb suggests three s tages where 
those technologies , which prove to be counter productive 
ought to be l imi ted , Ihe t i r s t i s the R & D stage* 
second i s the t e s t i n g stage and the third, production 
s tage . He further adds that the f i r s t stage i s the best 
for putt ing contro l s . I t i s sa id that the Manhattan 
projec t i n i t i a l l y s tarted on the assunption that Nazi 
Germany was wel l ahead in the development of atomic 
bomcts, out after her defeat i t was revealed that i t 
was not even c l o s e to i t . Even then no one had questioned 
the US e f f o r t s and u l t imate ly the bomb was used on Japan, 
There i s a wide renunciation in US for the space based 
m i s s i l e defence pro jec t and many want i t to be abondoned 
in the development s tage but US government says that i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to monitor and control research and that 
i s v*iy tiiey are going ahead with t h i s to keep pace with 
researches in the UusR. 
1. .Christopher J . Lamb, o p . c i t . . p . 27. 
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Ihese are a few examples v^ich prove^ to a ce r ta in 
extent , tha t if not inpossible, t h i s s tage i s the most 
d i f f i c u l t a t vjhich to control technology. 
The second stage i s a lso important where t e s t i ng 
should be banned so tha t c a p a b i l i t i e s of a new technology 
i s not known and wi l l make i t d i f f i c u l t for the user to 
deploy i t . I t i s also easier to monitor a new t e s t with 
modern devices. The debate on t o t a l t e s t ban t r ea ty keeps 
t h i s approach in mind to deny the power a new technology 
and without a t e s t the technology i s rendered unre l i ab le . 
Although some weapons requi re very l i t t l e or no t e s t ing 
but negot ia tors for arms control can s t i l l negot ia te 
effect ively if they determine that a new weapon would be 
des t ab i l i z ing and agree to p roh ib i t i t and further decide 
tha t i t could not be b u i l t and deployed sa te ly without 
be 
extensive t e s t i n g . If tes t ing could/monitored, then 
r e s t r i c t i n g t e s t i ng could offer the best solution to 
preventing the introduction or new weapon technology. 
Res t r ic t ions could s t i l l be placed at the 
production stage even if the tendency i s to deploy 
weapon tested enough, the v i a b i l i t y to verify production 
and deployment l imi t s , negot ia tors could s t i l l find room 
for negot ia t ions . 
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These three questions apart , the question i s 
whether new technology be r e s t r i c t e d or in other words 
i t can be said tha t whether aavancement in technology 
will support peace or war. Many are of the opinion 
tha t new technology i s for peace and c i v i l i z a t i o n . A 
nation having highly advanced technology must be highly 
c iv i l i zed also not to use tha t technology against anyone. 
The other group fee ls that any technology advancement has 
been put to use against the enemy since the time ^ e a r 
was made. 
Technology should be control led; 
One opinion may be tha t qua l i t a t i ve advances in 
weapons are the driving torce in arms competition. Sta tes 
have the natural fear of lagging behind in arms race 
and giving an opportunity to t>ie enemy for a sxirprise 
a t tack and, thus, gaining p o l i t i c a l advantage. For th i s 
reason, technology should be cont ro l led . 
Should not be control led; 
Another opinion i s t ha t unconstrained technology 
i s a visa for secxirity. In their opinion, l imi ta t ions on 
new weapons technology can only hinder tiielr secur i ty . 
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Special ly in an open society, where there i s no r e s t r a i n t 
on new research and tha t too without any secrecy, qua l i -
t a t i v e advantage must be maintained to keep pace with 
secre t developments in a closed socie ty . Ih i s i s the 
reason why some in the USA may bel ieve tha t war with 
Soviet Ifriion can be avoided only when USA keeps and 
maintains technological advantage over Russia. Barbara 
Tuchman quotes an example "A study made in 1981 by the 
In te rna t iona l Communication Agency . . . r epor t s t h a t while 
the Russians apparently do not fear d i r e c t at tack, they 
suffer their own kind of apprehension about the US as a 
power tha t can overwhelm them oy superior mi l i ta ry 
technology. In the popular view, the US i s seen as capable 
of changing the mil i tary oalance ot power in i t s favour 
overnight by some technological miracle t h a t will leave 
the Soviet Union far behind in the arms race . Soviet 
governing groups, according to the study, harbour doubts 
about the conpetence, r e l i a b i l i t y and effect iveness of 
the i r own forces. 
The r i sk of nuclear war can be grea t ly reduced 
by disarmament and arms control , which i s i t s primary 
aim. On the other hand, arms p ro l i r e r a t i on does j u s t the 
1. Barbara, Tuchman, "The Alternat ives to Arms Control", 
in Kolkowicz and Joeck, Arms Control and In ternat ional 
Security, p . 138. 
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reverse, as i t i s generally believed tha t arms build 
up oDtains p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t a ry super io r i ty . If we 
examine the defence po l ic ies of superpowers, they are 
pr imari ly aimed at the belief tha t nuclear super ior i ty 
i s the trump card for f ighting successfully a nuclear 
war. If th is i s the case« then a l l the s tudies on 
disarmament and arras control are exercises in f u t i l i t y . 
The only hope for such s tudies i s based on the doctr ine 
tha t race for nuclear super ior i ty ae t e r s the other 
par ty to use i t on others.. This again is based on the 
widely accepted theory that nuclear wars will throw us 
bacl« to the stone-age with no t race of a human being 
to throw one. Side by side, the fear tha t should 
deterrence f a i l , nuclear super ior i ty over the others 
must p reva i l so t h a t in case of a war, nuclear sxper-
i o r i t y wi l l come handy in subjugating o thers and achieving 
p o l i t i c a l advantage, ihe consequence of t h i s theory i s 
continuous arms r a c e . Even without entering into any war, 
j u s t the possession of nuclear capabi l i ty gives p o l i t i c a l 
advantage which na tu ra l ly gives r i s e to arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
This consequently i s always a t logger heads with the theory 
of arms control and disarmament. The doctrine of disarmament 
and arms control has to be in conformity with mi l i ta ry 
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r e a l i t i e s i . e . , there i s an i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p in the use 
of nuclear weapons for destroying a given t a rge t and the 
systems for offence and defence. This r e l a t ionsh ip opens 
up whole gamut of ' s t a b i l i z i n g nature of arms cont ro l . 
Ih i s ' s t a b i l i z i n g ' character can be determined by s t ra tegy 
of circumstances. Thus, in due course of time, for c r i t i c s 
of today, new technologies for their ' d e s t a b i l i z i n g ' effects 
may find them s t a b i l i z i n g . Hence, countries outs ide 'nuclar 
c lub ' , may go for nuclear weapons for mi l i tary and p o l i t i c a l 
advantages. " I t i s only by de-emphasizing the r o l e of 
nuclear weapons in foreign pol icy through a sustained 
process ot dismentling the nuclear arsenals tha t the 
imperative of non-prol i ferat ion can become entrenched 
among the norms of in terna t ional behavioxir". The 
dangerous advantages attachedwith p ro l i f e ra t ion i s reason 
enough to f igh t against i t through the propagation of 
disarmament and arms cont ro l . The movement tor disarma-
ment and arms control i s a glorious contr ibut ion 
towards nat ional secur i ty and in te rna t iona l peace. 
Reichart and aturm very r i g h t l y pointed out, "there 
i s nothing ingenous about arms cont ro l . Like any other 
1. J . Goldblat, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Imperative", 
In Karek Thee ed. , Arms and Disarmament, 1986, p . 334. 
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s t ra tegy tor preserving the na t ions ' securi ty, useful 
e f for t s a t arms control require foresight , a keen 
ana ly t ica l understanding ot the emerging character of 
the country 's secur i ty problems^ and an a b i l i t y to bring 
imagination to bear in devising remedies for them". 
Broadly speaking, we can identify three main 
purposes ot arms cont ro l . F i r s t l y , i t can reduce the 
r i sk of war, secondly, to lessen the havoc ot war and 
l a s t ly , to cut down heavily on expenditures for mi l i ta ry 
preparedness. 
Most importantly, in te rna t iona l s t a b i l i t y i s 
considered to be basic necessi ty for avoiding nuclear war. 
Nations wouldn't go a l l out for the development or use 
of a nuclear weapon if i t i s not l ike ly to achieve any 
pxirposeful advantage, Ihe effect wi l l be mutual on the 
r i v a l party in the arms race . The r e s u l t wi l l be a de f in i t e 
slowing oown in the manufacture of pa r t i cu l a r category of 
weapons. Ihus a reduction in expenditure on a new weapon 
system. A good example of the same i s ABM and IFN t r e a t i e s . 
1. John J . Reichart and Steven R. Strum, ed., American 
Defence Policy, 1982, p . 387. 
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If such r e s t r a i n t s are put on the deployment of a pa r t i cu la r 
categqries of weapons i t would def in i t e ly reduce tensions 
and fears about each others nuclear supe r io r i ty , 
Tt\e aims of arms control can be achieved by, 
f i r s t l y , regulat ion of the type and number of forces 
deployed and also by put t ing l imi ta t ions on the a c t i v i t i e s 
of forces and thus reducing the r i sk of war. These aims 
can be great ly achieved by a t e s t ban t rea ty in the f i r s t 
case and by resolving disputes through negot ia t ions in 
the case of l a t t e r . There can be arms races without the 
accompanied fears and tensions in the minds of r i v a l s 
if i t i s within agreed framework and guide l ines . 
3ut, a l l t h i s can be achieved in an atmosphere 
of f r iendl iness and re laxat ion not only between two 
nations but in the whole world. 'Ihis can not be gained 
in an atmosphere where use of force i s the order of the 
day or where powertul nat ions are bullying the weaker 
ones or pul l ing the s t r i ngs in the non-aligned th i rd 
world to f ight the i r wars. Heavy armaments are surely 
followed by tensions as i s evident by NATO's plan to 
s t a t ion cruise missi les and longer range version of the 
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ir'ershing B a l l i s t i c Missiles in Europe. In th i s case, the 
dependence i s p o l i t i c a l ra ther than technical , the 
deployment of these nuclear weapons would not be to lerable 
to important segments of the affected nations unless 
simultaneous e f for t s were made to l imi t these and analogous 
Soviet weapons in arms control negot ia t ions" . 
Arms control envelops a l l the attempts for the 
regulat ion of armed forces including the reduction of 
weapons and their deployment or use of forces or l imi t a -
t ions on theresearch on new weapon systems. Hedley dul l 
says, "arms control i s , r e s t r i a n t i n t e rna t iona l ly 
exercised upon armament policy, whether in respect ot 
the level of armaments, their character , deployment or 
u s e . . . (Disarmament) i s the reduction or abol i t ion of 
armaments. I t may be un i l a t e ra l or m u l t i l a t e r a l , general 
or local, comprehensive or par tial^ control led or 
2 
uncontrol led". 
The difference between reduction and r e s t r a i n t 
d i s t inguishes disarmament from arms cont ro l . Ken Booth 
1. Reichart and Strum, American Defence Policy, 
o p . c i t . , p . 390. 
2. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race; Disarmament 
and Arms Control in the Missi le Age, Weidenfeld Sc 
Nicolson, London, 1961, ix . 
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r i g h t l y says that "whereas, disarmament always r e f e r s to 
a lowering of the number of weapons, arms control can 
embrace an increase inthe level of armaments as long 
as i t i s mutually res t ra ined by the p a r t i e s to the 
agreement". 
"Disarmers are revolu t ionar ies who want to upturn 
the t r ad i t iona l process of the in te rna t iona l system; arms 
con t ro l l e r s are conservatives who want to make those 
processes safe. Oisarmer.s want safety from the th rea t 
of weapons; arms cont ro l le r s seek secur i ty through the 
bet ter control of weapons, uisarmers oelieve tha t mi l i ta ry 
power can be successfully managed. Disarmers seek to 
abolish nuclear weapons; arms con t ro l l e r s seek only to 
define their ro le in the s t ruc ture of de ter rence , 
Disarmers believe tha t the perpetuation of tlie war 
system i s an ev i l and po ten t i a l l y ca tas t rophic aspects 
of in te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s ; arms con t ro l l e r s believe 
2 tha t t h i s i s the best of a l l possible worlds". 
3 
Disarmament i s ' marginal i s t ' . 
1. Ken Booth in John Baylis, ed. Contenporary Strategy, 
1987, p . 141. 
2. R.A. Levine, Ihe Arms Debate, 1973, p . 28. 
3 . Ken ooth. Contemporary Strategy, o p . c l t . / p . 143. 
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Disarmament has a t t r ac ted a lo t of popular support 
for d i f ferent reasons. I t s level of success i s en t i r e ly 
a d i f fe ren t question, To some i t i s appealing due to i t s 
economic advantages as they want to place the i r l oya l t i e s 
on welfare of the people and development. The Brandt 
Commission was in favour of the idea of channelling money 
from armaments towards the th i rd world development/ and 
t h i s in i t s e l f was supposed to ensure in t e rna t iona l secur i ty . 
Another argument in favour i s tha t armaments have to be 
renunciated as i t generates global insecur i ty by giving 
r i s e to suspicions and r e t a l i a t o r y t a c t i c s . The one-
upmanship over the other gives r i s e to an unending offence 
- defensive syndrome without any t race of the o r ig ina l 
offender or who i s defending. Ultimately, t h i s never-
ending chain react ion boi l s up to a point where the 
preparat ions are put to use. E.H. Carr, for the same 
reason remarks, "The most serious wars are fought in 
order to make one 's own country m i l i t a r i l y stronger or, 
more often, to prevent another country from becoming 
( i i i l i tar i iy stronger, so tna t there i s much j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the epigram tha t the pr inc ipal cause ot war i s war 
3 i t s e l f " . On the other hand, some may think tha t war 
preparat ions are morally indefensible . 
1, James E. Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control 
and Disarmament, 1980, Chapter 9. 
2, The arandt Commission, North Soutli: A Programme tor 
Survival, 1980, Chapter 9. 
3, E.H.Carr., Ihe Twenty Years' Cr i s i s , 1966, p . n . 
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The tensions f i r s t approach, which endeavours 
to reduce tensions through education and understanding 
Dy working on the 'minds of men' and grea t ly found in 
the functioning of UNESCO i s the f i r s t of the three 
i s 1 
approach presented by David dinger. Solutions to pending 
p o l i t i c a l problems i s as necessary for considerable 
reduction in a arms-race for the simple reason tha t s t a t e s 
can not stop arms build up while they are a t logger-heads 
with other s t a t e s i s the second approach termed, ' p o l i t i c a l 
in 
settlement approach', also tound/the works of Morgenthau, 
George Kemnan & Walter Lippman. The thi rd approach, namely^ 
'armaments f i r s t approach, claims tha t the beginning of 
disarmament process wil l r e s u l t in reduction in c o n f l i c t s . 
David S^tnger, Clark Osgood and L.B. Sohn who form 'gradua-
2 l i s t school'» believe tha t control led and gradual 
reduction of le tha l weapons can create an atmosphere 
of t r u s t , l ike the GRIT Scheme (Graduate Reciprocation' 
in Tension Reduction) and the zones scheme. One author 
says t h a t the 'armaments f i r s t approach i s based on the 
Litvinov idea tha t the way to disarmament i s to disarm 
through a mul t i l a t e ra l t r e a t y . 
1. D.J. Singecr, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament; 
Ibwards a Synthesis in National Security Policy, 1962,p.7, 
2. C.E. Osgood, An Alternat ive to War or Surrender, 1963, 
L.a. Sohn "Zonal Disarmament and Inspection", in 
bul le t in of Atomic Sc ien t i s t s , September 1982. 
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Recently , there seems to be a po la r iza t ion 
between m u l t i l a t e r a l i s t s v^o believe that disarmament 
should De cased on t rea ty oy agreed ve r i f i ca t ion systems 
and u n i l a t e r * a l i s t s who believe tha t there i s bovmd to 
be a rec iprocal disarmament by others if one nation goes 
tor un i l a t e ra l disarmament. This has given r i s e to a 
fresh ideology, ascribed to Hedly Bull, terming i t as 
'new thinking which shows shortcomings in exis t ing 
po l i c i e s r e su l t i ng in dangers of war. I t loois with 
suspicion the general and comprehensive disarmament 
agreement, and i n s i s t s on the s ingleness of s t ra tegy on 
arms control : a broadening of the scope ot the subject 
and an appreciation of the l inks between v a r i e t i e s of 
mi l i t a ry ac t i v i t y h i the r to thought separate; a c r i t i c i sm 
of the assumption that disarmament should be the objective 
2 
of the arms control pol icy. Schelling and Haiperin 
explain the theory of arms control as "the e s sen t i a l 
feature of arms control i s the recognit ion of the common 
i n t e r e s t , of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the rec iprocat ion and 
cooperation even between potent ia l enemies with respect 
to tiieir mi l i t a ry establishments. Whether the most promising 
1. Stephen M. Meyer "Verification and Risk in Arms Control", 
in In te rna t iona l Security, Spring, 1984, p . 126. 
2. Ken Booth, Contemporary Strategy, o p . c i t . , p . 157. 
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areas ot arms control involve reductions in ce r t a in kinds 
of mi l i t a ry forces, increases in cer ta in kinds of mi l i ta ry 
forces, changes in weaponry, d i f t e ren t modes of development 
or arrangements superimposed on ex is t ing mi l i ta ry systems, 
we prefer to t r e a t as an open quest ion". 
2 One of the SIPRI works has presented cer ta in 
recommendations on disarmament p r inc ip les including, 
measijuces taken by one s t a t e for i t s own securi ty , as a l l 
s t a t e s have th i s r igh t , should not adversely affect 
secur i ty i n t e r e s t s of other s t a t e s , environment of o thers 
must not be jeopardized by mi l i t a ry action of o thers , 
weapon t e s t s viiich are l ikely to cause bad ef fec ts on 
the environment of others wil l surely dis^turb peaceful 
r e l a t i on? , respect for those areas by other countr ies , 
which are declared weapon free zones by one group of 
s t a t e s , f i r s t deployment of weapons of mass destruct ion 
must be c lea r ly prohibited, weapons of svirprise attack 
for complete annihi la t ion must be banned, and arms 
control and disarmament obligat ions agreements must be 
1. T.C. Rebelling and M.H. Halperin, Strateqyand Arms 
Control, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961, 
p . 2. 
2. J . Goldblat, Ihe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Imperative, 
op . c i t» , p . 425. 
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irrevocable and for unlimited period and should be 
universally accepted. 
One approach treats arms control to oe a rejection 
of disarmament as arms control is considered to be 
2 
"restraint internationally exercised" because as appro-
aches to peace and security the two are authentical. It 
was evident in SALT talks as both the super powers have 
not reduced t.ieir military strength, preserving only a 
nuclear deterrence. Ihere are chances of error in under-
standing arms control on certain counts. Firstly, the 
fallacy that arms race can be completely stopped by 
agreements. It is difficult to understand military 
complexities and a perfect equilibrium can not be 
achieved. Stability does not entirely depend on 
military extent^on the level of technical knowhov/, 
industrialization and the best possible balance oetween 
the two. Secondly, another error is on the point that 
a new weapon is always a threat to military stability 
as it is a threat to peaceful negotiations. The third 
point is the belief that tlie level of negotiations 
1. Daedalus, Fall, 1960. 
2. Herbert ^coville. Towards a Strategic Arms Limitation 
Agreement, 1970, p. 6. 
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r e f l e c t mi l i ta ry power. Actually, SALT ta lks can no longer 
be found adequate to deal with weapons that are l e tha l for 
regional and in te rcont inen ta l war fare, and the difference 
oetween s t r a t eg ic and t a c t i c a l weapon no longer stands 
good in the presence of cruise rn iss i le - l ike f l ex ib le 
weapon. 
One view i s that arms l imi ta t ion t r e a t i e s should 
not be pursued as i t hardly d is turbs the s t r a t e g i c balance 
because the changes in weapon levels are countered by 
both the super powers. To counter i t the argument put 
forward i s that arms rqce endangers the s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y 
i t s e l f . Moreover, nuclear balance affects the balance 
of r e l a t i v e force p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . Arms control agreements 
should not be viewed j u s t as an absolute because the 
object ive r e a l i t y of the arms competition i s qui te 
d i f fe ren t from the subjective conceptions of that 
competition. To prove the point, Kahan says tha t "the 
primary purpose of s t r a t eg ic arms control i s to attempt 
to introduce greater s t a b i l i t y in to the nuclear balanae 
tnrough cooperative ef for ts and negotiated arrangements 
affecting nuclear systems". Avoiding a war remains the 
main purpose of arms cont ro l . 
1. Jerome H. Kahan "Arms In terac t ion and Arms Control", 
in Reichart L. Sturm, o p . c i t . , p . 396. 
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We can c a t e g o r i s e arms con t ro l agreements which 
have been so fa r concluded; agreements concerning 
p r o h i b i t i o n of tiie use of p a r t i c u l a r weapons in new 
a r e a s ; agreements concerning dea l ing c r i s e s ; concerning 
q u a l i t a t i v e growth of nuclear weapons. In the f i r s t 
ca tegory come: The Antar ica Treaty (Dec. 1959) vAiich 
p r o h i b i t s any kind of m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y in the reg ion 
the t r e a t y on The Explora t ion and Use of Outer Space 
(Jan . 1967) p r o h i b i t s deployment of weapons in Outer 
opace; Tne Lat in American Nuclear Free Zones Treaty 
(Feb. 1967) p r o h i b i t s a l l a c t i v i t i e s concerned with 
manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. The Treaty 
on the P r o h i b i t i o n of the limp l a cement of Nuclear 
Weapons and other .weapons of Mass Des t ruc t ion on the 
Seabed and Ocean Floor and s u b - s o i l thereof (Feb. 1971) 
p r o h i o i t s the f a c i l i t i e s for weapons of mass d e s t r u c -
t ion in or on the seabed beyond a twenty f i ve mile 
l i m i t from land . Ihe second group comprises , c r i s e s 
management agreements l i k e , the Ho t l i ne Agreement 
(oune 1963), the agreement on measures to reduce 
the r i s k of outbreak of nuc lear war (Sep t . 1971), 
the agreement on t h e prevent ion of Naval I n c i d e n t 
Hay 197 2; and the agreement on the p reven t ion of 
nuc lea r war (June 1973). The t h i r d group may inc lude 
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agreements dealing with l imi ta t ions on the increase 
of nuclear weapons l ike the Test Ban Treaty (1963), 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1967) and the 
S t ra teg ic Arms Limitation Accords under SALT I which 
includes a t rea ty r e s t r i c t i n g ABM system, and under 
SALT I I (Jvme 1969), primary l imi ta t ion was a ce i l ing 
tor 2250 ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers, sublimits on 
MIRv missi les and combers armed with cruise miss i les , 
and some r e s t r i c t i o n s on modernization of weapons and 
the INF agreement (1987) l imi t ing nuclear weapons of 
intermediate range. 
To ensure c r i s i s s t a b i l i t y , confidence building 
measures* (CBM) have been emphasized during the l a s t 
twenty years or so . "Whereas arras control focuses on 
r e s t r a in ing the number, character , deployment, or use 
of weapons, CBMs are designed to improve the knowledge 
of the pa r t i e s about each o the r s ' mi l i ta ry a c t i v i t i e s . 
A formal shape was given to CBM when in 1975, t h i r t y 
five nations met at a Conference in Hels inki . I t was 
decided in t h i s Conference tha t f i r s t l y , any mi l i ta ry 
1. Ken Booth, Contemporary Strategy, o p . c i t . , p . 162, 
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maneuver of more than 25000 troops was to be no t i f i ed . 
Secondly, any maneuver of l e ss than 25000 troops was 
to "oe voluntar i ly not i f ied and l a s t l y observeJB were 
to be extended inv i t a t ions for such maneuvers. Another 
Conference in Stockholm in 1984 called for Confidence 
and -security building measures and Disarmament in 
H;urope (CDE) decided to reduce the r i sk of war by 
confidence and securi ty building measures by taking 
up ser iously, disarmament, CDE was the only platform 
le f t for super powers a t t e r START and INF meetings 
fai led in 1984. 
Arms control theory assumes that acquiring 
new weapon systems can actual ly enhance the r i sk of 
war over p o l i t i c a l con f l i c t s . Ihus arms control gives 
a technical approach to arms l imi ta t ions with a 
convincing se t of oDJectives, 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to verify nuclear t e s t s and 
hence such ve r i f i ca t ion i s overlooked. Actually there 
should be a broad based Test dan Treaty so tha t a 
check may be put on nuclear Sta tes against developing 
new weapons or upgrading the ex is t ing ones, so that 
arms r =.ce may be considerably slowed down andfurther 
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strengthening i t by putt ing a ban on the production ot 
t i s s ionable mater ia l . This may slow down the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons and ul t imately coming to a nought 
someday, .aimilerly, discouraging b a l l i s t i c defence will 
build confidence among others and wil l rec iprocate 
mi l i tary without any feel ing of vu lne rab i l i t y . 
The 1968 UN Security Council Resolution No. 225 
was c i tea to s t a t e s complying with Non-t^oliferat ion 
Treaty should a nation becomes a victim of a nuclear 
attack or a th rea t of a t tack . But a t the same time i t 
Was argued tha t such assurances are not guarantees as 
in the case of tiiis resolut ion, France absented herself 
and other perir.ament memoer s o£ secur i ty council i . e . , 
UK, USA and USSR r e i t e r a t e d the i r support to an e a r l i e r 
resolut ion tor ass is tance in case of any type of a t tack . 
Now, if any permanent members of secur i ty council being 
nuclear s t a t e becomes the aggressor, i t wil l be 
impossible to take any measure against i t with the 
aggressor not giving i t s consent. There i s bound to oe 
the use of veto in the secur i ty council in such a case. 
No action can be taken against such an aggressor unless 
actual war or th rea t has been exp l i c i t e ly given. 
So, if the superpowers are bent upon continuing 
the arms race and continue to prepare for f igh t ing ana 
winning a nuclear war, the arms control wi l l oe in 
serious t rouble . There are remote chances of i t s success 
if super powers 8tick to the maxim tha t nuclear weapons 
are j u s t for the deterrerce of war. Arms control wil l 
have a greater chance of success if super powers s t r i k e 
a balance between thei r nat ional secur i ty policy and arms 
control pol icy. Arms contrdl has a chance of success on 
another count also i . e . , if there i s a proper balance 
between mi l i ta ry r e a l i t y and nat ional secur i ty preparat ions, 
The mil i tary r e a l i t y is narrowing the gap between offensive 
and defensive systems. "The interdependence between 
s t r a t e g i c offence and defence was recognized from the 
beginning of s t r a t e g i c arms cont ro l . But, in a tense 
secur i ty environment, the combination of uncertainty 
regarding the products of B a l l i s t i c Kiss i le Defence and 
great po ten t ia l loss of securi ty i s a recipe for trouble 
for arms control e f f o r t s . 
1. Sverre Lodgaard, "Approaches to Nuclear /\rms 
Rest ra in t" , in Bullet in of Peace Proposals, 
vo l . 16, No. 4, of 1965. 
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Since arms proliferation i s both the cause as well 
as the result of the likelihood of war the objective of 
both Arms Control and Disarmament i s the same i . e . to 
reduce the risk of war. Iheir purpose i s three fold^to 
reduce the likelihood of war« to reduce the potential 
dangers in case of a war, to reduce e^enditures on war 
preparations. 
The poss ib i l i ty of proliferation i s in i t s e l f a 
reason for attempts at disarmament and arms control and 
these attempts are a posit ive contribution towards national 
and international security. This i s a suff icient reason 
for their continuationt "Ihere i s nothing ingineous about 
arms control l ike any other strategy for preserving the 
national security. Useful efforts at arms control require 
foresight, a keen analytical understanding of the emerging 
character of the country's security problems and an ab i l i ty 
to bring imagination to bear in devising remedies for 
them... M1 
1, John F. Leich and Steven Sturm, Ed, American Defence, 
p, 387. 
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David Singer has given three approaches to 
Disarmament: the tension free approach, reducing tension 
through greater understanding (Ihe UNESCO approach); the 
p o l i t i c a l settleraeiit approach, trying to reduce tens ions 
by removing the underlying p o l i t i c a l problems (Morgenthau 
SL Kennan approach); the armaments f i r s t approach; trying 
to reduce tens ions through the disarmament process (David 
Singer, Charles Oswood & Noel Baker approach) , Mostly the 
attempts at disarmament in pos t World War II period have 
. centred around what i s known as, the GRIT Scheme (Graduated 
Reciprocation in T^s ion Reduction) which argues that 
the gradual e l imination of weapons in a contro l l ed manner 
w i l l crea te an atmosphere of t r u s t and understanding which 
can gradually be attettpted in r ^ i o n s and/or zones. 
The various attempts that have been made for arms 
contro l and disarmament s ince World War II can be ca tego-
r i zed in accordance with certa in assurances given by and 
2 
understandings accepted by s t a t e s . 
1. David J . Singer, Deterrence/ Arms Control and 
Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National 
Security Pblicy, 1962, p . 7. 
2. A Majeed, "Arms Control and Disarmament", Strateg ic 
s t u d i e s Journal, v o l . I , No.2, Aligarh 1988, p . 73 . 
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( i ) Res tBic t ions on nuclear weapons t e s t i n g , 
( i i ) Strateg ic Arms l i m i t a t i o n . 
( i i i ) Non-prol i ferat ion of Nuclear Weapons. 
(iv) E^ohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruct ion. 
(v) Demilitarisation^ denuclearisat ion and other 
measures of r e s t r a i n t in cer ta in geographical 
areas , 
(vi) The prevention of war. 
(v i i ) Humanitarian laws of war. 
A UN study on disarmament and development in 1972, 
h ighl ighted the gravi ty of s o c i a l and economic problems 
faced by the countr ies and the amount they spent on 
mi l i tary and defence production. I t focussed on the v a s t 
improvement in the economic condi t ions of the countr ies 
and l iv ing condi t ions of the people as a r e s u l t of 
disarmament and diversion of funds to the so lu t ion of 
s o c i a l and economic problems. The study projected the 
f a c t that a very small portion of the world e3q>enditure 
on defence could be used for enormous improvement in 
the economic condi t ions of the people, s p e c i a l l y in the 
third world. Another outcome of the study i s that the 
tension between East and West w i l l adversely a f f e c t 
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the new International Economic Order and the arms race 
will not only claim a huge portion of the resources but 
would also affect international economic cooperation. 
Another UN study on disarmament and development 
reiterates the moral and rational value in the relation-
ship between disarmament and development. And these 
economic imperatives, the study asserts, "demand to 
conceptualise the relationship between disarmament and 
development to calculate the magnitude of real resources 
claimed by the world wide military outlay, to assess the 
opportunity costs of the arms race for societies at 
different levels of development and with fifteen economic 
and social systemsj to examine the technical feasibility 
of converting armament related efforts into development 
channels; to project the direct and indirect benefits 
of disarmament; and finally to examine the possibilities 
for some institutional arrangements to facilitiate the 
transfer of disarmament related financial resources for 
the benefit of the developing countries". 
1. S.J.R. Bilgrami, The Arms Race and Disarmament, 
Deep u Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1982, p.93. 
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Relationship between disarmament and secur i ty ; 
The i r r i t a n t for disarmament i s tiie controversy 
whether disarmament or securi ty should come f i r s t . The 
d i rec t approach group f ee l s tha t reduction of weapons 
wi l l de f in i t e ly lead to securi ty as nat ions wi l l be l ess 
prepared to at tack the o ther . The exponents of the 
" ind i rec t approach", advocate tha t unless a sense of 
securi ty i s achieved by nat ions tha t the other wi l l not 
attack them, they wi l l never agree to reduce weapons. 
"Firmly kn i t a l l i ances or a functioning co l l ec t ive 
secur i ty system would have to be in operation pr ior to 
disarmament". 
P o l i t i c a l condit ions for disarmament: 
The major problem faced by any disarmament 
negot iat ion i s the problem presented by important 
nat ions for set t lement of any outstanding p o l i t i c a l 
problems with other countr ies before they agree, to 
go for disarmament. TTie "secur i ty f i r s t " approach group 
holds out sett lement as a pr ior condition for any talk 
of disarmament. War, in their opinion, i s a r e s u l t of 
such p o l i t i c a l conf l i c t which could not be solved 
through negot ia t ion . 
1. Ib id . , p . 19. 
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Another important block in the disarmament 
negot ia t ions i s whether t o t a l or p a r t i a l disarmament 
should be the re . The former i s def in i te ly easier to 
verify and there can be no elimination of an enemy 
nat ion. Ihe iirpleraentation of such an agreement can 
t a s l l y be assured, i f the i n t e rna t iona l control system 
can be evolved. The second specia l session of UN General 
Assembly, devoted exclusively to disarmament in spring 
of 1982 adopted a ccxrprehensive programme of disarmament. 
On the other hand, p a r t i a l disarmament can not 
be given up al together considering i t as the beginning 
of a larger goa l . Without going through all the 
problems, those areas of disarmament, can be tapped 
where an agreement i s poss ib le under the present 
condi t ions . 
Pa r t i e s to Disarmament; 
Iden t i f i ca t ion of countr ies v i t a l for effect ive 
disarmament i s of g rea t importance. Some bel ieve tha t 
u n i l a t e r a l disarmament i s not poss ible due to securi ty 
1. Disarmament, Fact Sheet No. 18, June 1981. 
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r i s k . Others fee l tha t only super powers should be a 
party to such agreements. There are s t i l l o thers who 
fee l tha t these t a lk s should be m u l t i - l a t e r a l and 
rec iproca l so t ha t the countr ies threatened by the i r 
r i v a l s also jo in i n . Even one po t en t i a l r i v a l l e f t 
outs ide may threaten the securi ty of o the r s , Fxxrther, 
there i s another group which f ee l s tha t a l l the s t a t e s 
must be p a r t i e s to such ta lks and agreements. 
Disarmament proposals general ly assume some level 
of rec iproc i ty among the nat ions par ty to i t . 
Methods of l imi ta t ions ; 
Five main methods have been proposed for methods 
of disarmaments i f i t i s p a r t i a l and rec iprocal , involving 
most armed s t a t e s . These are : 
(i) Reduction in the s ize of armed forces and 
conventional weapons, 
( i i ) Reduction of nuclear weapons. 
( i i i ) Reduction or withdrawal of forces from iden t i f i ed 
areas . 
(iv) Reduction of expenditure on arms, 
(v) Voluntary disclosure of na t ional mi l i ta ry 
establishments and planning. 
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At d i f fe ren t times,by d i f fe ren t nat ions , one 
approach or a combination of approaches have been 
adopted in the negot ia t ions for disarmament. 
Balanced and phased disarmament; 
I t was f e l t after 1962, tha t a balanced and phased 
approach may be applied for t a lks on disarmament so tha t 
no country i s threatened by the other and there i s a 
balance in securi ty of both the p a r t i e s to the agreement. 
Another point was tiiat comprehensive agreements on 
disarmament may be itnplemented in a phased manner so tha t 
the p a r t i e s have more t r u s t on each other and the i r 
secur i ty i s not eas i ly threateaed i f the other par ty 
goes oack on i t s word. Ihe level of secur i ty must be 
maintained in r e l a t ion to the other pa r ty . 
In te rna t iona l peace keeping forces; 
Another hurdle in the ta lks tor disarmament i s 
the question of peace keeping force . Ihe USA fee l s tha t 
the creat ion of such a force i s necessary to safeguard 
the securi ty of a nation during and after disarmament. 
The USSR fee l s tha t the UN should have a non-nuclear 
weapons peace force under Ar t ic le 43 of the cha r t e r . 
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USA wants a force outside UN charter to which USSR 
does not agree calliftg the US opinion anti-UN Charter, 
of creat ing a body above UNO. I^ie point i s tha t such a 
force should be strong enough to repel and suppress any 
disturbance in the t r a n q u i l i t y of any agreement. 
Richard Dean Burns d is t inguishes between two 
types of disarmament: u n i l a t e r a l neglect which he 
defines as a na t i ons ' f a i l u r e to provide for an adequate 
defence, and u n i l t e r a l disarmament which i s a consci-
ously decided policy of self-imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s or 
l im i t a t i ons , o r i t i s h policy after World War I , being an 
exarrple of the former and the Japan ' s policy after 
World War I I of the l a t t e r , 
2 Christopher J . Lamb has given a ca tegor iza t ion 
of diseucmament attempts which he d is t inguishes as: 
nuclear or non-nuclear, voluntary or involuntary, p a r t i a l 
or complete, mater ia l or moral u n i l a t e r a l l y , b i l a t e r a l l y 
or imj l t i l a t e ra l ly . 
1. Richard Dean Burns, Arms Control and Disarmament; A 
Bibliography, Santa Barbara, 1977, p . 3 , 
2. Christopher J . Lamb, o p . c i t . , p . 70. 
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Most nuclear or non-nuclear arms l imi ta t ion 
agreements recognise the vas t difference between nuclear 
and conventional armaments. The agreements are e i ther 
on nuclear or non-nuclear armaments excepting a few 
agreements l ike MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions) seel^ing reduction in NATO and WTO forces 
in cen t ra l Europe, Ihere have been many negot ia t ions 
between NATO and WPO swapping reduct ions in nuclear 
weapons of the former with the conventional weapons 
and forces of WPO. Another such exanple i s the prohi -
b i t ion of a l l nuclear or conventional weapons of mass 
destruction by the seabed t rea ty of 1971. I t i s cons i -
dered as too r isky to disarm a nuclear s t a t e against 
i t s w i l l . Even a small nuclear s t a t e i s considered 
unsafe for any such action l ike the US-Soviet 
agreement on elimination of medium range nuclear 
miss i les in Europe. A voluntary agreement i s considered 
the best way for any nuclear disarmament, 
in A de£eaywar sometimes r e s u l t s in inpos i t ion on 
the defeated s t a t e by the conqueror, a kind of involun-
tary disarmament. For example, after both the world wars, 
the Allied Powers imposed disarmament on their defeated 
enemies. 
6 2 
There i s no case of any voluntary and complete 
u n i l a t e r a l disarmament. There are a few cases of p a r t i a l 
u n i l a t e r a l disarmaments. One such case was in 1139, when 
I I I 
Conrad/of Germany stopped the use of cross bow and stuck 
to h i s voluntary decision for 13 years and revoked h i s 
decision when no other nation followed s u i t . A modern 
exanple i s the r e s t r a i n t put vo luntar i ly and u n i l a t e r a l l y 
by the USA when for 16 years, i t stopped the development 
and modernisation of chemical weapons and revoked i t s 
decision for the same reason vdiy Conrad I I revoked h i s 
in the 12th century, Ihe US chemical warfare Review 
Commission said in i t s June 11, 1985 repor t : The US 
u n i l a t e r a l l y abondoned chemical weapons production 16 
years ago. Ihe Soviet response was a massive chemical 
weapons build up and even actual use of these weapons. 
There have been innumerable examples of b i l a t e r a l 
agreements. The d i f f i cu l ty with such agreements i s in 
the cases where others are also involved or the agreements 
are subject to the approval of the a l l i e s . The Anglo-
1. Report <bf the Chemical Warfare Commission, 
Government Print ing Office, Washington D .C , 1985, 
p . 39. 
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French Naval Jract of 1787 and the Ot:fcoman l imi ta t ion of 
Egyptian Arms in 1841 are a few examples of B i l a t e r a l 
Agreements, The Hague Conference of 1899, and 1907 may 
be cal led the s t a r t i n g point of mu l t i l a t e r a l conventions 
for disarmament. The famous dum-dum b u l l e t s of the 
Br i t i she r s f ight ing colonia l warfare was the focus in 
the f i r s t conference. At the time of the second conference 
the tension among the nat ions were so high tha t each 
negotiator was suspicions of the other and was not willing 
to pa r t with any of i t s weapons. IViis conference can hardly 
be ca l led a conference on disarmament. The f a i l u r e of the 
conference resu l ted in massive arms build up and mass 
destruct ion in the World War I , Ihe idea of the league 
was coined and President Woordow Wilson's "14 poin ts" 
became the guiding l igh t for peace in the World War I . 
These poin ts also had a semblance of disarmament. The 
covenant of the league indicated more vigorous search 
for peace. Germany was forced to l imit i t s array to 1 lakh, 
i t s navy to l/lO of i t s former s ize and en t i r e ly removing 
air force. The Ar t ic le 8 of the convenant s ta ted : the 
1, Joseph Goldblat, Agreements for Arms Control: A C r i t i c a l 
Survey, Taylor Sc Francis, London, 1982, p . 131. 
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members of the League recognise that the maintenance of 
peace requi res the reduction of nat ional armaments to 
the lowest level consis tent with nat ional safety and the 
enforcement Dy common action of in t e rna t iona l ob l iga t ions . 
The debate on material disarmament reduction in 
weapons and moral disarmament-reduction in mis t rus t deve-
loped after the world r ea l i s ed the f u t i l i t y of the World 
War I , Supporters of each arguing the other could only 
follow. Moral disarmers pleaded tha t unless mis t rus t 
was reduced material disarmament was not poss ib le and 
vice versa . Locarno Pact signed by 5 European nat ions in 
1925 namely, Belgium, Great Bri ta in , France, Germany and 
I t a l y to aid France, Belgium or Germany, i f any one of 
them i s attacked was an agreement in l ine with the charter 
of the league to guarantee safety to the s igna tor ies for 
the creat ion of an atmosphere of t r u s t which would u l t i -
mately lead to material disarmament. Similar type of 
agreement referred to as 'Eastern Locarno' between 
Czechoslovakia Germany, Poland and the USSR could not 
ge t through. 
1, Ib id . 
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Conventional Disarmament: 
It is not only the nuclear disarmament which 
threatens the very existence of mankind on the face of 
the eartn but many other conventional type of armaments 
also pose a grievious threat to the haman race. All kinds 
of conventional weapons, like rifles, other artillery 
weapons, machineguns mortars, rocket launchers, small 
arms and aircraft have undergone tremendous advancement 
since the 1940s and are capable of causing large scale 
deaths and destruction. This is not a figure on paper 
but many wars fought in different regions since the 
World War II have shown that the conventional weapons 
are capable of causing large scale deaths and destruction. 
Thus, there is the need to concentrate the work 
in this field also, while tackling the problem of 
nuclear disarmament. Many attempts have been made in 
this field like, reduction of armed forces,bringing down 
the amount of money being spent on defence,supply of arms 
to other countries and proposals regarding non-intervention 
in foreign countries oy outside states and tiieir agencies 
and prevention of foreign military bases besides declar-
ing certain areas as peace zones. These attempts and 
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suggestions have been made as separate measures of within 
the framework of general and complete disarmament. But 
no clear cut pos i t i ve r e s u l t s have been forthcoming in 
t h i s f i e l d . The reasons for t h i s f a i l u r e may be many but 
the very fac t tha t these suggestions have come a cropper 
makes i t doubly • necessary and important to give i t a 
serious thought. 
Armed forces; 
I t i s heartening to note tha t many nat ions are of 
the opinion tha t the question of conventional disarmament 
needs to be tackled with due seriousness and urgency, 
Walter Mondale, the then Vice President of USA suggested 
"we must immediately slow down and then reverse the 
sharp growth in conventional arms". The same feeling 
i s re f lec ted in the statement by the foreign minister 
of USSR which recognises the importance and l e tha l nature 
2 
of conventional arms as compared to nuclear arms, 
Morarji Desai, the foirroer Prime Minister of India said 
"to i n i t i a t e a programme of disarmament in the conventional 
1, Walter Mondale, vice President of USA, Tenth Special 
Session. A/S-IO/PV.2, May 24, 1978, p . 28. 
2. G.M, Kornienko, Deputy Minister of USSR, Press 
Conference, 25 January 1979, Press Release, USSR, p . 18, 
.. 1 
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f i e ld we should not wait u n t i l nuclear disarmament i s 
completed, tie should, t h i s very year begin e f for t s to 
work out an agreement on disarmament and the d ras t i c 
reduction of armed strength in the conventional f i e l d " . 
2 Yugoslavia declared, "conventional weapons too 
give cause for serious and j u s t i f i e d concern because 
of the enormous increase in the i r s tockpi les and 
arsenals and because of their sophis t ica t ion with respect 
to des t ruc t ive power and precis ion, as a r e s u l t of which 
many of these weapons have by their e f fec ts ac tual ly 
come closer to being weapons of mass des t ruc t ion . 
Yugoslavia advocates the banning of the development, 
production and deployment, of new types of conventional 
weapons and new systems of such weapons. Negotiations 
on the l imi ta t ion and gradual reduction of armed forces 
and conventional weapons should be held simultaneously 
with negot ia t ions on measures for nuclear disarmament, 
pa r t i cu l a r l y of nuclear weapon s t a t e s and other mi l i t a ry 
1. Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India, Tenth Special 
Session VS-IO/PV.24 June 9, 1978, p , 13. 
2. Djuraovic, President of Federal Executive Council of 
Yugoslavia, Tenth Special Session A/S-10/PV.2, 
24 May 1978, pp. 4 2-43. 
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s i g n i t i c a n t coun t r i e s . Such negot ia t ions of course, be 
conducted wherever the necessary condition ex i s t , on 
mul t i l a t e r a l , regional or b i l a t e r a l bas i s with a view 
to strengthening peace and secur i ty with lower level of 
forces" . 
The f i na l document of 1978, takes in to considerat ion 
the universal feeling against conventional armaments and 
declares : "Negotiations . . . . on the balanced reduction 
of armed forces and of conventional armament should be 
based on the p r inc ip les of undiminished securi ty of the 
p a r t i e s with a view to promoting or enhancing s t a b i l i t y , 
a lower mi l i ta ry level , taking in to account the need of 
a l l s t a t e s to p ro tec t their secur i ty . These negot ia t ions 
should be conducted with pa r t i cu la r einphasis on armed 
forces and conventional weapons of nuclear weapon s t a t e s 
and other m i l i t a r i l y s ign i f ican t coun t r i e s . The l imi ta t ion 
andgradual reduction of armed forces and conventional 
weapons should be reso lu te ly pursued within the framework 
of progress towards general and complete disarmament. 
S ta te with the la rges t mi l i ta ry arsenal has a 
1. Final Document of the UN General Assembly Special 
SessioA, 23 May to 1 JQly 1978, New York. 
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specia l r e spons ib i l i t y in pursuing the process of 
conventional armament reduct ion. Agreement or other 
measures should be reso lu te ly pursued on a b i l a t e r a l , 
regional and m u l t i l a t e r a l bas i s with the aim of streng-
thening peace and securi ty a t a lower level of forces* 
by the l imi ta t ion and reduction of armed forces and of 
conventional weapons, taking in to account the need of 
s t a t e s to p ro tec t the i r securi ty , bearing in mind the 
inherent r i g h t of self defence emobdies in the char ter 
of the UN and without prejudice to the p r inc ip l e s of 
equal r i g h t s and self-determination of peoples in 
accordance a t each stage and undiminished secur i ty 
of a l l s t a t e s " . 
The reduction in the numerical strength of 
forces has become a very acute problem in recent years 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in Europe where subs tan t ia l number of 
armed forces and large quan t i t i e s of armaments are 
concentrated. The problem of conventional disarmament 
has been taken up in a l l i t s severi ty and USSR has 
proposed tha t conventional disarmament be taken up 
1. S.J.R. Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p . 281. 
and dealt-with on non-bloc bas is with due considerat ions 
to both foreign and nat ional armaments. This a t t i t u d e 
of USSR seems to be in s incer i ty to the seriousness of 
the problem. 
On 31 January 1973 a conference of 19 nat ions was 
cal led a t Vienna to decide about the modali t ies of any 
future negot ia t ions and to discuss with the prospect ive 
pa r t i c ipan t s before the actual negot ia t ions were taken 
up. 
Since then negot ia t ions have been going on without 
any success. The reason why there has been no progress 
for a number of years in the negot ia t ions on the reduc-
tion of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe 
i s tha t the Western par t ic ipants^ in the negot ia t ions 
i n s i s t , without any ground, on theso-cal led asymmetrical 
reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both s ides 
to the detriment of the securi ty of s o c i a l i s t s tates '*. 
This a t t i t u d e of the western countr ies no doubt was the 
biggest hurdle in the success of any future nego t ia t ions . 
1. I D i d . 
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Talks on any kind of disarmament or arms control measures 
can be successful only vAien the negotiat ing p a r t i e s stand 
on the platform of the same level and also both p a r t i e s 
should be will ing to come down to agreed levels without 
endangering thei r own securi ty and respec t . 
Revised proposals were again submitted in 1978 
by the western countr ies and they were s t i l l not wil l ing 
to negot ia te on equal leve l . On the other hand, USSR was 
trying, a l l along, to get the ta lks s t a r t ed even a t the 
cost of i t s own p r inc ip l e s . 
Mil i tary detente on the European cont inent also 
requi res other s teps proposed by the s t a t e s pa r t i c ipa t ing 
in European conference not to be the f i r s t to use nuclear 
weapons against each o ther . 
This kind of proposal no doubt, if accepted, wi l l 
f a c i l i t a t e an agreement on the reduction of armed forces 
and armament in Central Europe. The pxirpose of the proposal 
wi l l be served if i t in any way helps to regula te d i s a r -
mament process in conventional weapons, 
1. Ib id . 
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Ihe success in these negot ia t ions would be an 
important contr ibut ion to the irrplementation of the overa l l 
i n t e rna t iona l s i tua t ion and would serve as an example and 
a model for p r ac t i c a l steps to reduce armed forces and 
armaments in other pa r t s , Europe as well as in other 
regions, of the world. 
There has so tar been no r e a l progress due to the 
a t t i t u d e of western countr ies who are unwilling to scale 
down the heights and come at par i ty with Warsaw Treaty. 
"The west has to scale down thei r ambitions to change 
the balance of forces in favour of NATO to the detriment 
2 
of s o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s . 
Cutting down mi l i ta ry budgetst 
I t has often been proposed since 1920 tha t d i sa r -
mament could be effected by the budgetary l imi ta t ion ot 
the mi l i ta ry expenditure of each of the signatory powers; 
1, ^^rorayko. Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR, Tenth Special 
Session, A/S-10/AC-1/4, 26 May 1978, p . 9. 
2. Gromyko, 33rd Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, 26 September 1978, Press Release, USSR, p . 16. 
73 
l e t each na t ion c u t a given pe rcen tage of i t s annual budget, 
a l l would be r e l i e v e d , and t h e i r r e l a t i v e n d l i t a r y s t r e n g t h 
would remain the same. I t would be a powerful in s t rument 
in the hands of UN i n s p e c t o r s ; i t would enablethem to keep 
the armament p o l i c y of every government under c o n s t a n t 
supe rv i s ion ; i t would g ive e a r l y warning of a d i s l o y a l 
governments ' a t t empt s to v i o l a t e t h e unde r t ak ings of a 
disarmament t r e a t y , e i t h e r by s e c r e t l y i n c r e a s i n g the 
numbers of i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , or by i l l i c i t pu rchases of 
2 arms. 
During 1954-64, the Sov ie t Union r e p e a t e d l y addressed 
i t s e l f to the problem of f r eez ing or reducing m i l i t a r y budget 
e i t h e r in the c o n t e x t of a disarmament t r e a t y or as a 
3 
s e p a r a t e measure . The western powers, on the o the r hand 
cons ide red c u t t i n g of m i l i t a r y budgets to be examined under 
disarmament agreements . 
1. P h i l i p Noel Baker, The Arms Race; A frpgramme for World 
Disarmament, A t l a n t i c Books, London, 1958, p . 498 . 
2 . I b i d . 
3 . See ORDC, Supplementary for Apr i l , May, June 1954, 
Document DC/53, Annex 8; ORDC, Suppl , for Apr i l to Dec, 
1955; Annex 8; I b i d . , Annex 15; Annexe 16, i^pendix 2; 
ORDC, Suppl, for Jan-Dec. 1956, Document Agenda I tems 64, 
70 and 72, Doc. A/3974 and add. 1-2 p a r a s 18 and 35 (g ) . 
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They usua l l y opposed indepe»ident budge tor y r e d u c t i o n 
on the grounds t h a t f i g u r e s r e l a t i n g t o n d l i t a r y expend i tu re 
in n a t i o n a l budgets were no t comparable and t h a t budgetary 
r e d u c t i o n s might provide an a d d i t i o n a l means of c o n t r o l 
over the implementat ion of such measures . Neve r the l e s s , 
during 1963-64, the Sovie t Union and the Uni ted S t a t e s 
fol lowed a p o l i c y of "mutual exanp les" or " r e c i p r o c a l 
u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n " , which al though no t based on any d i s a r -
mament agreement, had the r e s u l t of reducing m i l i t a r y budgets 
2 
of t h e two powers . Both the d r a f t s of g e n e r a l and complete 
disarmament inc luded measures for r e d u c t i o n s or c o n t r o l of 
m i l i t a r y budge t s , 
^fc>reover, t he Sovie t Union, in i t s memorandum of 
28 January 1964 drew the a t t e n t i o n to u n i l a t e r a l r e d u c t i o n s 
t h a t had been r e c e n t l y c a r r i e d ou t by the Sov ie t Union and 
the United S t a t e s thereby c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n which an 
agreement could be reached to reduce the m i l i t a r y budgets 
1. See ORDC, Doc. DC/53 Annexe, Doc. DC/SC l/PV.87, ORDC, 
Supple for Jan to Dec. 1957, Doc. DC/113, Annexe 5; 
ORDC Supple for Jan to Dec. 1964, Doc. DC/209, Annexue 1, 
ENDC/126. 
2. Ihe United Nat ions and Disarmament, 1945-1970, UN, 
New York, p . 144. 
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of a l l S ta tes by 10 to 15 percent . The United S ta tes 
maintained that , while the proposal lool^ed s inple , i t 
was in fac t one of the nost complex matter before the 
ENDC, and tha t before any action could be taken, more 
must be known about mi l i ta ry expenditure and how they 
2 
could be ve r i f i ed . 
In 1973, the Soviet Union proposed tha t agreement 
should be reached on the reduction of the mi l i t a ry budgets 
of S ta tes by permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council by 10 percent and u t i l i z a t i o n of p a r t of 
the funds, thus saved, to provide ass is tance to developing 
3 
count r ies . 
The proposal was approved by the General Assembly 
in i t s 28th Session. I t was argued tha t the proposal wil l 
help in the removal of tensions andwould have a pos i t i ve 
impact on in t e rna t iona l s i t u a t i o n . Furthermore t h i s would 
d ive r t a good amount of resources in developmental work 
especia l ly in developing coun t r i e s . I t has been ca lcula ted 
1. S.J.R. Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p . 283. 
2. The United Nations and Disarmament, o p . c i t . , p . 144. 
3 . S.J.R. Bilgrami, o p . c i t . . p . 284. 
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tha t as a r e s u l t of the implementation of the Soviet 
Proposal the countr ies of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
could receive the impressive sum of 1.5 thousand million 
1 d o l l a r s , 
•"Ihe Soviet Union i s prepared to take a f l ex ib l e 
pos i t ion regarding the specif ic f igure with which a 
reduction of mi l i ta ry budgets would begin. A f igure 
greater or smaller than 10 percent could be agreed upon 
as a f i r s t step for 1977. What i s important however, i s 
tha t t h i s question should as soon as poss ible become the 
subject of business l ike negot ia t ions between the s t a t e s 
concerned. The present steady growth of mi l i ta ry expendi-
ture by many s t a t e s can and must give way to the p rac t i ce 
2 
of systematical ly reducing tha t expenditure. 
Many s t a t e s f e l t tha t i t was usual p r ac t i c e for 
nat ions to hide defence budgets and the f igures shown 
or published were far from r e a l i t y . "Openness breeds 
confidence. For too long, s t a t e s have continued to publish 
1. Alexander Baryshev, The USSR and the United Nations, 
Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1977, pp. 79-80. 
2. Disarmament; Soviet I n i t i a t i v e s , Conpiled by 
S. Batsanov, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1979, p . 178, 
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defence budget f igures which the world knows to be very 
incomplete". He argued that sample t e s t s of s t a t e s 
defence budgets should be ca r r i ed out assuggested, under 
the auspices of Secretary General and should be universal ly 
applied if the t e s t s proved co r r ec t . 
He further said, "The UK i s wil l ing to p a r t i c i p a t e 
in such a t e s t by providing a f u l l break down of i t s defence 
budget . We hope tha t th i s study wi l l provide a fa i r and 
firm basis of knowledge and confidence, which would make 
2 
i t easier to reach agreement to reduce our expenditure". 
But «ie old hi tch i s that mi l i ta ry budgets are incomparable 
thus i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to take any pos i t ive step regar-
ding t h i s . 
The Final Document of the Special Session of UN 
General Assembly , taking in to considerat ion a l l the 
3 p r ac t i c a l problems, suggests, "gradual reduction of 
mi l i t a ry budgets on a mutually agreed basis , for example 
in absolute f igures or in terms of percentage point . 
1. S;J.R. Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p , 284. 
2. James Callaghan, The Prime Minister of UK, Tenth 
i»pecial Session, A/S-IO/PV 14, 2 June 1978, p . 4 1 . 
3. Final Document of the UN General Assembly Special 
Session, 23 May to 1 July 1978, Nru Yjirlrj ^ n u j 89. 
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pa r t i cu l a r l y by nuclear weapon s t a t e s and other m i l i t a r i l y 
s ign i f ican t ones, would be a measure t ha t would cont r ibute 
to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of rea l loca t ion of resources now being used 
for mi l i ta ry purposes to economic and soc ia l development, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y for the benefi t of the developing count r ies . 
The bas is for implementing t h i s measure wil l have to be 
agreed by a l l pa r t i c ipa t i ng s t a t e s and wi l l requi re ways 
and means of i t s implementation, acceptable to a l l of 
them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing 
the r e l a t i v e signif icance of reduct ions as among d i f fe ren t 
s t a t e s on a l l the aspects of reduction of mi l i t a ry budgets. 
Transfer of weapons/arms supply: 
I t i s suggested tha t the arms race can s ign i f i can t ly 
be curbed by reducing arms t rans fe r s from one nation to 
the o ther . An effect ive way of arms cont ro l can be to t ry 
to negot ia te on the problems of arms supply to nat ions in 
to 
need from the nations which have/follow the gu ide l ines . 
"Consultation should be carr ied out among major arms 
supplier and r ec ip i en t countr ies on the l imi ta t ion of a l l 
types of in t e rna t iona l transfer of conventional weapons. 
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based in pa r t i cu la r on the p r inc ip l e of undiminished 
securi ty of the p a r t i e s with a view to promoting or 
enhancing s t a b i l i t y a t a lower mi l i ta ry level , taking 
in to account the need of a l l s t a t e s to p ro tec t their 
secur i ty as well as the ina l ienable r i g h t to self-
determination and independence and the obl igat ions of 
the s t a t e s to . r e spec t the r igh t , in acccirdance with the 
Charter of the UN and the Declaration on p r inc ip l e s of 
In te rna t iona l Law concerning Friendly Relat ions and the 
cooperation among s t a t e s " . 
Walter Mondale, the then US Vice President, said 
"our common i n t e r e s t demand a vast reduction in thetlow 
of conventional arms. The USA on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e 
reduced the volume of the arms, i t s e l l s by 8 percent 
in f i s c a l year 1978 on weapon and weapon re l a t ed items 
to countr ies other than those of NATO and Austra l ia , 
New Zealand and Japan. The USA wi l l not be the f i r s t to 
introduce in to a region, a newly developed advanced 
weapon system which would crea te a new or s ign i f ican t ly 
1. The Final Document of the UN General Assembly, Special 
Session, 23 May to 1 July 1978, New York, para 85. 
higher combat capab i l i t y . We wil l not s e l l any such weapons 
syfetem unless they are operat ional ly deployed with the 
United Sta tes Forces. Recognising tha t t h i s problem requies 
action by a l l suppl iers and consumers, the r e s u l t so tar 
has been modest. Much more remains to be done. I t wi l l be 
increasingly d i f t i c u l t for us to sustain our policy un i l a -
t e r a l l y unless there i s more rapid movement towards a 
meaningful m u l t i l a t e r a l e f fo r t a t r e s t r a i n t " . 
On the other hand Gromyko, the Soviet r epresen ta t ive 
said, "progress i s possible in the recent ly i n i t i a t e d 
Soviet Uo consul tat ion on the l imi ta t ion of in te rna t iona l 
t rade in and t ransfers of conventional armaments. This 
can be accomplished in the general context of i n t e rna t iona l 
detente, the consolidation of in t e rna t iona l peace, the 
elimination of exis t ing war danger poin ts and the preven-
2 
tion of the emergence of new such danger p o i n t s " . 
This means tha t the reasonable and the precise 
p o l i t i c a l and in te rna t iona l legal c r i t e r i a should be 
promulgated in order to determine in which s i t ua t i ons 
1. Walter Mondale, vice President of USA, UN General Assembly 
Tenth Special Session, A/S-10/PV.2 24 May, 1978, p .28 , 
2. Gromyko, UN General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, 
A/S-10/AC 1/4, 26 May 1978, p . 9 . 
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and in regard to which r ec ip i en t s , arms t rans fe rs are 
j u s t i f i e d and permissible, and in which they must be 
prohiMted or d r a s t i c a l l y l imi ted . Such c r i t e r i o n should 
be based on the Charter of the UN the def in i t ion of 
aggression, and the decision, of the UN concerning the 
granting of mater ial and moral support to peoples f ignt ing 
for the i r l ibera t ion from colonia l or r a c i s t oppression. 
Obviously not only the USSR and the USA, but also 
other s t a t e s t ha t supply such arms, should take p a r t in 
solving the question of the l imi ta t ion of i n t e rna t i ona l 
2 t rade in and t ransfer of conventional armaments. 
The f i r s t Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, 
said; "The success of the negot ia t ions regarding curbing 
the Sale and supplies of conventional arms wi l l depend, 
above a l l , on whether the pa r t i c ipan t s , manage to agree 
upon the p o l i t i c a l and legal c r i t e r i a of admiss ib i l i ty 
or inadmiss ib i l i ty of arms sa les and suppl ies . I t i s 
one thing to supply weapon to a vict im of aggression 
1, S.J.R. Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p . 286 
2. Gromyko, UN General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, 
o p . c i t . , p . 10, 
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and i t i s quite another to provide weapons for the aggre-
ssion or say, pu$ weapons in to the hands of those who 
openly say that war i s a "normal" thing and even a kind 
of "normal s t a t e of the world". A g rea t deal wi l l depend 
also on whether the United Sta tes abondons i t s one sided 
se lec t ive approach to the discussion of problems' r e l a t ed 
to regions of concern to i t while dodging the discussion 
of problems of other regions . Furthermore, in the long 
run, the problem of conventional arms sa les and supplies 
can not be resolved through negot ia t ions between only 
two countr ies , the USSR and the USA, since there are 
many other large suppliers of weapons", 
Gromyko said, "Thus what i s required, f i r s t and 
foremost, to r e s t r i c t the sale of conventional armaments 
i s the in t e rna t iona l legal standards of reference which 
would take in to account, both the tasks of l imit ing arms 
sa les and the legi t imate i n t e r e s t s of the peoples opposing 
aggression and f ight ing for the i r freedom and independence". .. 2 
1. G.M« Kornienko, F i r s t Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the USSR, ftress Conference, 25 January 1979, Press 
Release, USSR, pp. 20-21. 
2. Gromyko, 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly, 
26 September 1978, Press Release, USSR, p . 15. 
83 
The hurdles in the »ay of negot ia t ions on arms supply 
are obvious. The legi t imate i n t e r e s t s of various nat ions 
can be so varying that i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to f ix l imi ts 
to them. Moreover, j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for arms supply can be 
convincing to one se t of s t a t e s while t o t a l l y unacceptable 
to o thers . While aggression i s never accepted in a war 
and a l lega t ions and counter a l l ega t ions , together with 
continuous r i v a l r i e s have always jeopardized any moves 
for cur Ding arms supply, there i s l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y that 
any ice will be broken through ta lks under the exis t ing 
condi t ions. 
Troops and Bases in Foreign Countries; 
The USSR presented a draf t declarat ion to the 
18' Nations Disarmament Commission (ENDC) in 1963 , 
ca l l ing upon a l l nat ions to renounce the use of foreign 
t e r r i t o r i e s for s ta t ioning s t r a t eg ic delivery systems. 
The USSR maintained tha t the declara t ion, i f adopted, 
would be the f i r s t step towards elimination of a l l 
mi l i t a ry oases on foreign t e r r i t o r i e s and the prevention 
of the p ro l i f e ra t ion of nuclear weapons. In 1964, the 
1. S.J.R. Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p . 288. 
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USSR proposed the reduction of armed forces in foreign 
t e r r i t o r i e s on the basis of r e c i p r o c i t y . The USSR was 
prepared to s t a r t by reducing i t s troops in the t e r r i t o r y 
of the German Democratic Republic and other European 
Sta tes if the Western Powers agreed to reduce the number 
of the i r tropps in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
other s t a t e s . 
The Soviet Union, a t the ENDC meeting of 12 February 
1963, pointed out t ha t while the defensive r o l e of foreign 
mi l i t a ry bases was neg l ig ib le they could be used for 
aggressive purposes including surpr ise attack and that 
they jeopardised the secur i ty of the host countr ies and 
they cons t i tu ted in ter ference in the i n t e rna l a f f a i r s of 
other s t a t e s and served neo-co lon ia l i s t p o l i c i e s . 
On the other hand, the United States had the 
opinion that foreign bases have a considerable amount of 
defensive character and can be l iquidated only through 
disarmament negot ia t ions as given in the plan for 
1. I b i d . 
2. Every Man's United Nations, XX, 1945-1965, Office of 
Public Information, UN, New York, p . 53. 
3 . Ihe United Nations and Disarmament, o p . c i t . . p . 99. 
85 
disarmament oy USA, otner argument was tha t foreign oases 
were ful ly acceptable to the host countr ies and they were 
there due to the fac t that the bases were se t up a t the 
wi l l of the host count r ies . "They also contended tha t the 
elimination of western a l l i ance bases in the f i r s t stage 
would upset the mi l i ta ry balance between East and W€st, 
would give a u n i l a t e r a l advantage to be Soviet Union 
because of geographical and p o l i t i c a l d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between the two mi l i t a ry a l l i ances and would leave the 
individual Western European count r ies vulnerable to the 
preponderant Soviet mi l i ta ry s t rength . They re jec ted the 
Soviet proposal both as the separate Measure and as a measure 
linked^to the f i r s t stage elimination of nuclear del ivery 1 
veh ic les . 
The Soviet Union submitted a draf t reso lu t ion at 
the twenty f i r s t session of the UN General Assembly 
ca l l ing for eliminating foreign mi l i t a ry bases in Asia, 
2 Africa and ijatin America. The caoviet Union regarded 
t h i s as r e i t e r a t i o n of i t s standing suggestion to withdraw 
bases from foreign t e r r i t o r i e s but the western a l l i ances 
always opposed t h i s move by refusing to do the same in 
Europe. The United Sta tes ca l led t h i s move of the Soviet 
1. The United Nations and Disarmament, o p . c i t . , pp. 99-100. 
2, General Assembly Official Records, 21st Session Annexes, 
Agenda Item 98, Doc. A/6399, and Doc. A/6541 para 5,10-12. 
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Union as a mere propaganda s tun t . Various count r ies from 
Asia, Africa and Latin America also opposed the Soviet 
reso lu t ions on the ground tha t i t did not include Europe 
and wanted the incorporation in the reso lu t ion of a clause 
dis t inguishing between the bases resented by the host 
country. The matter was discussed in the General Assembly 
and was adopted oy i t as Resolution 2165 (XXVI>, o r ig ina l ly 
submitted by India, UAR and Yugoslavia and refer red i t to 
the ENDC, "for further considerat ion" and repor t to the 
next General Assembly decided not to vote on USSR dra f t 
r e so lu t ion . 
In the next General Assembly and other r e l a t ed 
forums, the matter of withdrawal of troops from foreign 
t e r r i t o r i e s was not given due considerat ion and was given 
the same treatment as given by the previous ones. 
Highly in jur ious Conventional Weapons not to be used; 
The United Nations Conference for the f i r s t time 
negotiated the convention on prohibi t ion , on the use of 
1. The United Nations and Disarmament, o p , c i t . , p , 150 
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cer ta in conventional weapons which may cause excessive 
i n j u r i e s or indiscr iminate e f fec t s a n d ' i t s three annexed 
pro tocols . New ru les were provided for the protect ion of 
c i v i l i a n s and c i v i l i a n objects from at tacks by means of 
incendiary (flame or heati weapons, land-mines, booby 
t raps and fragments that can not be eas i ly detected in 
the human body. The convention, which serves as the legal 
framework for the protocol, envisages review mechanism 
which, in future, wil l f a c i l i t a t e the development of new 
ru l e s on prohibi t ion or r e s t r i c t i o n s on other ca tegor ies 
of conventional weapons. 
The i n i t i a t i v e for convening a ynited Nations 
Conference to p roh ib i t or r e s t r i c t the use of ce r t a in 
cruel weapons originated from the Diplomatic Conference 
on the Recommendation and Development of In te rna t iona l 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Confl icts which had 
met from 1974-77 to update the 1949 Geneva Convention on 
on the protect ion of War Victims, In the course of 
de l ibera t ions , of the Diplomatic Conference, i t became 
clear tha t the whole question of prohibi t ion or r e s t r i c t i o n s 
1. Ib id . , pp. 87-88. 
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on use of specif ic weapons was c losely linked to mi l i t a ry 
considerat ions and therefore any further discussion on the 
matter should take into account not only humanitarian 
aspects but also the requirements of nat ional secur i ty . 
There emerged a strong view tha t a separate a t t enp t should 
be made by the in te rna t iona l community to a r r ive a t a 
balance between humanitarian and mi l i t a ry concerns. The 
Diplomatic Conference therefore recommended the convening 
of a separate United Nations Conference for tha t purpose. 
The General Assembly, accordingly, adopted a reso-
lut ion 32/152 of 19 December 1977, convening a UN Conference 
on cer ta in excessively in jur ious conventional weapons, 
s ta t ing i t s conviction that the suffering of c i v i l i a n 
populations and combatants could be s ign i f i can t ly reduced 
i f general agreement could be a t ta ined to p rob ih i t and 
r e s t r i c t the use of such weapons. 
In the preparatory Conference held in 1978 and 1979 
and in the Conference i t s e l f in 1979 and 1980, serious 
e f for t s were made to come to an agreement on in t e rna t iona l 
convention and pro tocols . 
1. S.J.R, Bilgrami, o p . c i t . , p . 291. 
2. Ib id . , pp. 291-292. 
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General and Complete Disarmament; 
The Soviet Union got an item included on 'General 
and Complete Disarmament' a t the fourteenth Session of the 
General Assembly of the UNO, in 1959. The reso lu t ion 
r ea l i s ed the importance of complete disarmament and cal led 
upon governments to make every ef for t to achieve a 
const ruct ive solution to the problem and expressed the 
hope tha t measures would be taken to solve the problem 
and complete disarmament modalties would be worked out in 
the shor tes t poss ib le time. So the fourteenth Session of 
the General Assembly declared that General and complete 
disarmament would be the goal of the UN. 
By 1961, USA and USSR agreed to work out modalties 
and United Nations also endorsed th i s agreement on the set 
of basic p r inc ip le s on which a l l i n t e rna t iona l negot ia t ions 
on disarmament were to be based. 
Agreed Pr inc ip les of Disarmament Negotiat ions; 
The agreed p r inc ip les of disarmament negot ia t ions 
declared by the two super powers was a major leap towards 
disarmament. The four p r inc ip le s were; 
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1. General and cortplete disarmament, 
2. S t r i c t and effect ive i n t e rna t iona l control as would 
provide firm assurance t h a t a l l p a r t i e s are honouring 
tneir obl igat ions , 
3 . Reliable procedures for the peaceful sett lement of 
disputes, and 
4 . Effective arrangement for the maintenance of peace 
including the obligation of s t a t e s to place at the 
disposal of the United Nations agreed man-power necessary 
for an in te rna t iona l peace force to be equipped with 
agreed types of armaments. 
The two super powers, in order to achieve the goal 
of general and complete disarmament agreed to include 
eight non-aligned nat ions in the conference. The eight 
non-aligned became a cementing force for both the super 
powers to continue the i r e f for t s for achieving the goal . 
The f i r s t advantage of t h i s move was a negative one. In 
order to win the support of a majority of the non-aligned 
s t a t e s , as they were the larges t group in the forum, the 
1. Ib id . , p . 296. 
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two super powers were not in a posi t ion to withdraw from i t . 
The presence of the non-aligned with their consent, a clear 
goal to be achieved and the j o i n t p r inc ip le s of both the 
super powers were a clear indicat ion of a conducive 
atmosphere in the conference. The only h i tch was the 
absence of China and non-cooperation of France. " I t must 
be remembered tha t general and complete disarmament can 
be concluded only with the pa r t i c ipa t ion of the maximum 
number of the m i l i t a r i l y important s t a t e s , and in the 
f i r s t place of a l l the nuclear powers . . . unless some 
steps are taken towards associat ing France and China with 
nuclear and other disarmament t a lks , the statemate on 
various important disarmament questions wi l l cont inue". 
The Draft by USSR and USA: 
The Soviet Union submitted to the ENDC a 'Draft 
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under S t r i c t 
In te rna t iona l Control ' in 1962. The same year, the USA 
also submitted to the ENDC an "ouline of Basic iProvision 
of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in h peaceful 
world*, tioth the d ra f t s t r i ed to find means to achieve the 
specific goal of General and complete disarmament. 
1. Ib id . , p . 297. 
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O r i g i n a l l y , the USSR had proposed a p lan spread 
over four years with t h r ee s t a g e s . The f i r s t two were t o 
be of 15 months d u r a t i o n . La te r , on the p e r i o d of 4 yea r s 
was extended to 5 y e a r s . On the o ther hand, the U.bA 
proposed a two s tage prograinme i n i t i a l l y , of 3 yea r s each, 
d u r a t i o n . The pe r iod of t h i r d s t age was t o be f ixed a t 
the time of s igning of t r e a t y . The comparison between the 
two d r a f t s brought out the p o i n t t h a t USA was vague as 
far as the t h i r d s t a g e of t h e progrararne was concerned. 
The s t ages of both the p l a n s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e 
promotion to the nex t p lan depended on the success fu l 
a t t a inment of the p rev ious s t age , and r e a d i n e s s of the 
i n s p e c t i o n machinery for the measures taken in the i n i t i a l 
s t a g e . As the US p lan con ta ined t h a t a l l t he m i l i t a r i l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e s have to g i v e t h e i r consent before 
going to the second s tage and before the t h i r d s t age , 
r u l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conduct have to be framed and 
implemented. Both the d r a f t s envisaged the c r e a t i o n of 
a peace Keeping machinery in the event of g e n e r a l and 
complete disarmament. The Sov ie t s c a l l e d i t super n a t i o n a l 
macninery. The two super powers a l s o envisaged the c r e a t i o n 
of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l disarmament o r g a n i s a t i o n wi th in the 
UNO. 
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Insp i t e of the fact tha t the super powers subitdtted 
i den t i ca l draf t s , they objected to each o t h e r ' s p l ans . The 
VS cal led the Soviet plan a mere propaganda move devoid of 
any sincere e f fo r t . They objected to the Russian plan as 
lopsided on the grounds that the time suggested by the 
Russians was too short for a plan where armaments could 
be reduced suf f ic ien t ly only for i n t e rna l maintenance of 
law and order; any disarmament of t h i s magnitude had to 
be in stages and the stages must give a sense of securi ty 
to United States with assurances of similar disarmament 
in the Soviet set up, and l a s t l y in the event of "general 
and complete" disarmament there should be an In te rna t iona l 
Force to maintain in t e rna t iona l peace and secur i ty . To 
the US plan, the Soviet Union in s i s t ed tha t early stages 
suggested by the USA would perpetuate the area of US 
advantages. They involved pe rcen t i l e cuts in del ivery 
vehicles which would maintain a subs tan t ia l lead for the 
United S ta t e s , They included measures requir ing subs tan t ia l 
inspection in the Soviet Union. 
The USSR made i t clear to the world that i t de f in i -
te ly was more ser ious in i t s e f fo r t s for the achievement 
1. Luis Hehkin ., Disarmament, published for the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York by Oceana Publication, 
Inc . , Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1964, p . 15. 
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of the aim of disarmament. Jus t after the Soviets opened 
diplomatic doors to the outside world, they have been 
professing the policy of disarmament. While the USA, as 
i s evident in t h i s case, has been playing "cat and mouse" 
or a Reluctant sui tor" , in "favour only of 'arms con t ro l ' 
or 'arms reduct ion ' or 'arms l i m i t a t i o n ' " . 
The USA was trying to avoid the r e a l i s sue by 
quibbling over t r iv ia l matters thus creat ing an impression 
tha t i t was not serious vAiile the Soviets created an 
impression tha t i t was sincere in i t s e f for t s and was 
actual ly ready even to give cer ta in concessions and 
modifications in i t s p lans . They created a condition 
where p o l i t i c a l advantage over the USA was g l a r ing . 
wnatever oe the in t en t ions of the super powers, 
both the proposals were los t in the milieu of a l lega t ions 
and counter a l legat ions and no effor t was s incerely made 
to overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s by sui tably modifying the 
d r a f t s . The r e s u l t was an impression that both the 
proposals of general and complete disarmament were 
1. Arthur II. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament, The Path 
of Negotiation, Harper and Row Publishers, New York 
and London, Published by Council of Foreign 
Relations, 1966, p . 25. 
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"attempts to umask each other and made i t d i f f i c u l t , e i ther 
for one or the other, to continue to take refuge in sweeping 
general statements while avoiding precision and actual 
commitment. 
I t i s t rue tha t i n s p i t e of the east-west con f l i c t 
over the two dra f t s , they remained, throughout these years, 
the guiding p r inc ip les in extensive discussions in the 
ENDC on the issue of general and complete disarmament 
and whatever success has been achieved in p a r t i a l measures 
for disarmament. 
i:iY analysing the problems of conf l i c t between the 
two super powers, the problem areas have been: 
(1) Nuclear Disarmament: 
Except t ransfer and control of nuclear weapons or 
technology as the f i r s t stage obl iga t ions in both the 
d ra f t s they were d i f ferent on almost on a l l other i s sues , 
regarding plans tor the execution of the programme. 
The American plan proceeded on the bas is of i t s 
general method of gradualness and proposed that in the 
l i gh t of technical examination re fer red to in the f i r s t 
1. Ib id . , p . 27. 
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stage, the p a r t i e s to the t rea ty agree to maXe f u l l declar-
ation of the amounts, types and nature of u t i l i s a t i o n of 
a l l their f i s s ionable mater ia ls ; reduce in accordance with 
agreed percentages, the amounts of such mater ia ls as used 
in weapons; destroy the non-nuclear components e t c . of 
weapons from which the f i ss ionable mater ia ls have been 
removed; and accept l imi ta t ions on the production or 
re fabr ica t ion of nuclear weapons from any remaining 
f i ss ionable mate r ia l s " . 
On the other hand, the Soviet plan ca l led for the 
complete elimination of a l l nuclear weapons, the dest ruc-
tion or conversion of a l l s tockpi les to peaceful purposes, 
the shutting down or conversion, under the supervision 
of the inspectors of the In te rna t iona l Disarmament 
Organisation of a l l p lan ts e t c . and control over the 
2 
extract ion of raw material tor the atomic indus t ry . 
(2) Delivery Vehicles: 
The Soviet draf t provided for complete cessation 
of delivery vehic les for nuclear weapons and a lso to 
1. ENDC/30, 18 A p r i l 1962, S t a g e I I , P a r t C, ^viuclear Weapons 
2 . ENDC/31, Rev. 1 Nov. 1962, C h a p t e r V, A r t . 22 . 
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stop the production of such vehicles in the f i r s t stage to 
prevent the i n i t i a t i o n of nuclear war a t the very ou t se t . 
The Soviet Union, in the 17th and 18th sessions of the 
general assembly, amended i t s proposals, to permit i t s e l f 
and the USA to r e t a in on thei r own t e r r i t o r i e s , a l imited 
number of i n t e r - con t inen ta l miss i les , an t i -mis s i l e s and 
a n t i - a i r c r a f t miss i les u n t i l the end of the th i rd s tage. 
This limited agreed level was known as "nuclear umb-rella". 
The United Sta tes planprovided a t h i r t y per cent cut 
in stage I of a l l major delivery systems. In the second stage, 
there was to be f i f t y percent cut of the remaining delivery 
vehicles and in the f ina l s tage, the r e s t of the delivery 
2 
means were to be eliminated. 
The United Sta tes refused to accept the Soviet 
extension of the period of re ten t ion of ce r t a in del ivery 
systems t i l l the very end of disarmament process on the 
ground that i t would mean abondonment of p o l a r i s carrying 
3 
element in the United Sta tes defence system. 
1. The United Nations and Disarmament, o p . c i t . , pp.93-94 
2. Ib id . 
3 . Arthur S. LaH, J'ieQotiatinq Disarmament, Centre for 
In te rna t iona l Studies, Conrnell University, I thaca, 
New York, 1964, p . 44. 
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The United S ta tes argued that the USSR was over-
simplifying the problem by trying to segregate, for 
separate treatment, so ca l led delivery system for warheads. 
The USSR argued that even without the a v a i l a b i l i t y of such 
systems, nuclear warheads could be delivered by the 
t ranspor t planes, merchant ships and some of the a r t i l l e r y 
systems used for conventional warheads. The Soviets said 
that t h i s was j u s t an attempt to undermine their proposal 
and to evade nuclear disarmament". 
The US refused to accept the Soviet extension of the 
period of re ten t ion of cer ta in delivery systems t i l l the 
very end of disarmament of p o l a r i s carrying submarines 
which were then a very important element in the US 
2 defense system". 
Arms Control Agreements and Humanitarian Laws of War 
Nuclear Weapon Tests Limitat ions: 
Various arms control agreements have included mainly 
the following po in t s : 
(i) Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
( i i ) Res t r i c t ions on nuclear weajjon t e s t s . 
1- Ib id . 
2. Ib id . 
99 
( i i i ) S t ra tegic arms l imi ta t ion . 
(iv) Prohibit ion of non-nuclear weapons of mass 
des t ruct ion , 
(v) The demi l i ta r iza t ion , denuclearization and cer ta in 
other measures of r e s t r a i n t in ce r ta in environments 
or geographic areas , 
(vi) Prevention of war. 
(vii) Ihe humanitarian laws of war. 
Attempts have been made to ban nuclear weapon t e s t s 
in multi , bi or t r i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s since the very beginning 
but even the three p a r t i a l agreements have fa i l ed to 
t o t a l l y el iminate nuclear t e s t s 
I , Antarctica Treaty: 
The 1959 Antarctica t rea ty declared Antarct ica as 
an area to be used for peaceful purposes. The t r ea ty bans 
the area for use of any action of mi l i t a ry nature, and 
tes t ing of nuclear devices or explosions, establishment 
of bases or f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . The t rea ty i s important because 
of txie fac t tiiat i t i s tiie f i r s t t rea ty of i t s kind after 
World War I I , which completely denuclearized the area, 
although the area without hab i tan t s and with vast open 
ground was idea l for nuclear t e s t i n g . The s igna tor ies 
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to t h i s t rea ty are r e l a t i v e l y small because of the s t ruc ture 
of Antarctica as not many s t a t e s are in te res ted in the area. 
I I . Pa r t i a l Test Ban Treaty^ 
The 1963 Pa r t i a l Test Ban Treaty for the prohibi t ion 
of nuclear t e s t s , mil i tary or non-mili tary, in the a i r , 
space or under water, capable of affecting the atmosphere 
with radioact ive debris outside the t e r r i t o r y of the 
country conducting such t e s t s , was prohib i ted . But the 
p a r t i a l Test Ban Treaty was concluded at such a time when 
United i i tates and USSR had already conducted a s e r i e s of 
nuclear explosions in atmosphere and had a l l the knowledge 
to continue tes t ing under yround, and thus, tliey have 
conducted even more t e s t s uncierground to maintain the i r 
super ior i ty , in nuclear explosions, over other nuclear 
s t a t e s . P a r t i a l Test Ban Treaty has only reduced the 
radioact ive explosions. This was regarded as f i r s t 
agreement of arms cont ro l . 
I I I . Outer Space Treatvt 
The Outer Space Treaty of 196 7 also limited states 
unlimited power over space since space was considered as 
belonging to no one. Article IV which relates to Arms 
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control , places r e s t r i c t i o n s on s t a t e s in the use of outer 
space for any nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass 
dest ruct ion and proh ib i t s the establishment of mi l i ta ry 
uases, i n s t a l l a t i o n s or f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , tes t ing of any type 
of weapons or the conduct of mi l i t a ry manoexivreB on c e l e s t i a l 
bodies . 
The 1963 P a r t i a l Test Ban Treaty also contains 
provisions prohibi t ing the use of outer space for the 
t e s t s for nuclear weapons. The 1972 ABM trea ty p roh ib i t s 
the development or deployment of space based a n t i - b a l l i s t i c 
miss i le systems. The ENMOD Convention of 1967 bans the use 
of environmental modification techniques for any h o s t i l e 
use of t h i s environment. Under the 1979 SALfl? I I t rea ty , 
s t a t e s are debarred from the use of space for Fract ional 
Orbi ta l Bombardment Systems (FOBS) . The same t rea ty 
p roh ib i t s the use of moon, for any h o s t i l e act or threa t 
of h o s t i l e act including the space c ra f t or personnel. 
However, the use of space for cer ta in types of ac ts 
including the use of space for carrying nuclear weapons 
from one point to ariOtner point oii earth has not been 
banned. The use of space for weapons not capable of mass 
destruction has also not been banned. The r e s u l t i s tha t 
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the super powers are in a new race for armament through 
the use of space for in tercept ing miss i les in o r b i t . 
IV. Latin America; TlatelolcoTreaty: 
The t rea ty for the prohibi t ion of nuclear weapons 
in Latin America, known as 'T l a t e lo l co ' , was signed in 
1967. The t r ea ty bans the t es t ing , use, manufacture^ produ-
ction^ acquis i t ion by any means, of nuclear weapons in 
Latin America. I t s ' a very s igni f icant t rea ty as i t was 
the f i r s t t r ea ty declaring an-area with huge populations 
as nuclear weapons free zone. However, explosions under 
the garb of 'peaceful purposes' are allowed under the t rea ty , 
But cer ta in countries have placed their obl igat ions 
on the t rea ty with cer ta in conditions l ike U^^ and tne 
have reserved the r i g h t to rpconsider the i r obl igat ion 
in the event of an attack from a s t a t e of the area with 
the help and support of a nuclear power. The USSR also 
had similar r e se rva t ions . 
However, the t rea ty has no such reserva t ions 
although many countr ies in Latin America are s t i l l 
not pa r t i e s to the t reaty , l ike Cuba with i t s peculiar 
UA 
1- Disarmament: Soviet Initiatives, op.cit. pp. 175-76. 
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r e l a t ionsh ip with USA has not signed the t rea ty or Chile, 
Argentina and Brazil are out of NPT, They have many a c t i v i t i e s 
connected with the use of nuclear devices. This factor cas t s 
shadows on the t r ea ty because, Argentina and Brazil , two 
larges t s t a t e s of Latin America have considerable use of 
nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, 
V, Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsi 
The Non-.cxoliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 
1968, to prohibi t transfer of nuclear weapons and devices 
to any non-nuclear s t a t e by nuclear powers. Non-nuclear 
weapons also agreed to conclude another agreement, for 
safeguards with In te rna t iona l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
aiming to ' s top transfer of nuclear energy from peaceful 
uses to weaponsC 
The controversy regarding t h i s t r ea ty was on the 
point that the non-nuclear s t a t e s were prevented from 
acquiring nuclear devices but no such obligat ion was put 
on nuclear s t a t e s . On the other hand, nuclear s t a t e s have 
been assigned, by the t rea ty the task of t ransfer r ing 
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nuclear devices and nuclear energy to non-nuclear s t a t e s 
according to the i r needs, at a low cost , for peaceful 
purposes; nuclear s t a t e s also undertook to work for 
cessation of nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. 
They were also given the task to provide secur i ty guarantee 
to s ignator ies to the t r e a t y . The oasic objection of the 
non-nuclear s t a t e s was on the v e r t i c a l p ro l i f e r a t ion 
instead of hor izontal p r o l i f e r a t i o n . To compensate and to 
sa t i s fy non-nuclear s t a t e s , the clause of cessat ion of 
nuclear arms was added, which proved to be damp squib. 
The r e s u l t was tha t the NPT never commanded the respect 
which t h i s kind of a t rea ty should have, as non-nuclear 
s t a t e s , n o t s igna tor ies to the t rea ty may not be forced 
to abandon their nuclear programmes, 
Non-Nuclear Weapon Sta tes Assured Security; 
United Nation Security Council Resolution No. 255 
of 1968, which guarantees securi ty assurances to non-
ncuelar s t a t e s , s ignator ies to NPT in the event of a 
nuclear attack or th rea t of a nuclear attack has been 
vehemently re jec ted by many s t a t e s on many counts. 
F i r s t l y , France and four other non-nuclear members 
of the Security Council abstained trom vot ing. Secondly, 
10! 
there i s already another UN resolut ion guaranteeing member 
s t a t e s , securi ty in the event of any a t tack, do there was 
nothing new in t h i s r eso lu t ion . I'^ioreover, as of now, a l l 
the permament members of the Setur i ty council are nuclear 
s t a t e s , i t i s very unlikely that a nuclear s t a t e wil l 
not use i t s veto power in the securi ty council which i s 
taking such an action against the member s t a t e which i s 
the aggressor. Above, a l l the main shortcoming of t h i s 
resolut ion i s that action could be taken only when a 
th rea t or an attack has taken place . 
Uni la tera l decisions have often been taken, l ike 
in 19 78, when UK, USA and USSR made their po l i c i e s 
declared in the special session of the UN General Assembly 
on I'isarmament to the effect that they wi l l not use 
nuclear weapons on non-nuclear s t a t e s , Ihese announcement 
had varying clauses, which could be in te rpre ted to su i t 
the i n t e r e s t s of the nuclear s t a t e s . Fiorther, u n i l a t e r a l 
agreements have no binding force and as such can not be 
regarded as guarantees. 
^^ I . Prevention of Nuclear Accidents; 
In 1971, for the f i r s t time the USA and the USSR 
signed an agreement for the prevention of an accidental 
nuclear war. The p r inc ip le s of the Nuclear Accident 
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Agreement, declare that any accidental detonation of a 
nuclear device wi l l be immediately no t i f i ed by the s t a t e 
causing i t , and take a l l possible act ions immediately to 
render i t harmless before i t causes any damage. Advance 
no t i f i ca t ion shal l be given of any planned missi le launches 
if the miss i le crosses the t e r r i t o r i e s of the other party 
or i s directed towards any s t a t e . 
The UK, USSR agreement of 1977 and the French Soviet 
Agreement of 1976 i s designed on the same l i ne s . 
VII. The Sea-bed Treaty; 
The 1971 sea-bed Treaty bans the use of sea-bed for 
implementing or emplacing on the sea bed any nuclear 
weapons or any type of weapons of mass destruct ion or 
s t ruc tu res , f o r t i f i c a t i o n s designed for s tor ing, t e s t ing 
or using nuclear weapons. The t r ea ty excludes the 
coas ta l areas of nuclear s t a t e s . The t rea ty a lso does 
not ban the use of 12 mile area of other s t a t e s for 
s tor ing such weapons by nuclear s t a t e s if those -s ta tes 
permit. 
"The Treaty was presented to the in t e rna t iona l 
community as a step towards excluding the sea bed area 
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from the domain of the arms race , '-^ he pa r t i e s undertook 
to conduct negot ia t ions in good fa i th concerning measures 
in the f i e ld of disarmament which would lead to t h i s goal, 
but no such negotiat ions have yet been held", 
VI I I . Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; 
The Sta tes of the Indian Ocean region are i n s i s t e n t l y 
demanding that the Ocean be declared a zone of peace and 
mi l i ta ry bases of foreign s t a t e s , not belonging to the 
region should be eliminated. 3ig power r i va l ry should be 
discouraged in the region. The mi l i ta ry presence of s t a t e s 
not even remotely connected, geographically, with the region 
and are expanding there bases in the region should not be 
allowed. The problem of creat ing peace zone in various 
regions of the world where the regional s t a t e s agree to 
create one, should not be j o l t e d by the big powers. This 
problem has to be deal t from two angles, f i r s t l y , those 
bases which have already been es tabl ished in the Indian 
Ocean have to be eliminated and to prevent the establishment 
of fresh bases. This can be achieved tlirough negot ia t ions 
among foreign s t a t e s , not belonging to the region, to 
1. Marek Thee, o p . c i t . , p . 310. 
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reduce the i r mi l i ta ry presence in the region on rec iprocal 
bases. The Indian Ocean region should be used for commercial 
purposes and trade through the region, in accordance with 
the p r inc ip les of in te rna t iona l law should not be prevented. 
This i s important, especia l ly , from the point of view of 
the Soviet Union as the i r link from the European pa r t to 
the Far East i s only through the Indian Ocean. The Sta tes 
of the Indian Ocean region are wil l ing to negot ia te on the 
problem of crea t ing a zone of peace in the region. This 
approach was expressed in the 19 71 UN Declaration on the 
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
The Soviet-United S ta tes t a l k s on the l imi ta t ion and 
subsequent reduction of mi l i ta ry a c t i \ ^ t i e s in the Indian 
Ocean had been going on. Both the p a r t i c i p a n t s d i r ec t ly 
involved in the t a lk s and the numerous l i t t o r a l s t a t e s 
of the Indian Ocean concerned with the strengthening of 
their own securi ty , have an equal stake in i t s success. 
The degree of progress achieved at the t a lk s , about which 
the United Nations i s regular ly kept informed by both 
s ides through the ad-hoc committee on the Indian Ocean, 
1. See AppendixlV 
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attests to the feasibility of full agreement. To achieve 
this, the talks must be intensified and injustifiably 
prolonged recesses which only delay their completion must 
be avoided. 
India, particularly emphasized the demilitarisation 
of the Indian Ocean, regretted that the talks between the 
United States and the Soviet Union remain suspended and 
hoped that in future negotiations they will abondon the 
concept of reduction or stabilisation and return to their 
own earlier publicly stated commitment to work for the 
2 
complete demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean. The Soviet 
Union reaffirmed its willingness, "to continue, at any 
moment, talks with the United States,which were unilaterally 
suspended by the US, on demilitarisation of the Indian 
3 Ocean. 
The idea advocated by many s t a t e s and above a l l by 
the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s , that the Indian Ocean should be turned 
4 i n to a zone of peace would be largely implemented. 
1. S.J.fi. Silgrami, o p . c i t . , p , 290. 
2. Vil lodi (India) Tenth Special Session, A/S-lO/PV-27, 
6 July 1978, p . 87. 
3. Ihe Hindustan Times, 26 February 1982, 
4 . Disarmament: Soviet I n i t i a t i v e s , o p . c i t . , pp. 175-176. 
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IX. Conventions on Bio-Chemical Weapons: 
The UN Convention for conventional armaments defined 
weapons ot mass destruct ion, as "atomic explosive weapons, 
rad io-ac t ive material weapons, l e tha l chemical and 
biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future 
which have cha rac t e r i s t i c s comparable in des t ruc t ive effect 
to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned 
above". "The 1972 resolut ion proh ib i t s , production, stock-
p i l l i n g or acquisi t ion by other means, or re ten t ion of 
b iological agents or toxins, as well as weapons equipment 
or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins 
for h o s t i l e purposes or in armed con f l i c t " . 
But t h i s prohibi t ion i s only for cer ta in types and 
quan t i t i e s of b io logica l agents and toxins not considered 
useful for s c i e n t i f i c , medical and peaceful purposes. The 
biological Weapons convention has aimed at narrowing the 
chances tha t such researches in Biological Agents modifying 
them in such a manner that they become a t t r a c t i v e for 
mi l i tary purposes. Tne iiJiological /.'eapons convention has 
1. The UN and Disarmament, 1945-1965, o p . c i t . , p . 28. 
2. Marek Thee, o p . c i t . , p . 305. 
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also t r i ed to l imit these weapons only to those who 
already possess these and prevent other countr ies to 
acquire or manufacture them. This i s the f i r s t In ter 
nat ional Convention after the World War I I , where pa r t i e s 
have agreed to abandon the use or manufacture of a 
chemical weapon. The USA, USSR and UK have announced that 
they have no stocks of b io logica l or oac ter io logica l weapons 
after des t ruct ion, or conversion of stocks to peaceful 
purposes, i'rance and China, after refusing to sign the 
t rea ty Joined in 1984. 
But even th i s t r ea ty i s not without any doubts as 
there are some loopholes remaining to be f i l l e d even after 
so many negotiationson chemical warfare in United Natid)ns, 
i t s committee on disarmament and between UK and USSR. 
There also remain some doubts on declara t ions of chemical 
weapon stocks and the production f a c i l i t i e s and the 
f a c i l i t i e s which can be used for chemical weaponsproduction. 
of 
Doubts also remain on the ve r i f i ca t ion of stocks/chemical 
weapons. Complete disarmament of chemical weapons got a 
fresh j o l t when in 1985, USA announced that i t i s going to 
s t a r t production of a fresh chemical weapon, to strengthen 
the mi l i ta ry might of the country. 
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X. ftrevention of Accidents a t Sea: 
An agreement between the USSR and the USA was 
concluded in 1972 for r e l a t i o n s between the two naval 
powers. This was to govern thei r naval r e l a t i o n s on 
sea for the safety of the naval vesse ls of the navy of 
both the p a r t i e s and the a i r c r a f t f lying on high seas. 
This agreement i s s igni f icant in reducing peace time 
tensions between the two p a r t i e s . 
XI. iri'event!on of Nuclear Wart 
The USA and the USSR signed an agreement in 1973 
for the prevention of nuclear war; They pledged to act 
in such a manner that a s i tua t ion i s not reached where 
a nuclear war becomes unavoidable. They also agreed not 
to use force or the th rea t to use force against a l l i e s 
of the other . The agreement provides that i f any 
s i tua t ion a r i s e s both wil l immediately negot ia te with 
each other to prevent any r i s k . This appl ies to the 
r e l a t ions of both pa r t i e s with the a l l i e s of the other. 
This t rea ty was s igni f icant because, in a b i l a t e r a l 
agreement both p a r t i e s , not only agreed to avoid 
accidental nuclear war but also to avoid de l ibera te 
r i sk of war. 
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XII. Threshold Test Ban Treaty: 
No ice was broken as far as t o t a l ban on nuclear 
weapon t e s t ing i s concerned but towards such a goal the 
US-USSR concluded a t rea ty in 1974, Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty (TTBT) , prohibi t ing to carry out under ground 
nuclear weapon t e s t s having a yield of more than 150 
k i l o tonnesCequal to 150,000 metric tonnesof TNT). This 
was not very s igni f icant as the Hiroshima Bomb was 10 
i I 
times higher than the above iian and thus, i t did not 
put any undue r e s t r a i n t on the two p a r t i e s . 
XIII . Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty; 
Then again in 1976 the US and USSR concluded 
another treaty^ Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 
allowing nuclear t e s t s outside the usual t e s t s i t e s 
and for peaceful purposes. This was also not very 
effect ive on the points t ha t : (i) i t i s technical ly 
unfeasible and economically unviable; ( i i ) i t has not 
enhanced the p re s t ige and value of arms control / 
* 
( i i i ) the t rea ty has not been enforced t i l l as l a t e 
as 1939, both p a r t i e s had announced their wil l ingness 
to voluntar i ly adhere to i t during the period i t i s in 
the process of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
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AlV. The Environmental Modification Convention; 
The Environment Modification (ENMOD) convention was 
signed in 1977, to stop the use of another means of warfare 
for mass destruction. "Environmental modification tecnniques", 
which are meant'to change through deliberate manipulation 
of natural processes, the dynamics, composition or structure 
of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere 
and atmosphere or of outer space, have been banned by the 
convention. 
The effect of ENKOD seems to be very limited as it 
prohibits only serious types of environment modification 
techniques having longer lasting effects and does not 
touch those weapons capable of creating serious damage to 
weather for a limited period useful for military strategy. 
Its limited effects can be gauged by the fact that it has 
attracted only a small number of countries including the 
five permament members of the security council. 
Some more meaningful assurances should be added to 
the convention to make it more attractive for other 
countries like the environmental modification technology 
should be more comprehensive so that more countries may 
trust the intentions of super powers; the parties should 
not only renounce its use but also its preparations and 
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l a s t l y , i t should be banned ayainst any s t a t e or people as 
i t s use wi l l effect not only combatants but also non-
combatants. 
Limitations on S t ra teg ic Arms 
Bi l a t e ra l ta lks between the US and the UiJSR s ta r ted 
in 1969, regarding r e s t r i c t i o n s on s t r a t eg ic nuclear arms 
arsenals , concluding in the f i r s t phase (1972) l imit ing 
a n t i - b a l i s t i c miss i les (ABM) system and a t r a n s i t i o n a l 
agreement on the l imitat ion of s t r a t eg ic offensive arms. 
S t ra teg ic offensive arms l imi ta t ion t rea ty was signed 
between the two nations in 1979. 
The interim agreement between US-USSR of 1972 on 
r e s t r i c t i o n s of s t r a t eg ic offensive arms l imi ta t ion provides 
cessation for a period of 5 years, of the t o t a l number of 
fixed land Dased (IC3M) launchers and BM launchers on 
modern submarines. S t ra teg ic bombers are not included in 
the t r ea ty and both the p a r t i e s are prohioited to convert 
land cased launchers for l igh t ICcSMS or for older types 
of ICBMs in to land based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. 
SALT I I t a lks , which were never r a t i f i e d , af ter the 19 79 
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t rea ty on the l imitat ion of s t r a t eg i c offensive arms, puts 
a cei ling^ on both the p a r t i e s , of 2400 on ICBW launchers, 
3L3M launchers, heavy bombers, a i r - to - su r face b a l l i s t i c 
miss i les (ASBMs) capable of a range of more than 600 km. 
This ce i l ing was la ter to be brought down to 2250. 
XV. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Proposals; 
Talks for comprehensive Test Ban Treaty s ta r ted 
between UK, USA and USSR but came to a stop j u s t after 
3 years as in 1980 a change in US administrat ion resul ted 
in a near t o t a l reversa l of policy and the ta lks f a i l ed . 
I t i s s igni f icant because, since then many proposals 
regarding the ve r i f i ca t ion of t e s t bans have come up 
before c ;nference on Disarmament (CD). 
Leaders of s ix nations-Argentina, oreece, India, 
Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania presented a memorandum to 
the leaders of US and USSR offering effect ive and 
ef f ic ient ve r i f i ca t ion arrangements. They had offered 
to place seismo-meters not only on own t e r r i t o r y but 
also on the t e r r i t o r i e s of nuclear weapon s t a t e s to 
monitor even a small nuclear explosion, in order to 
f a c i l i t a t e t o t a l nuclear t e s t ban. 'Ihis offer was 
rejected by the USA as the policy of the then US 
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government had changed from the previous one. "Contrary 
to the policy proclaimed during the preceding quarter 
of a century, the present US government considers a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear explsions to be a long term 
object ive", ra ther than, a small matter of the 'highest , 
p r i o r i t y ' , or a matter of g rea te s t importance for the success 
of ef for ts to ha l t and reverse the nuclear arms race, as 
has been s ta ted in a succession of United Nation General 
/assembly r e so lu t ions" . 
The argument tha t many countr ies find convenient, i s 
that , ve r i f i ca t ion of nuclear t e s t s i s very d i f f i c u l t and 
hence any such t r ea ty i s r isky, i s contradicted by many 
s c i e n t i s t s who c a l l i t ' i l l o g i c a l ' , as by seismometers 
and s a t e l l i t e photography, i t i s possible to track down 
a l l the m i l i t a r i l y s igni f icant explosions. 
If the CTBT ta lks were allowed to continue i t would 
have been a very s ignif icant move towards arms control as 
new designs of nuclear warheads or modification of old 
ones would have become d i f f i cu l t for nuclear powers to 
go a l l out for arms race . 
1. Mareek Thee, "Arms and Disarmament", Ed. SIPRI Findings, 
New York, 19 86, 
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XVI. A Chemical Weapon-Free Zone in Europe;Focus on 
Cen t r a l Europe; 
The independent commission on disarmament and 
s e c u r i t y i s s u e s , oftjen c a l l e d the Palme Coi:mission, 
submit ted i t s r e p o r t in 1982 c a l l i n g for a chemical 
weapon f ree zone in c e n t r a l Europe. The area comprising 
of the s t a t e s of the reg ion would work to c l e a r t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r i e s of chemical weapons, n e i t h e r to manufacture 
nor to acqu i re them and ban o the r c o u n t r i e s from 
s t a t i o n i n g or manufacturing them or t r a n s p o r t them 
through t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s . This suggest ion l a t e r t r a n s -
formed i n t o an agreement worked out j o i n t l y by r u l i n g 
East German s o c i a l Democratic p a r t y . The two p a r t i e s 
mutual ly dec la red the area compris ing Belgium, Czechos-
lovakia , the German Democratic Republic , the Federa l 
Republic of Germany, Luxembourg the Nether lands and 
Poland be dec la red as a chemical weapon f r e e zone a r ea . 
XVII. Nuclear Weapon Free Zone; Cen t ra l Europe The 
Corr idor Proposal ; 
The Palme Commission (.The Independent Commission 
on Disarmament and Secur i ty I s sues ) recommended in 1982 
a plan to provide the e s t ab l i shment of a nuclear weapon 
f r e e zone in Cen t r a l Europe which was to be on a s t r i p 
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of 150 km wide on each side of the West German border 
with East Germany and CzechoBlovakia. The term used 
for th is was nuclear weapon free ' co r r ido r ' , making 
i t obvious that the concerned countr ies were free to 
keep nuclear weapons outside th is corr idor . 'Ihe oan 
was also proposed in the corridor on mi l i ta ry manoeuvres 
concerning nuclear operat ions. The aim was to extend t h i s 
denuclearized corridor from northern to southern sides 
of the two mi l i ta ry a l l i ances , i . e . NATO and the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation. The proposals were read i ly accepted 
by most of the non-aligned countr ies and also by East 
Germany, which wan-ced the area to be extended or even the 
whole t e r r i t o r y of the country could be declared a nuclear 
weapon free zone on the condition that equal i ty and equal 
securi ty i s assured. 
C r i t i c s ; 
NATO Sta tes had some objections to the proposals-
f i r s t ly , the Warsaw Trea ty ' s superior posi t ion in 
conventional forces wil l undermine NATO's a b i l i t y to 
s t r i ke , i f the proposals are implemented. The Palme 
Commission's repor t was not very clear on t h i s fac t and 
i t suggested that the future ta lks could bring pa r i ty 
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between the two a l l i ances in conventional forces and thereby 
the r isk of a nuclear attack wi l l reduce. Secondly, the 
proposals have nothing to say about the fac t t ha t conven-
t iona l weapons can be used for both nuclear and non-nuclear 
aaiinunitions, the proposed arrangement wi l l lead to a 
reduction in conventional capacity. Thirdly, c r i t i c s 
alleged that the weapons which would be driven out of 
the corridor wi l l be concentrated outside i t and would 
thus, be an easy target for ' f i r s t s t r i k e ' . This would 
ul t imately lead to more tension and lowering of secur i ty . 
Another point of objection was tha t the two a l l i ances have 
different geographical areas on the two s ides of the 
corridor and hence they have differences in the depth of 
their defences. Further, c r i t i c s pointed out that the 
corridor proposal wil l create a specia l pos i t ion for 
cer ta in countries and wil l be a contradict ion of the 
co l l ec t ive securi ty p r inc ip le of NATO countr ies . Lastly, 
i t was argued that the proposals wil l act .as a diversion 
for the ongoing negot ia t ions on European medium range 
nuclear weapons, and also the proposals are shallow as 
at the time of c r i s i s the number of nuclear weapons in 
c^urope wil l come back to the corr idor . 
1. iMarek. Tl-.ee, o p . c i t . , p . 23 2. 
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The r i sk of nuclear war in Europe wi l l remain as 
long as the major powers r e t a in nuclear weapons in their 
a rsena ls . However, a p a r t i a l denuclearisat ion as provided 
for in the corridor proposal, may help to control th is 
danger in the following ways: 
1. I t would strengthen thebar r i e r s against accidental 
nuclear war, 
2. I t would provide a p r ac t i c a l brake on the operat ional 
re lease of nuclear weapons and allow time for diplomatic 
endeavours to resolve the conf l i c t . 
3. I t might provide an opportunity to reduce both nuclear 
and conventional forces on the bas i s of r ec ip roc i ty . 
XVIII. Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control; The START and INF 
(LRTNF) Talks; 
S t ra tegic Arms Limitation Talks were held between UiA 
and USSR between June 1982 and December 1983. The negotiat ions 
also s ta r ted between the two on intermediate range nuclear 
forces (INF) and long range thea t re nuclear forces (LRTNF) 
t a l k s . 
1. Marek Thee, o p . c i t . , pp. 234-235. 
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The United S ta tes , a t START, wanted a reduction in 
the Soviet, heavy land-based miss i les and wanted an agree-
ment to reduce tne i r number. Besides t h i s , USA wanted 
reduction in t o t a l throw weight a l so . As negot ia t ions 
progressed the USA re-adjusted i t s posi t ion and agreed 
not to s t r e s s on equali ty in throw-weight with USSR but 
to concentrate on reduction in d i spa r i t y . I t also agreed, 
r e luc tan t ly , to reduce the number of bombers and cruise 
mi s s i l e s . The USSR, on the other hand was thinking on 
SALT I or SALT I I l ines and wanted a reduction in overal l 
numerical l imi t s , lower than SALT I I but giving the 
freedom to each party to mix as i t pleased. I t a lso 
agreed to include bombers, launchers and warheads as 
u n i t s and agreed to c n s i d e r ve r i f i ca t ion measures 
lowering i t s guard even below SALT I I . 
At the LRTNFtalks, the United S ta tes wanted numerical 
equal i ty between warheads on Soviet land based miss i les 
within range of western Europe, and warheads on US missi les 
s tat ioned in Europe which could reach the USSR."^  
1. Harek Thee, o p . c i t . , p . 3 25. 
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1. S o v i e t S t r a t e g i c Nuc lea r Weapons C a p a c i t y a t t h e end 
of 1983 . 
^ , , ,, u- -1 Number T o t a l T o t a l D e l i v e r y 
D e l i v e r y V e h i c l e Deployed . . a rheads C a p a b i l i t y ( M t ) 
Land Based ICBMs 
Sea Based SLBMs 
S t r a t e g i c Bombers 
T o t a l 
S o u r c e : Marek Thee , op 
1398 
9 4 1 
145 
24 84 
> , c i t , . P-
6273 
, 2317 
290 
8880 
325 . 
4427 
828 
580 
5835 
2 . US S t r a t e g i c Weapon C a p a b i l i t y a t t h e end of 1983 . 
D e l i v e r y v e h i c l e : Number T o t a l T o t a l D e l i v e r y 
Deployed Warheads C a p a b i l i t y (Mt) 
Land Based ICBMs 
Sea Based 3L3Ms 
S t r a t e g i c Bombers 
T o t a l 
S o u r c e : Marek Thee , op 
1045 
5 6 8 
241 
1854 
. c i t . , p . 
2145 
5152 
2368 
9665 
3 26 . 
1375 
333 
2178 
3886 
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AlA. The Contactor a Peace I n i t i a t i v e ; 
The Presidents of the Contadora Group of Latin 
American S ta tes adopted^ in July 1983, the Cancun 
Declaration of Peace in Central America. 
This was followed by an agreement in September 1983 
by Costa Rica, Guatemala, El-Jalvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
containing the basic assurances to achieve securi ty ,peaceful 
co-existence and cooperation. Objectives which are d i r ec t l y 
re la ted to current conf l ic t s are : 
(i) Cessation of a l l kinds of arms race and to s t a r t 
negot ia t ions on the l imi ta t ion and reduction of 
arsenals and t roops. 
( i i ) Not to allow any mi l i ta ry bases of foreign powers 
or any type of mi l i ta ry in te r fe rence . 
( i i i ) Prevention of the use of nat ional t e r r i t o r y by any 
person, group or organisat ion, seeking to des tab i l i ze 
the countr ies of Central America, and not to allow 
any mi l i ta ry aid from outside to them. 
(iv) Prevention of incitment or support to terrorism 
in the area. 
(v) Provision of d i r ec t communicationsystems to prevent 
any violent inc idents in the region. 
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(vi) To prevent t r a f f i c in arms from the t e r r i t o r y of one 
country to t e r r i t o r y of another. 
(vii) Reduction of foreign mi l i ta ry advisers and ul t imately , 
el iminating them. 
(v i i i ) Prevention of t ra f fc in arms to persons, groups or 
organisat ions who seeX to de s t ab i l i z e the countr ies 
of the region. 
XX.. The South Pacif ic Nuclear Free Zone;Treatv of Rarotonga; 
South Pacif ic became the second populated area, in 
1985, to be declared a nuclear weapon free zone. In the 
meeting of South Pacific Forum, the organisation comprising 
of a l l the independent s t a t e s of the region signed a t rea ty 
in Rarotonga in the Cook Is lands to declare the region 
as a nuclear weapon free zone. The 13 member s t a t e s of the 
Forum are; Austral ia , the Cook Is lands , F i j i , K i r i ba t i , 
i'.auru, Kew Zealand, Niue, i-apua New Guinea, the Solomon 
Is lands , Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Samoa. There i s a 
strong ant i-nuclear feel ing in the region and they denounce 
French nuclear weapons t e s t ing , and durap'-ing of nuclear 
wastes by Japan in the Pac i f ic . P rac t i ca l ly , the region i s 
nuclear weapon free zone except for the nuclear weapon 
t e s t ing in French Polynesia. 
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XXI. A Complete Ban on Tests ; 
There has been a considerable pressure on the USA 
and the UK to worX for a complete t e s t Dan of nuclear 
weapons. 86 out of 130 Sta tes , p a r t i e s to NPT met a t a 
Conference in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985 
to review the progress of the t r e a t y . 
The USA and USSR again r e i t e r a t e d the i r e a r l i e r 
demand but refrained from c r i t i c i s i n g each other . The 
most s igni f icant achievement of the t rea ty i s that i t 
has brought the two super powers to come face to face 
on the negot ia t ing table together with non-aligned 
countr ies not assa i l ing them, except USA which was a 
ta rge t by them for not negot ia t ing for el imination of 
t e s t ing of nuclear weapons. 
In the Same Conference six nations including India 
offered ttieir good off ices for s ta t ioning of Seismometers 
ontheir t e r r i t o r i e s to de tec t any nuclear explosions and 
to avoid cheat ing. 
A moratorium on t e s t ing of nuclear weapons was 
declared by Soviet Union from 6 August 1985 Jo January 1, 
1986, which was la ter extended to 1 April 1986, and 
urged the USA to join in but the USA was suspicious that 
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USSR has done so af ter an extensive programme of nuclear 
t e s t s . This a l legat ion i s without any substansive proof. 
Negotiations Abandoned; 
President Kennedy in June 1963 had declared a 
moratorium on nuclear t e s t s in atmosphere and the very 
next month PTBT was signed by the USA, UK and USSR which 
banned t e s t s in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water. This was a t r ans i to ry agreement for a larger goal 
of el iminating t e s t s permanently, in fu ture . But the pos t -
FTBT r e s u l t s show that actual ly the t e s t s in USA and USSR 
increased in number. Negotiations for comprehensive t e s t 
ban r e s t a r t e d by UK, USA and USSR in 1977 andsome ice was 
broken in t h i s d i rec t ion when there was a change after 1980, 
in US administrat ion. 
But soon after President Reagan declared in 1982, 
that USA was no longer in te res ted in continuing the 
negot ia t ions . Reagan administration had declared that i t 
was in te res ted in pursuing i t s SDI programme and the 
t e s t i ng of Excalibur X-ray laser wi l l be jeopardised i f 
aoratorium i s declared. 
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The purpose and aim of NPT of maintenance of 
in t e rna t iona l peace and reduction of tensions was recog-
nized in the meeting and there was no conf l ic t as far as 
the basic i s sues of non-prol i fera t ion are concerned. The 
Sta tes reaffirmed thei r f a i th in NPT, and r e i t e r a t e d the 
need for comprehensive t e s t ban. The success of Tla te lo lco 
Treaty of keeping Latin America free from nuclear weapons 
was pra ised . 
The NPT i s of temporary nature and in 1995 a 
conference i s to be convened to determine i t s fu ture . 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
INDIA 'S POLICY ON DISARMAf-lENT AlNfD ARt^ lS CONTROL; THE 
FORI-iULATIVE H^ASE 
129 
By dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945, man succeeded not only in inflicting 
wide apread havoc and destruction but creating terror 
and deterrence. Together with this emerged new 
technology with very far reaching implications. Today 
by an estimate, the super powers have enough nuclear 
store to wipe out the entire human civilization from 
the face of the earth. This arms race has never slowed 
down since then and is constantly on the road to better-
ment, for the worse. 
This menace has reached such proportions that 
one single press on the button can announce death to 
thousands of millions of people. In a sharp divisions 
of powers on the basis of ideology, each trying to 
outwit therival, the race for nuclear superiority is 
ever on. These increasing nuclear stores are drifting 
the world ever closer to destruction. 
This increasing tiense atmosphere calls not for 
stockpiling more weapons but to minimise the chances 
of war by bringing closer the rivals in an atmosphere 
free from mistrust and suspicion. 
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Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had emphatically renounced 
nuclear weapons when he said in the Legislature, "We are 
not in te res ted in making bombs, even if we have the 
capacity to do so, and that in no event wi l l we use 
atomic energy for des t ruct ive purposes. I am qui te sure 
that when I say t h i s , I represent every member of th i s 
house.I hope tha t wi l l be the policy of a l l future 
governments". Then again a t Trombay at the occasion of 
inaugurating I n d i a ' s f i r s t nuclear reac to r . Apsara he 
said, "No man can prophesy the fu ture . But I should l ike 
to say on behalf of my government and I think I can say 
witl-i some assurance on behalf of any future government 
of India - tha t whatever might happen, whatever the 
circumstances, we sha l l never use t h i s atomic energy 
for evi l purposes. There i s no condition attached to 
t h i s assurance, because once a condition i s attached, 
2 the value of such an assurance does not go very fa r" . 
In September 1965, eighty six members of Paliament 
belonging to a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s presented a memorandum 
to the then ft:ime Minister, Lai ^^ahadur Shas t r i , in 
1. India, Lok Sabha Debates, July 1957, p . 1435. 
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 
1961, p . 193. 
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react ion to China's nuclear bomb. The Prime Minister repl ied 
in the following words, "Despite the continued th rea t of 
which 
aggression from Chinf^has developed nuclear weapons. 
Government of India has continued to adhere to the decision 
not to go in for nuclear weapons but to work for their 
e l iminat ion". rie declared that India would never go in 
for nuclear weapons even i f a h o s t i l e neighbour develops 
such a device. Instead, he arinounced India wi l l worK for 
the i r des t ruct ion . This was r e f l ec t ed in one of the speeches 
of V.K, Krishna Menon in the UN when he emphatically 
r e i t e r a t e d I n d i a ' s stand in the following words, "There 
can not be any question of regula t ion or el imination or 
balanced reduction of atomic weapons. There i s only one 
thing to do with atomic weapons, and tha t i s to do away 
with them".^ Again in the F i r s t Committee of UN General 
Assemoly, Menon said, "Governments would r e a l i z e the 
f u t i l i t y of expending vast resources on weapons tha t 
were too dangerous to be de te r ren t . Besides, i t was more 
and more being rea l ized tha t there was no pro tec t ion 
against nuclear weapons and that no c i v i l defence measures 
3 
could possioly be effect ive against a nuclear a t tack" . 
1. Speeches of Prime Minister, Lai Bahadur Shastei June 1964-
May 1965, Govt, of India, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Publications Division, Delhi, 1965, p . 109. 
2. UN General Assembly, F i r s t Committee 9th Session 693rd 
laeeting, 19 Oct. 1953, p . 127. 
3. UN General Assembly, F i r s t Committee, 15th Session, 
m o t h meeting, 15 Nov. 1960, p . 138. 
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India advocated disarmament through f i r s t freezing 
production and upgrariation of nuclear weapons and canning 
of :^uclear Tests and then to take ef fec t ive measures for 
reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Prime Minister Nehru considered i t the most important 
-Tjestion facing mankind. India, a peace loving country, 
has always endeavoured to safeguard the securi ty of humanity 
and has worked to eliminate nucle<=ir weapons, the most le thal 
weapon over invented by man. 
As early as September 1945, All India Conference 
Committee adopted a resolut ion condemning the manufacture 
and use of atom bomb, so much so, tha t Pandit Wehru who 
i n i t i a t e d the resolu t ion , said that the r e a l conf l i c t of 
the present world i s between the s p i r i t of humanity and 
atom bomb. 
isuclear disarmament seems to be the only effect ive 
guarantee against nuclear war. This i s the opinion India 
iiolds with other non-aligned count r ies . Since the very 
1. G.N. Srivastava, Non-Alignment and Nuclear Disarmament, 
1985, p . 11. 
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beginning India i s working tor the prevention of nuclear 
war oy cessat ion of the nuclear arms race, and reduction 
and complete elimination of nuclear a rsena ls . Jawaharlal 
Nehru, within f i r s t five years as Prime Minister, advocated 
the theory tha t nuclear disarmament i s the only guarantee 
of securi ty to mankind. He issued a statement ca l l ing for 
immediate suspension of nuclear weapon t e s t s pending the 
conclusion of a comprehensive t e s t ban t r e a t y . Then with 
four other leaders of the non-aligned nat ions, a t the 
Belgrade Summit, Pandit Nehru i n i t i a t e d a move to bring 
USA and USSR to the negot ia t ing table for an accord on 
nuclear i s s u e s . 
Within three decades two world wars were fought 
led by great leaders of tha t generat ion. The destruct ion 
caused by the wars was so massive that i t should have 
oeen an experience and a lesson for future generat ions . 
i^ ian himself i s responsible for the catastrophe which 
struck humanity twice in such a short period of time. 
The pr ice paid for the wars was too heavy but the 
experience fa i l ed to clear the path from possible future 
holocausts as iman has reorganised for a much more 
ser ious and dangerous arms race . 
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Pandit Jawanarlal Nehru while del ivering the 
convocation address at Columbia University, New York, 
on Octooer 17, 1949 said "We have had wars and we have 
had victory and we have celebrated the v ic tory; yet, 
what i s v ic tory and how do we measure i t ? A war i s 
fought presumably to gain ce r t a in objec t ives . The defeat 
of the enemy i s not by i t s e l f an objective but ra ther 
the removal of an obstruction towards the attainment of 
the object ive . If tha t objective i s not a t ta ined, then 
that vic tory over the enemy brings only negative r e l i e f 
and indeed i s not a r e a l v ic tory . We have seen, however 
that the aims in war i s almost en t i re ly to defeat the 
enemy and the other and r ea l object ive i s often forgot ten. 
The r e su l t has been tha t the victory at tained by defeating 
the enemy has only been a very p a r t i a l one and has not 
solved the r e a l problem; if i t has solved the immediate 
problem i t has, a t the same time given r i s e to many 
other and sometimes worse problems". 
Jawanarlal Nehru often talked of the ways and means 
to avoid war. In a statement he made in the Lok Sabha on 
April 2, 1954, he said, "Peace i s not only an absolute 
1. The limes of India, New Delhi, October 19, 1949. 
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necessi ty for us in India in order to progress and 
develop but i s also of paramount importance to the 
world . . . peace can not be preserved by ta lking of and 
preparing for war". He further adds that " . . . the 
lesson of the l a s t two wars has to be remembered and 
i t seems to me astonishing that , i n s p i t e of tha t lesson, 
we go the same way: The very process of marshalling 
the world in to two h o s t i l e camps p r e c i p i t a t e s the 
conf l i c t which i t has sought to avoid. I t produces a 
sense of t e r r i b l e fear, and tha t fear darkens men's 
minds and leads them in to wrong courses. There i s 
perhaps nothing so bad and so dangerous in l i f e as 
fear . As a great President of the United S ta tes , said, 
2 
there i s nothing rea l ly to fear except fear i t s e l f " . 
He goes on to add, "our problem therefore becomes one 
of lessening and ul t imately put t ing an end to th i s 
fear . That wi l l not happen i f a l l the world takes 
s ides and ta lks of war. War becomes almost cer ta in 
then".-^ 
1. Lok 3abha Debates, parliament Secre tar ia t , Govt, of 
India, 1954. 
2. Ib id . 
3. Ib id . 
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un the >:nown and expected e f f e c t s of t he hydrogen 
bomb and i t s massive d e s t r u c t i v e power. Pandi t Nehru sa id , 
"There are h o r r i b l e p r o s p e c t s , and they a f f e c t us , 
n a t i o n s and everyone, whether we are involved in wars 
or power b locs or n o t . 
Addressing Lok i>abha on a p r i l 2, 1954 Pandi t Nehru 
expressed the p o l i c y of the Government of I n d i a t h a t t h e 
knowledge and power of nuc lear technology should not be 
used to forgfe these weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n . He said 
t h a t t he government i s committed to work for the 
p r o h i b i t i o n of such weapons by coirunon consent and 
agreement, ne fu r the r added, "rending p r o g r e s s towards 
some s o l u t i o n , f u l l or p a r t i a l , in r e s p e c t of the 
p r o h i b i t i o n and e l imina t ion of t he se weapons of mass 
d e s t r u c t i o n , which the General Assembly, has affirmed 
as i t s n e a r e s t d e s i r e , the government would consider, 
among the s t e p s to be ta en now and forthwith the 
to Hewing*.-
1. Statement in Lok oabha, /^pril 2, 1954. 
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1. Some sor t of what may be ca l led " s t a n d s t i l l 
agreement" in respect , a t leas t , of these actual 
explosions, even i f arrangements about the 
discontinuance of production and stockpil ing must 
await more substant ia l agreements amongst those 
p r inc ipa l ly concerned. 
2. Full publ ic i ty by those p r inc ipa l ly concerned 
in the production of these weapons, and by the 
UN, of the extent of the des t ruc t ive power and 
the known effects of these weapons and also 
adequate indicat ion of the unknown but probable 
e f fec t s . 
3. ImiTiediate (and continuing) pr ivate meetings of 
tne sub-committee of Disarmament Commission to 
consider the s t a n d - s t i l l proposal . 
4. Active steps by s t a t e s and people of the world 
who, though not d i r ec t l y concerned with the 
production of these weapons, are very much concerned 
with the possible use of them, and also a t present 
with these experiments and thei r e f fec t s . 
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The Uovernment of India wil l use i t s best e f for t s 
in pursui t of these object ives" . 
I t i s necessary to study and analyse the a t t i t ude , 
of the two power blocs, towards arms control and 
disarmament measures, i f any serious study i s to be 
made regaroing I n d i a ' s policy towarcis the sarae. 
The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 
received, what may be regarded the f i r s t attempt a t the 
control and production of atomic weapons, by Bernard 
'^aruch on 14 June 1946, widely known as Jaruch Plan. 
This plan suggested the creation of an In te rna t iona l 
Atomic j-evelopment Authority (lADA) to completely 
control a l l a c t i v i t i e s connected with atomic energy, 
throughout the globe. The plan envisaged the ownership 
of a l l atomic a c t i v i t i e s in tl-je hands of In te rna t iona l 
Atomic Development Authority and not any individual 
s t a t e . I t would do th i s by extending ownership and 
1. Statement by Jawaharlal i^ehru, i^ime Minister of India 
in the Lok Sabha, April 2, 1954. 
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managerial control over all nuclear energy activities 
including the mining of atomic o-ce, considered potentially 
dangerous for world security. Other nuclear activities 
considered less dangerous would have to be subject to 
2 
frequent inspect ion. iiesides that . In te rna t iona l Atomic 
Development Authority was given the task of doing research 
for peaceful uses of nuclear-energy. An important l imi ta-
tion of these proposals was that the United S ta tes govern-
ment would not agree to give up nuclear research f a c i l i t i e s 
and technical exper t ise u n t i l the lADA establ ished i t s e l f 
and began functioning s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The ooviets 
rejected the Baruch Plan mainly, "because i t saw them 
4 
confl ic t ing with i t s own idea of nat ional secur i ty . 
The Soviets d is l iked the massive authori ty lADA was to 
possess and the absence of veto power, in t h i s connection 
in the securi ty council, which Soviets feared may be used 
1. Kgesings Contemporary Archives, 1946-48, p . 7955. 
2. ohyam Bhatia, I n d i a ' s Nuclear Bomb, Vikas Puolishing 
House, New Delhi, 1979, p . 38. 
3. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1946-48, p . 7955. 
4. 3ernhard ciechhoefer, Post-War Negotiations tor Arms 
Control, The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington D.C., 
1961, p . 46. 
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t o i r t e r f e r e i n any s t a t e . I t a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e p l a n t o 
p l a c e permatnent ODservers a t s e l e c t e d n u c l e a r s i t e s and 
t h e ove rwhe lming ly dominant p o s i t i o n g iven t o lADA over 
s t a t e a u t h i o r i t i e s . S o v i e t s oecame s u s p i c i o u s of American 
i n t e n t i o n s i n t h e p r o p o s a l t h a t USA w i l l r e t a i n i t s 
r e s e a r c h t a c i l i t i e s t i l l t h e v e r y l a s t moment, t h e r e b y 
g a i n i n g , - i o v i e t s wanted t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o t a l l a t o m i c 
weapofiS f i r s t , b e f o r e any p l a n for arms c o n t r o l can be 
pu t i n p r a c t i c e . 
The S o v i e t d e l e g a t e t o t h e UN Atomic Energy 
Commission, Mr. Gromyko s u g g e s t e d i n 1947 t h a t " a l l 
e x i s t i n g s t o c k s of n u c l e a r weapons had t o be d e s t r o y e d , 
and n u c l e a r weapons o u t - l a w e d , o e f o r e any i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
agreement t o c o n t r o l t h e e f f e c t of n u c l e a r r e s e a r c h 
cou ld be e n t e r e d i n t o wi th t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e S o v i e t 
gove rnmen t " . The S o v i e t s i n s i s t e d on i t s s t a n d i n s p i t e 
of c i t t e r o p p o s i t i o n from a m a j o r i t y of n a t i o n s i n UN 
Atomic Energy Commission. The S o v i e t s i n s t e a d , p r e s e n t e d 
i t s own p l a n on 11 June 1947 c a l l i n g t o r i m m e d i a t e 
d e s t r u c t i o n of a l l n u c l e a r weapons . I t e n v i s a g e d an 
1. - iernhard Bechhoef er , 0[:). c i t . , p . 7 1 . 
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I ADA under s e c u r i t y counc i l with the aval l a b i l i t y of 
use of ve to and the r i g h t of i n s p e c t i o n only in t h e 
case of dec la red n a t i o n a l nuc lea r p l a n t s . iMoreover, 
each s t a t e would p re se rve the r i g h t to sponsor i t s 
1 
own nuc lear r e s e a r c h and development programme. 
The s t a r t of cold war between USA and USSR from 
194 7 onwards l a id to r e s t whatever l i t t l e hope was l e f t 
to any p o s s i o i l i t y to a r r i v e a t a compromise formula 
for the development and use of atomic energy t o r peaceful 
purposes . USSR had adopted a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e in Uii 
Atomic Energy Commission d e l i b e r a t i o n s and regarded the 
cJaruch plan as, "Das ica l ly a m i l i t a r y and espionage 
2 
system d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t i t s e l f " . Gromyko's a l t e r n a t i v e 
p lan was t h e r e f o r e , weighted as much as p o s s i o l e in 
3 favour of ttie Sovie t Union. 
1. o . r . Morray, From Yalta to Disarmament, The Ker l in 
Press , London, 1961, pp. 99-103. 
2. i;'re-dericH Osborn, "Negot ia t ing on Atomic Energy" in 
i^aymond Sennet and Joseph v^ohnson, eds . Nego t i a t i ng 
with Russ ians , World Peace -t'oudation, iioston, 1951, 
p . 229. 
3. John S^-anier ard Jo^^eph None^, The P o l i t i c s of 
Disarmament, i:i:aeger, New York, 1962, p . 69 . 
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The U n i t e d S t a t e s w a n t e d t o r e t a i n i t s n u c l e a r 
m o n o p o l y as l o n g a s i t was m a n a g e a b l e . Tj-ie US p r o f e s s e d 
t o a c c e p t n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t p r o v i d e d i t was p r e c e d e d 
oy t h e C L e a t i o n of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l a g e n c y wh ich 
c o u l d b e d o m i n a t e d and c o n t r o l l e d by t h e U n i t e d b t a t e s . 
I n ^ i a a t t h e t i m e of u a r u c h p l a n was u n d e r g o i n g 
t u r b u l e n c e a t home d u e t o t h e t r a n s f e r of p o w e r and a s 
s u c h d i d n o t t a k e much i n t e r e s t i n t h e p l a n . A f t e r 
i n d e p e n d e n c e , I n d i a ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o UN M r s . V i j a y -
l a k s h m i P a n d i t , i n S e p t e m b e r 1947 s a i d i n t h e UN G e n e r a l 
A s s e m b l y , r e f e r i n g t o d i s a r m a m e n t , " T h a t t h e r e was an 
u n e a s y a w a r e n e s s t h a t t h i n g s a r e p e r h a p s m o v i n g t o w a r d s 
some new a n n i h i l a t i n g d i s a s t e r . . . n o t e n o u g h i s b e i n g 
d o n e t o c h e c k t h e t r e n d " . I n d i a made a n o t h e r s t a t e m e n t 
on 25 S e p t e m b e r 1948 i n t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y t h a t 
" q u e s t i o n o f c o n t r o l l i n g a t o m i c e n e r g y and d i s a r m a m e n t 
was o n e of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t and s i g n i f i c a n t p r o b l e m s 
w h i c h w a r r a n t e d f u i l d i s c u s s i o n " . She f u r t h e r s a i d t h a t 
" t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of a t o m i c w e a p o n s was e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t 
1 . UN D o c . A/PV 8 5 , p . 1 3 4 . 
2 . UK Doc . A./PV 1 4 3 , p p . 7 - 1 0 . 
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as the banning of b iological and chemical warfare". 
I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t in arms control and disarmament 
discussions also ref lec ted in Mx's. Pandi t ' s speech at 
the UN Atomic Energy Commission in 194 3, that the world 
body was to protec t the nat ional i n t e r e s t s of weaker 
countr ies l ike India from being trampled upon in the 
2 
event of an agreement between the great powers". To 
support a l l measures for digarnuiment and arms control 
was in keeping with the na t ional policy as one of the 
ways to avoid war and concentrate on developmental 
programmes, and to propagate non-violence which forms 
one of the t ene t s underlying the formation of foreign 
pol icy . Nehru said, "In India during thie l a s t quarter 
of a century or more, Mahatma Gandhi made an outstanding 
contriijution not only to the freedom of India, but to 
that of world peace. He taught ua the doctrine of non-
violence, not as a passive submission to ev i l , but as 
an active and pos i t ive instrument for the peaceful 
3 
solution of international differences. 
1. I b i d . 
2. Shyam 3hatia, o p , c i t . , p . 42. 
3. Jawaharlal i^enru, 'Independence and After ', Ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, 1949, p . 302. 
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1-irs. Vij aylakshmi Fandit, representing India in 
the UN General Assembly supported the Baruch plan except 
the par t which .envisaged the in t e rna t iona l ownership 
of f i s s i l e raw materials l ike uranium and thorium". The 
Indian government was supporting Jaruch Plan with 
qua l i f i ca t ions to protec t i t s economic i n t e r e s t s as i t 
was evident at tha t time that materials in abundance in 
India would some day replace coal and o i l for e l e c t r i c i t y 
generation. Moreover, Indian government did not want t o 
openly ident i fy i t s e l f with any of the super powers. 
" Ind ia ' s ro l e in disarmament discussions during t h i s period 
was chiefly characterized by a conscious and painstaking 
attempt to reconci le great power differences by refra ining 
from siding with ei ther camp on disputed i s sues and also 
2 by encouraging adjustments to compromise. Regarding 
atomic energy, Indian representa t ive r e i t e r a t e d I n d i a ' s 
keen i n t e r e s t as a peace loving and under-developed 
3 
nation for the peaceful u t i l i z a t i o n of atomic energy". 
1. UW General Assemoly u r r i c i a l ivecords, 1948, p . 442. 
2. i<.N. Jerkes and M.S.Bedi, The Diplomacy of India, 
Stanford University Press, California, 1958, p . 64. 
3 . UI. Doc. A/PV. 14 3 , p p . 7 - 1 0 . 
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Differences between USA and the Soviet Union 
continued despi te two years of negotiat ions on the issue 
of control of atomic energy. India played the r o l e of a 
neutra l nation t ry ing to bring about a compromise between 
the two. The 11 member sub-committee to bring about a 
compromise saw the Indian representa t ive , Mr. B.N.Rau 
ss i t s Chairman. The re su l t was j u s t tha t the western 
blocs agreed to continue the negot ia t ions . India presented 
a resolut ion envisaging an effect ive system of i n t e r -
nat ional control of atomic energy, but was re jected by 
the General Assembly in the F i r s t Committee in the wake 
2 
of a Canadian proposal. Tne Indian delegation abstained 
from the Canadian Resolution which, apart from blaming 
the Soviet Union, endorsed the original recommendation 
3 
of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. 
Mrs. Pandit explained that , "voting for the Canadian 
resolut ion and therefore also i r ;direct ly for the Jaruch 
plan would have meant surrendering control of a v i t a l 
1. UN Doc. A/C:1/A-111/4/Rev. 2. 
2. UN Doc. A/700, 
3. u.P. Jain, India and Disarmament, Pandit, New Delhi, p. 17, 
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rav; m a t e r i a l , t l ior ium, t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l management and 
o w n e r s h i p . I b i s was no t a c c e p t a b l e w h i l e otl-jer energy 
g i v i n g raw m a t e r i a l s l i k e c o a l and o i l r ema ined i n t h e 
hands of i n d i v i d u a l n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s " . 
I n d i a m a i n t a i n e d t h e same a t t i t u d e d u r i n g t h e 
f o l l o w i n g y e a r s . In 1954, I n d i s r e i t e r a t e d i t s o p p o s i t i o n 
t o any p l a n r e s t r i c t i n g t h e p e a c e f u l u t i l i z a t i o n of 
n u c l e a r ene rgy or " e s t a b l i s h i n g some form of c o n t r o l 
which would be d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of l e s s 
2 d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s or would d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t them . 
I n s p i t e of t h e f a c t t h a t I n d i a n moves t o t r y and 
p l a y an e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n arms c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s 
f a i l e d m i s e r a b l y and Nehru and h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
c o u l d n o t i m p r e s s any of t h e major p o w e r s , I n d i a n 
d e l e g a t i o n i n New York c o n t i n u e d t o p r e s e n t r e s o l u t i o n s 
w i t h i n t h e framework of d i s a r m a m e n t . 
S i r S e n e g a l ' s p l a n was fo r t h e G e n e r a l Assemoly t o 
ask t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law commission t o f o r m u l a t e a d r a f t 
1. I b i d . , p . 17 . 
2 . UK 1<3C. - .NDC/144. 
declaration on the duties of states and individuals with 
respect to the development of nuclear energy so as to 
ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and also to 
secure the elimination of nuclear weapons from national 
armouries. The proposed plan would have served another 
purpose i.e. "shifting the arms control negotietions to 
a new body where the Indians were fully represented in 
their own right and where they could, therefore, also 
2 hope to have some influence. 
Nevertheless, the Indian delegation in New York 
continued to make new suggestions for discussion within 
the disarmament framework. In 1950, and 1951 the delega-
tion tabled draft resolutions for the creation of UN 
Development Fund to be financed by savings effected 
3 
through disarmament. 
Many dratt resolution were presented oy the USA 
and the USSR and also by other nations. The Indian 
representative made it clear that India was not merely 
1. R.N. Berkes and M.S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India, 
Stanford, 1958, p. 65. 
2. J.P. Jain, up . c i t., p. 20. 
3. Ibid., p. 30. 
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interested in any particular resolution of disarmament 
out in the actual beginning of disarmament". 
Disarmament Commission was established on 11 January 
1952, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution 
502(/I), of the same day. It was given the task of 
incorporating in prospective treaty or treaties: 
(i) the regulations, limitation and balanced reduction 
of all armed forces and armaments; 
(ii) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass 
destruction; and 
(iii) effective international control of atomic energy 
2 
for peaceful purposes only. 
The monthly meeting of the Commission established 
two other committees. Committee I was given the respon-
sirility of the regulation of all armaments and armed 
forces. Committee II was entrusted with the task of 
disclosure and verification of all armaments including 
3 
atomic weapons, armaments and all armed forces. 
1. UK Doc. A/C-l/SR-454. 26 Dec. 1951, pp. 28-29. 
2, Yearbook of the United t^ations, 195 2, UN P u b l i c a t i o n , 
NY, 1953, p . 5 . 
3 . I b i d . , p . 314 . 
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India welcomed the establishment of Disarmament 
Commission as a significant step in the right direction 
and hoped that it would envisaged the formulation of an 
agreed plan on disarmament". Krishna Menon told the 
Disarmament Commission of his hope that the smaller 
powers, instead of supporting either cold war camp, might 
act as catalystic agents to bring the great powers 
2 
together. He also said on 8 April 1952, disarmament 
could be achieved only when there was an agreement 
among the major powers". He followed this up in October 
of the same year by suggesting to the UN General Assembly 
that the members of the Disarmament Commission constitute 
themselves into a private sub-committee which would hold 
its discussions away from the glare of Internationa 
publicity.His proposal was accepted almost immediately 
by both the super power blocs, which was reasoned as 
the policies of India and Soviet Union on Disarmament 
were undergoing a change. 
1. UN Doc A/PV, 358, 11 Jan. 1952, p. 296. 
2. UNGAOR, First Committee, 58Ist meeting, 21st March 1952, 
pp. 497-98. 
3. UN Doc. A/PV, 4 24, 8 April 1952, pp. 685-86. 
4. J.P. Jain, op.cit., p. 41. 
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A more relaxed atmosphere for negot ia t ions on 
disarmament was created in the aftermath of the cessation 
of h o s t i l i t i e s in Korea and Indo-China.India while moving 
the draft reso lu t ion A/C 1/L 100 . in early 1954 
observed that these developments appreciably contributed 
to a more favourable climate for negotiat ion and the 
settlement of the problem of disarmament. 
The Soviet Union in 1953 moved a resolut ion asking 
for the inclusion of India, Yugoslavia and China in the 
Disarmament Commission, India i t s e l f s t a r t ed lobbying 
for i t s inclusion in the commission. But the Indian propo-
sa ls in the Disarmament Corninission were not supportive of 
any pa r t i cu la r country* l ike the proposal of 1954 which 
"callSd for consultation between the nuclear powers and 
s t a t e s not represented in the Disarmament Commission. 
In 1955/ India proposed enlarging the Disarmament Commissbn 
2 
and i t s sub-committee. This was repeated by Krishna Menon 
in 1956, 1957, And the, India, Yugoslavia, Canadian, 
Japanese and Paraguayan resolut ion was successful in 
1. M.S. Rajan, India in World ^tffairs, 1954-56, Asia^ London, 
1964, pp. 94-95. 
2. I b i d . 
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get t ing an expansion of the commission to 25 members and 
in 1958 an Indo-Yugoslav resolut ion t o include a l l s t a t e s 
of the General Asseraliy on the Disarmament Commission was 
accepted. In 1961, the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee 
became 18 nation committee including India . 
Indian i n t e r e s t in jo in ing the Disarmament Commission 
i s par t ly explained by Nehru's des i re not to see any 
important i n t e rna t iona l organisation dominated by the great 
powers. Jus t as the proposed in t e rna t iona l nuclear agency 
in 1954 could a r r ive at decisions contrary to Indian 
i n t e r e s t s , so could the Disarmament Commission on which 
2 
India was not represented , do the same. 
Global concern over the t e s t i n g of nuclear weapons 
f i r s t manifested i t s e l f as a react ion to American Hydrogen 
bomb t e s t s during 1954, when a Japanese f ishing boat, the 
'Fukuryu Maryu', was contaminated by rad io-ac t ive f a l l -
out . There was an outcry in tjie Indian t^arliaiiient when 
the news of the contamination, became known. The Statesman 
and The Hindu came out with conunents on the des t ruc t ive 
1. J . f . Ja in , o p . c i t . , p . 64. 
2. Shyam lihatia, o p . c i t . , p . 55. 
3 . M.S. Raj an, o p . c i t . , p , 9 2 . 
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c a p a b i l i t i e s of the bomb and the need for r e s t r a i n t . 
Nehru cal led for immediate stoppage of nuclear Domb 
t e s t i n g . Krishna Menon also repeated Nehru's proposal 
in the UN General Assembly in October 1954. 
"Some react ion to the t e s t s was inev i t ab le from the 
Indian government in view of i t s commitment to disarmament, 
a goal which was bound to be more d i f f i c u l t to achieve as 
more nuclear weapons were developed and t e s t e d . However, 
the d i s t i n c t i v e feature of Nehru's ' s t a n d s t i l l ' c a l l 
consisted of the t a c t i c s he employed to strengthen the 
impact of h i s proposal . These were, f i r s t l y , to generate 
the widest possible pub l ic i ty about the ef fec ts of nuclear 
weapon t e s t s in re leas ing r ad ioac t iv i ty , for example, in 
the hope tha t t h i s would influence in te rna t iona l public 
opinion against them. Another proposal was to gain support 
for a t e s t ' s s t a n d s t i l l from other newly independent 
countr ies in Asia and Africa". On his f i r s t s t a t e v i s i t 
to Soviet Union in 1955, Nehru issued a j o in t statement 
1. The Hindu, Madras, 9 April 1954, and The Statesman, 
New Delhi, 10 ^ r i l 1954. 
2. Shyam Bhatia, o p . c i t , , pp. 56-57. 
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with i3ulgenin ca l l ing for "a can on the production, 
experimenting and use of nuclear weapons together with 
a subs tan t ia l reduction of conventional arms under i t s 
in t e rna t iona l con t ro l" . 
India worked t i r e l e s s l y to i n i t i a t e the e s t ab l i sh -
ment of a sub-committee of Disarmament Commission, to 
discuss ways and means to find a solution to the problem 
of arms race . But since there was too much conf l i c t within 
the committee, which consisted of major powers, on the 
bas is of ideological differences, there was not much 
headway in the negot ia t ions . Aftei the sub-cominittee was 
found to be bogged down by too mfmy hurdles , India again 
gathered support for a more broadbased committee with 
f ive representa t ives each of the two power blocs and 
eight from the non-aligned world. Thus, came in to 
existence the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
(SKDC) in 1961. India pleaded before the General Assembly 
tna t the question of disarmament i s not a local one which 
could be decided by a few nat ions , i t has to take in to 
account the opinion of the peoples of the world whose 
1. Foreign Policy of India; Text of Documents, 1947-64, 
Lok Sabha Secre ta r i a t , New Delhi, 1964, pp. 485-89. 
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existence depend on the outcome o£ the disarmament 
negot ia t ions . The working of the EUDC was also very 
much influenced by the Indian e t t o r t s as i s evident 
from the Agreed Principles of the disarmament negot ia t ions 
concluded by UoA and USSR on the bas is of which the 
negot ia t ions were to be conducted in the ENDC. These 
pr inc ip les are important from I n d i a ' s point of view 
because these were the same, e a r l i e r suggested by India 
in 1960 and were Ejected outr ight by the two super powers. 
tJow the same pr inc ip les i . e . , of complete disarmament, 
were the oasis of future negot ia t ions in the EiSIDC. India 
also s t ressed on the point tha t disarmament and developmert 
are in t e r - l inked and proposed, as early as 1950, a UN 
Peace Fund to be ra ised by adopting disarmament measures. 
On another count Indian e f for t s are worthy. India 
laid the foundations in 1954, when Nehru appealed to 
super powers to suspend nuclear weapon t e s t s immediately 
pending a comprehensive t e s t ban t r e a t y . The r e s u l t was 
the 1963 p a r t i a l Test tian Treaty. 
India was not unaware of the importance of publ ic 
opinion and especial ly on the question of nuclear radia t ion 
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which could affect huge populations and whose long term 
affects only time can t e l l were highlighted way back in 
1955 when India proposed in the UN to es tab l i sh a 
committee of s c i e n t i s t s to study the immediate and long 
term consequence of nuclear rad ia t ion and the ef fec ts of 
nuclear and hydrogen bomb explosions, so that world may 
be informed of the same. As a r e su l t of the ptoposal , 
a s c i e n t i f i c committee on the ett:ects of atomic radia t ion 
was establ ished by the UN. 
At the 1959 session of the General Assembly an Indian 
sponsored Afro-Asrian draft resolut ion urged the French 
government to refra in from conducting nuclear t e s t s in the 
Sahara. But t h i s resolu t ion , even after some changes, had 
no e f fec t . Then again in 1960 India was co-sponsor to two 
resolut ion ca l l ing for immediate cessation of nuclear 
weapon t e s t ing , but in 1961 both the super powers re jectee 
the move by exploding nuclear devices . 
Any evaluation of the impact of Indian nuclear 
po l i c i e s on disarmament negot ia t ions u n t i l the P a r t i a l 
1. J . P. Ja in , o p . c i t . , pp. 89-91. 
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Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963, must necessar i ly 
show how limited, the impact ol: these p o l i c i e s was. 
Insp i te of Indian hiopes to the contrary, the world 
did not agree to general and complete disarmament,funds 
from the arms race were not diverted to meeting the 
needs of developing countr ies and even the Test ban 
Treaty, another Indian object ive, was only a p a r t i a l 
one because France and China did not sign i t and also 
because i t did not prevent the future detonation of 
nuclear t e s t s at underground s i t e s . 
About the ro le of the Indian foreign policy of 
the period i t can be said, " i t s g rea tes t value i s in 
helping to chart a p ro f i l e of New Delhi ' s policy 
a t t i t udes towards disarmament issues between 1947-63. 
These remained consis tent in two re spec t s . First,^ 
despi te i t s enthusiasm tor importing peaceful nuclear 
technology, India sought to accept nuclear technology 
aid only in terms of equal i ty , provided i t did not 
jeopardize i t s sense of independence. She r e s i s t e d 
1. Shyam 3hatia, o p . c i t . , p . 68. 
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the imposition of safeguards and sought to keep her 
nuclear options open for the tut\ii«». iiecond, as a 
consequence of its diplomatic sinriport both for general 
disarmament and a nuclear test Dan, the Indian government 
created for itself the image of a country which would 
never allow its atomic scientists to develop atomic 
bombs for any reason at any time". 
This was evident from the very beginning as in 
19 56, the Government of India published a book by the 
name of "Nuclear Explosions and tlieir effects" compiling 
all the known effects of nuclear radiation on living 
thinjs. In 1964, India again suggested that all nuclear 
proliferation be stopped and a multilateral treaty be 
concluded. Furthermore, in 1978 India proposed for a 
International Convention pronibiting the use or threat 
of use of nuclear weapons. 
In a statement issued on November 27, 1957 Pandit 
Nehru appealed to the super powers to end their unending 
pursuit of nuclear weapons to save the world from definite 
1. Ibid., p.69. 
15 3 
total destruction in case of a war. He said "the very 
existence of humansis threatened". He feared the 
possibility that these nuclear weapons will grow 
vertically as well as horizontally, "Ko country, no 
people, however powerful they might be, are safe from 
destruction if this competition in weapons of mass 
2 
destruction and cold war, continues". He spoke from 
the hear t when he said, "Many people think and ta lk 
about escaping from the d isas ter of a nuclear war by 
ourrowing underground, and l iv ing l ike r a t s in a hole . 
I t be surely a strange coitimentary on our times tha t 
we should be driven to that conclusion instead of 
d i rec t ing a l l our energies and a l l our strength to 
3 
the prevention of that cas tas t rophe" . 
Speaking on disarmament at the conference of 
NDn-aligned Nations a t Belgrade on Septentoer 2, 1961 
Pandit Nehru highlighted the need to create an atmos-
phere in which countries may be wil l ing at leas t to 
1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Speech by Jawaharlal Nehru, 
Nov. 28, 1957. 
2. Ib id . 
3 . Ibid-. ' 
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negotiate, because in his opinion complete disarmament 
was possible only when countries were meeting in a low 
tension atmosphere. He said, "I consider disarmament an 
absolute necessity for the peace of the world ... We can 
not expect to achieve disarmament suddenly. For the 
present moment, the only thing which we can do is to lay 
stress on the need to negotiate". 
Pandit Nehru stressed the need of disarmament when 
he spoke in the Rajya oabha on June 23, 196 2 saying that 
the world has never been without war but it never had 
nuclear weapons also and if countries stop producing 
nuclear weapons and destroy the existing ones, even then, 
at the time of war, industrialised nations would again 
start producing nuclear weapons, so the need was to avoid 
war altogether and that was possible only through 
disarmament. 
It will be apt to say here that the United Nations 
was created to save the world from any future wars and 
to accomplish this goal, from the date when the UN 
charter was signed on 26 June 1945 to this day, its 
1. Non-Aligned Nations at Belgrade, September 2, 1961. 
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major time has been taken by negot ia t ions on disarmament. 
Art ic le l l ( i ; enjoined the UN with the task ot formulation 
of p r inc ip les governing disarmament and the regulat ion of 
arma ents and to make recommendations to members or t o 
securi ty council in t h i s regard. Ar t i c l e 26 of the charter 
gives the authori ty to tormulate the necessary plans for 
the establishement of a system for the regulat ion of 
armament. 
India, a newly independent s t a t e at the time of 
inauguration of UNO had to c la r i fy i t s pos i t ion on various 
issues coming up for discussion before the committee. Many 
Afro-Asian countr ies were s t i l l out of the world body. 
Smaller s t a t e s were in the thicl^ ot a b i t t e r cold war 
between the two power b locs . USA and USSR representing 
two different ideologies were dominating the scene in 
the UWO. In t h i s s i tua t ion , India, though a weak and 
new s ta te , was no less import;ujt because of i t s s t r a t eg ic 
posi t ion and i t s ideology Leased on Gandhian p r inc ip les 
of non-violence and Panchsheel. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit 
ref lec ted these ideas when she spoke to the General Assembly 
in September 1947, she s ta ted "We in India, for our par t . 
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are aware of no compulsion to identify ourselves wholly, 
or to associate ourselves systematically, with either 
or any of the different groups. On the contrary, we 
consider it of paramount importance that the distance 
between them should be narrowed down. We believe that 
our conduct should conduce to t\ii\t end, and that there 
are standards and principles and ideals that transcend 
merely national interests that transcend the exigencies 
of the kind of power politics that has proved so calami-
tous in the past. Accordingly, we shall offer our support 
to, or withhold it from the proposals submitted to us, 
solely in the light of our judgement of the merits of 
the case in question. We stand for peace and will devote 
our resources and energy towards the abolition of all 
causes which lead to war. To those nations that work 
with this aim we shall gladly offer our full cooperation". 
The ensuing negotiations on disarmament reflected 
the bitter cold war as both the blocs used the forum to 
propagate against each other. 3ut India, .true to its 
policy of non-alignment gave her opinion about disarmament 
1. UN Document A/PV 85, 19 oept . 194 7, p. 137, 
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without being saddled by any power b loc . In these discuss-
ions India always advocated that climate of peace i s the 
primary r equ i s i t e for any break-through in regard to 
disarmament. Rose K, Serkes very c lear ly remarks about 
I nd i a ' s ro l e : "Do nothing that wil l contr ibute to the 
further enlargement or entrenchment of the climate of war, 
but do Svery thing possible towards, i t s shrinkage and 
disestabl ishment" . 
The USA and the Soviet Unionwere the f i r s t countries 
which had shown concern for the spread of nuclear weapons, 
in the sub-committee of Disarmament Commission in the 
the 1956-57. Soviets wanted / creat ion of a zone of l imi ta t ion 
and inspection of armaments and the USA wanted p a r t i a l 
disarmament. These proposals were put forward by the two 
countries with the aim that with the prohibi t ion of 
manufacturing weapons, both the p,-)rties wi l l agree not 
to t ransfer such weapons to non-riuclear count r ies . Their 
aim was the same but ooth wanted to adopt d i f ferent 
approaches. The Soviet Union wanted the creat ion of a 
1. uerkes and 3edi, o p . c i t . , p . 3B, 
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zone f r e e of n u c l e a r weapons w h i l e t h e USA s o u g h t an 
agreement on a t r e a t y which would a s s u r e d l y ban t h e 
d i s s e m i n a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons by t h e n u c l e a r powers 
and a c q u i r i n g of n u c l e a r weapons by n o n - n u c l e a r c o u n t r i e s . 
But t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y ' s c o n c e r n t o r t h e p o a s i b l e s p r e a d 
of n u c l e a r weapons t h r o u g h d i s s e m i n a t i o n and a c q u i s i t i o n 
got a c o n c r e t e shape on ly i n 1950. The I r i s h p r o p o s a l of 
20 November 1959 s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e Ten N a t i o n Disarmament 
Committee s h o u l d c o n s i d e r ways and means of a v e r t i n g t h e 
danger of t h e s p r e a d of n u c l e a r weapons and t h e p o s s i b i l i -
t i e s of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreernfjnt s u b j e c t t o i n s p e c t i o n 
and c o n t r o l and b a n n i n g t r a n s f e r of weapons t o n o n - n u c l e a r 
c o u n t r i e s and p r o h i b i t i n g n o n - n u c l e a r c o u n t r i e s from 
a c q u i r i n g t h e m . T h i s p r o p o s a l was r e a d i l y s u p p o r t e d by 
I n d i a , 
The I r i s h d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n was a g a i n d i s c u s s e d i n 
t h e 15th and 15th s e s s i o n of t h e G e n e r a l Assembly, and 
was s u p p o r t e d by Ghana, J a p a n , Morocco and Mexico 
s u g g e s t i n g an ag reemen t on: 
( i ) P r e v e n t i o n of d i s s e m i n a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons . 
( i i ) P r e v e n t i o n of t r a n s f e r of such weapons t o non -
n u c l e a r C o u n t r i e s . 
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( i i i ) i-'revention of manufacture of a c q u i s i t i o n of such 
weapons by non-nuclear c o u n t r i e s . 
Among o ther n a t i o n s , "Sovie t Union suppor ted t h e 
d r a f t , s t r e s s i n g in p a r t i c u l a r the dangers t h a t would 
ensue from g iv ing nuclear weapons t o ^^est Germany". 
This move of the USSR was opposed by the US as i t wanted 
t o p l ace r e s t r i c t i o n s on the nuc lea r powers a l s o on the 
p l e a t h a t non-nuclear powers can not be denied nuc lea r 
weapons i n d e f i n i t e l y . 
The UN General Assembly on 4 December 1901 adopted 
a Swedish d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n , as Reso lu t ion 1664 (XVI) 
c a l l i n g upon the s e c r e t a r y General to make an encjuiry 
and submit a r e p o r t wi thin 4 months regard ing spread 
of nuclear weapons and recogn iz ing the f a c t t h a t "non-
nuc lea r c o u n t r i e s have a grave i n t e r e s t and an important 
p a r t t o f u l f i l , in the prep«irr3t ion and implementat ion 
2 
of such measures" , and "sugges t ing t h a t an enquiry be 
made i n t o t h e cond i t ions under which c o u n t r i e s not 
pos se s s ing nuclfear weapons might be w i l l i n g to en te r 
1. Ui: and Disarmament 1945-65, o p . c i t . , p . 189. 
2. I b i d . , p . 19 3 . 
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into specific undertakings to rc^lrain from manufacturing 
or otherwise acquiring such weajons and to retuse to 
receive, in future, nuclear weapons in their territories 
on behalf of any other country". This draft was termed 
as weak by the isoviet Union and was also opposed by the 
USA on the grounds that it is biased against present 
defensive arrangements and tocusses entirely on non-
nuclear countries. "The conditions which created the 
need for defensive arrangements would have to be removed 
betore these arrangements could be terminated. The draft 
resolution seemed, the United States said, to question 
the right of free nations to join together in collective 
self-defence, including the right to self defence with 
^ 2 
nuclear weapons if need be". 
India reacted to the inquiry by declaring that 
non-prol i fera t ion was necessary as an " i n i t i a l step 
towards disarmament. Indian government f e l t t ha t the 
nuclear weapon s ta tes have a greater r e spons ib i l i ty to 
shoulder as many nations have mi l i t a ry pac t s . I t was 
possible tha t nuclear weapons are possessed by or have 
the capabi l i ty to manufacture nuclear weapons. India 
suggested a 3 point prdxjramae: 
1. Ib id . , p . 193. 
2. Ib id . , p . 192. 
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(i) All these nations not yet manufacturing tiiese 
weapons or permi(.ting them on their t e r r i t o r y 
should undertake not to do so; 
( i i ) The weapons already in existence should be confined 
to the t e r r i t o r y of the nations which manufactured 
them; 
(iii) The latter, as required by the General nssembly 
resolution 1943 (XVI), should bind themijelves by 
a treaty banni'ig nuclear tests and pending such a 
treaty, they should refrain from such tests. 
India suggested that existing nuclear weapons should 
be converted to be used (or peaceful purposes and 
assured that on agreement, it undertakes not to 
possess or acquire such a weapon. 
On August 8, 1963, the US, USSR and UK concluded 
the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, supported by an overwhelming 
majority of nations, prohibiting, preventing and not to 
carry out any nuclear weapon tests explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction 
1, UN uoc. DC/201 and.add 1-3. 
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or control, in the atmcsphere, beyond its limito including 
outer space, or under water including territorial waters 
or uign seas. 
Partial Test Ban Treaty o£ 6 Au'just 1963; 
India readily supported this treaty claiming it was 
the first step towards a larger goal. Indian representative 
in the 18 nation Disarmament Committee said, "Its importance 
does not lie so much ih what the treaty actually says, as 
in what it means and the hopes it aroused", A significant 
point about India's attitude was that India failed to see 
that it safeguarded the dominant position of the powers 
and it did not place any restriction on underground 
explosions. China called it "a fraud", and France did not 
subscribe to it. General De Gauie said, "until the nuclear 
powers foreswore nuclear war and destroyed their nuclear 
2 
weapons, France might not sign the t r e a t y " . This j o in t 
venture of both the super power.'j against the spread of 
technology to other nations and get t ing a firm grip on the 
monopoly of nuclear weapons paved the way for the signing 
of l^'on-Proliferation Treaty. 
1. UN Document, PV 156, 29 Aug. 1963, p . 1 3 . 
2 . The Hindu, Madras , 1 Aug. 196 3 . 
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between PTUT and NPT (1963-')e) the e f fo r t s of the 
super powers were to put a s t rangle hold on the monopoly 
of the nuclear powers and deny to other nations the 
weapon or the technology. On the other hand, France made 
i t very clear tha t i t was going ahead with i t s nuclear 
programme. The cuban misr.ile c r i s i s had shown to the world 
the gravity of the s i tua t ion . Russia was aiming i t s nuclear 
miss i les on American c i t i e s and the Americans were 
entering in to pacts with Europeans to pro tec t them in 
case of a Russian a t tack . The s i tua t ion was fraught with 
tensions as Americans were expected to defend the i r 
c i t i e s f i r s t in case of a Soviet a t tack . NATO grip on 
France accordingly, was loosening. 
Under such circumstances, India i n i t i a t e d on the 
Agenda of UM General Assembly "Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons", pleading that p ro l i fe ra t ion of nuclear 
weapons capable of k i l l i n g the whole human race, were 
on the r i s e since 1945 and tfius the world immediately 
needs prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear 
weapons. India suggested tnat a ban both v e r t i c a l and 
hor izonta l , was a must for the secur i ty and peace of 
the world. 
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Af te r t h e Ch inese n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n on 16th OctoiDer 
1964, i t was more s t r o n g l y f e l t t i i a t such a t r e a t y i s 
needed , u r g e n t l y . I n d i a s u g g e s t e d i n 1965 i n t h e m e e t i n g 
convened on t h e r e q u e s t of USSR, of t h e 18 n a t i o n 
Disarmament Commit tee t h a t f o l l o w i n g measure s h o u l d 
i m m e d i a t e l y be t aXen : 
( i ) An u n d e r t a k i n g by t h e n u c l e a r powers n o t t o t r a n s f e r 
n u c l e a r weapons or n u c l e a r weapon t e c h n o l o g y t o 
o t h e r s ; 
( i i ) V^i u n d e r t a k i n g n o t t o u s e n u c l e a r weapons a g a i n s t 
c o u n t r i e s which d i d n o t p o s s e s s them; 
( i i i ; i-^ u n d e r t a k i n g th rough t n e UK t o s a f e g u a r d t h e s e c u r i t y 
of c o u n t r i e s which migh t be t h r e a t e n e d by powers 
h a v i n g n u c l e a r weapons c a p a o i l i t y or emoarKing on 
n u c l e a r weapons c a p a b i l i t y ; 
( i v ) T a n g i b l e p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s d i sa rmament i n c l u d i n g a 
comprehens ive t e s t ban t r e a t y , a c o m p l e t e f r e e z e 
on p r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons and means of 
d e l i v e r y , a s w e l l a s s u b s t c i i i t i a l r e d u c t i o n i n 
t h e e x i s t i n g s t o c k s ; 
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(v) An u n d e r t a k i n g by n o n - n u c l e a r powers n o t t o a c q u i r e 
or m a n u f a c t u r e n u c l e a j ' weapons . 
To t h i s t h e US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h e E i g h t e e n 
i^Jation Disarmament Conirnittee s a i d t h a t t h e US a g r e e d 
t o each component of I n d i a n p r o p o s a l bu t "a s t a t e m a t e 
might r e s u l t from t h e tl ' ieory t h a t u n l e s s v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s 
were met or v a r i o u s p r i o r m e a s u r e s implemented , n o n - n u c l e a r 
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powers had t o c o n s i d e r a c q u i r i n g n u c l e a r weapons" . 
To p r e v e n t t h e s p r e a d of n u c l e a r weapons, USA s u b m i t t e d 
a d r a f t t r e a t y t o 18 N a t i o n Disarmament Commit tee on 
17 August 1965 . I t s u g g e s t e d t o : 
( i ) - t r o h i b i t n u c l e a r powers from t r a n s f e r r i n g n u c l e a r 
weapons i n t o n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of any n o n - n u c l e a r 
s t a t e , e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e ; 
( i i ) P r o h i b i t n u c l e a r powers from t a k i n g any o t h e r a c t i o n 
would c a u s e an i n c r e a s e in t h e t o t a l number of s t a t e s 
and o t h e r o r g a n i s a t i o n s h a v i n g i n d e p e n d e n t power t o 
use n u c l e a r weapons; and 
1. UN Doc. pc/PV 75, 4 May 1965, p p . 4 - 5 . 
2 . ENDC/W 224, 17 Aug. 196 5, p . 16 . 
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( i i i ) P r o h i b i t nuc lea r powers from a s s i s t i n g any non-
nuclear s t a t e in t h e manufacture of nuc lea r weapons. 
Ind ia opposed t h i s r e s o l u t i o n of the US on t h e grounds 
t h a t i t did not provide any s e c u r i t y , as demanded by the 
Indian r e s o l u t i o n , to non-nucle.ar s t a t e s and r e t a i n e d the 
monopoly of the nuclear s t a t e s . F u r t h e r , I n d i a claimed, 
i t did not p r o h i b i t nuc lear p r o l i f e r a t i o n and r educ t ion 
and u l t i m a t e e l im ina t i on of nuclear weapons and t h e d e l i v e r y 
v e h i c l e s . Ind ia proposed a two-phase r e s o l u t i o n for the 
n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n . In the f i r s t s tage nuc lea r powers were 
asked t o : 
(i) Not t o pass on weapons or technology t o o the r s t a t e s ; 
( i l ) -To cease product ion of nuc lea r weapons and d e l i v e r y 
v e h i c l e s , and to agree on a jt^rogranime uf r educ t ion 
of t h e i r s t o c k s ; and 
( i i i ) To agree a l s o t o incorpoi: a te o ther measures . 
In the second phase, for a comprehensive Treaty , 
non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s viculd be asked t o r e f r a i n from 
manufacture or acqu i r ing of nuclear weapons. If t h e 
1. EKDC/PV, 223, 12 Aug. 1965. 
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f i r s t stage i s not met, after <> speci f ic period as 
according to the I t a l i a n proposal, non-nuclear s t a t e s 
would be free to manufacture or acquire weapons gaining 
nuclear capab i l i ty . 
The iNon-Proliferation Treaty; 
India from the very beginning has advocated freeze, 
cu t t ing down and ult imate elirnination of nuclear weapons. 
In t h i s task, she cal led the super powers to come out with 
a plan vo luntar i ly as they had the grea tes t obligat ion to 
save the mankind, India asked them to r e s t r a in from se l l ing 
such weaponry to other non-nuclear countries as i t was 
through that in theevent of such happening other countries 
would also, some day, go nuclear or those countries who 
could not acquire from a nuclear s t a t e would be tempted 
to acquire one. In thi.'j t;onn<.-•.:. lion Ambassador Chakravarty 
addressed the P o l i t i c a l Committee d)f the General Assembly 
in the following words: 
"Another aspect of t h i s nuclear f ie ld i s something 
tha t i t will be possible for nuclear powers to assure 
the world that there wil l be na supply of them to other 
countries, from where they can go to s t i l l other countr ies , 
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so that they will be d i s t r ibu ted general ly . That i s , with 
the t ransfer of atomic or nuclear or other weapons a 
large number of countries would spread the danger of war 
and where one country outside t h i s group has the weapons, 
other people will t r y to get hold of them". 
rthen Ireland submitted proposals in 1961 to the 
Assembly for an In terna t ional Agreement on: (i) prohib i t ing 
the nuclear s t a t e s to t ransfer nuclear weapons or the 
technology to non-nuclear s t a t e s , ( i i ) prohib i t ing non-
nuclear countr ies e i ther to manufacture or to acquire 
nuclear weapons from other count r ies . The proposal was 
promptly supported by Ambassador Chakravarty on behalf 
of Indian government in the words, "We are happy to support 
the I r i sh reso lu t ion . The important point in t h i s draf t 
reso lu t ion i s that i t draws a t ten t ion to t h i s problem 
that has become mementous becauot? of the increasing 
capacity of a large number of countries to make nuclear 
and thermo-nuclear weapons. That i s the main reason why 
we are happy to support t h i s draf t r e so lu t ion . India 
1. Foreign Affairs Record, i.ew Delhi, Nov, 1961, p . 3. 
2. Ib id . 
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clearly supported the Irish re.solution but at the same time 
it did not hesitate to criticize the resolution on its 
shortcomings especially on the point that the resolution 
mentions no'A'here the position of nuclear powers who are 
continually acquiring more and more such lethal weapons. 
Pointing out this fact Ambassador Cha^ravarty declared, 
"I would like to make it clear that while we will support 
the draft resolution, however unsatisfactory it may be 
from our point of view, my delegation would not like our 
support to imply in any way that we have, by voting for 
this draft resolution, accepted the principles that seen, 
to oe implied in this draft resolution viz. that we agree 
to the continued manufacture or retention of nuclear 
weapons by the existing nuclear powers. Our position on 
this question has remained unchanged. We have always 
believed and we still believe, that there can be no 
effective disarmament uiiless the nuclear powers decide 
to abolish nuclear weapons. The possession and manufacture 
of these weapons act like a chain reaction and not only 
will the existing powers have a nuclear arms race, but 
others may follow". Although, India criticized the 
1. Ibid., p. 97. 
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draft resolution as it lacked in its content some basic 
points regarding the problem of non-dissemination of 
nuclear weapons, but decided to svapport the Irish resolu-
tion declaring that its a beginning of vital importance 
towards the goal of achieving an agreement on disarmament. 
The resolution was thus, unanimously adopted on December 4, 
1961 as Resolution 1965 (:0/I) . 
The matter was again raised by India at the meetings 
of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on the plea 
that Irish resolution can nc't; bi^ come the base of any 
future agreement on di;jarmament: because of its shortcomings. 
V.K. Krishna l-lenon said on this issue on 1962 at a meeting 
of ENDC tnat, "We would not be satisfied merely with the 
idea that the technique of utilizing nuclear weapons 
would not be transferred to another country by a nuclear 
power but that the weapon itself may be given. Nations 
are today sufficiently advanced for any one, who is 
given the weapons, to find ways for using them.Therefore, 
it would not be sufficient for countries which possess 
nuclear weapons to say 'we will give bombs to others but 
1. ENDC/PV 5, 20 March 1962, p. 35. 
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we will not tell them how to use them'. They will soon 
find. Therefore, it means a complete dedication not to 
allow these weapons to get away - a dedication to 
segregate them in places where they now are. After all, 
if you have made them, it is safest for you to keep them 
pending their destructior., why jive them to any body 
else".-^ 
India believed that suppr powers must take the 
initiative to keep the nuclear weapons and their technology 
as it will be too dangerous if .3 large number of nations 
possess them. i^ Joreover, general assembly Resolution No. 
1665 (XIV) does not proliibit transmission of information. 
A large number of nations possessing nuclear weapons 
would mean enhancement of tensions, insecurity and 
instability, reiterating this Krishna Menon said, "We 
do not claim that our national eyo needn to possess 
nuclear weapons. It has been askt^ d r^ ow and then , well, 
if there are going to be nuclear weapony, why should 
tney be confined to great ones? L'hi*re may be iiome 
force in the case of something that serves mankind. 
1. EUDC/'iPV 5, 20 March 196 2, p. 35. 
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but so far as my country i s c.ncerned, we do not feel any 
national suppression, any nation^i'l humiliation or any 
nat i Dnal backwardness in not being able to possess nuclear 
weapons. Non-dissemination i s an urgent necess i ty . This 
i s not a t heo re t i ca l pos i t ion . There have been developments 
in t h i s by at l e a s t 20 countr ies in the world, including 
my own, which are now capable ot making such weapons. And, 
what i s more, with the advancement of science and smaller 
s ize of these weapons, and t h e i r p o r t a b i l i t y , the i r 
eminousness i s increased". Thus, I nd i a ' s stand was made 
clear by Henon arguing that i t was not necessary for a 
nation to become great to possess a nuclear device. He 
s ta ted that i t was even more dangerous now since smaller 
versions which are por table can be t ransfer red to those 
nations which do not possess tnem. I t was f e l t by him 
tha t t h i s i s the greates t threat to mankind as any 
attack with such weapons would i n f l i c t very wide and 
harrowing havoc and des t ruc t ion . This move by India 
fa i led at the £NDC and UN General Assembly and at the 
very moment China went ahead witii i t s development of a 
1, Foreign Affairs Record, July 1962, p . 148. Krishna 
Menon's speech in the ENDC see ENDC/PV 60, 24 July 1962, 
p . 9. 
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nuclear device across the border. It justitied its 
manufacture of nuclear weapons on the ground tliat they 
were necessary for the purpose of defending world peace 
and promoting the cause of nuclear disarmament. 
India opposed any more nations to join the nuclear 
club and the concern was shown at tlie non-aligned conference 
at Cairo to persuade the body to stop China from developing 
a nuclear weapon suggesting that <i special mJ:;sion should 
be sentto China for the purpose, not only for her own 
security but for the security of: mankind. 
Lai Bahadur Shastri in the NAM Conference at Cairo 
said, "Many of those a;5sembled here might recall how 
strongly the first non-aligned conference at Belgrade 
felt on the subject of tests and how separate missions 
were sent to the US and the Soviet Union to persuade 
them to desist from further tests. With this background 
in mind the conference should consider, the recent 
disturbing indications which suggest that China is 
1. The People's Daily, Peking, 9 August 1962, 
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aixjut to explode a nuclear cieyice. I propose that we 
might consider sending a special mission to persuade 
China to desist from developing nuclear weapons. I say 
that not because India and China have some differences 
today. These differences must sooner or later, be 
resolved. But the threat to humanity from one more 
country having nuclear weapons at its disposal is far 
more serious matter". 
1, opeeches of ixime Mini stei , Lai Bahadur Shastri, 
Govt, of India, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, Publication Division, Delhi, 1966. 
C H A P T E R - i_ / 
I N D I A ' S rOLICY Ui^rO THE r.u. Ll-l I DECL/'\RATIOL 
ISO 
The stand taken by India that the super powers should 
ensure that nuclear weapons are not spread to other countr ies 
changed after China exploded a nuclear device on October 
16, 1964, at Lop Nor in Sinkiang. The thrust was now on the 
freezing of nuclear production by the nuclear c lub . India 
changed the term "non-dissemination" to "non-prol i feration". 
The changed stand concentrated on the nuclear club and the 
need for arms control as India termed the explosion by 
China as something gravely ser ious about the secur i ty of 
human c i v i l i z a t i o n . The explosion has increased the r isk 
of a nuclear holocaust . Indian po l i cy was to impress the 
fac t that the p r o l i f e r a t i o n was re la t ed b a s i c a l l y to 
nuclear powers, as they were the only ones required to 
stop building up nuclear s t o c k p i l e s , not the non-nuclear 
s t a t e s . If there was t o be an ^^reement i t was to be among 
the nuclear powers, who had to be consulted and i f they 
agreed to stop producticxi of nuclear weapons, i t would 
be eas ier to bring non-nuclear countr ies to d e s i s t from 
entering the nuclear c lub. 
1. Ambassador Husain's speech, U» General Asstmblv 
F i r s t Committee, 22nd Sess ion, 1567th meeting 
14th May 1968, p. 12. 
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"India wanted the nuclear powers to s e t a good 
exanple before the non-nuclear countr ies by agreeing 
to stop further production of nuclear weapons". The 
point was that the nuclear s t a t e s can not take everyone 
for a r ide and issue orders regarding the development 
or n on-development of nuclear weapons, unless they 
stop the nuclear production themselves. Ambassador 
Trivedi speaking at ENDC on 16t*i August 1965 said: 
"No in t e rna t iona l Treaty can be acceptable which 
i s sues d i c t a t e s only to non-nuclear countr ies not to do 
t h i s or tha t , p a r t i cu l a r l y when the countr ies possessing 
nuclear weapons do not assume any pr ior commitments 
2 
themselves". Ambassador Trivedi was of the opinion 
tha t the super powers were in te rpre t ing the world 
p ro l i f e r a t ion to their advantage. He quoted Oxford 
English Dictionary which explains the word as, 
'reproduce i t s e l f , grow by mul t ip l ica t ion of elenentary 
p a r t s . So, in the l ight of above India ca l led for a 
t r ea ty based on logic, r a t iona le and reason. 
1. Ashwani Kumar Chopra, I n d i a ' s Policy on Disarmament, 
1984, p . 156, 
2, ENDC/PV 222, 16th Aug. 1965, p . 15, 
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The task of disarmament of nuclear weapons based 
on non-prol i fera t ion was a d i f f i c u l t one and India 
advocated tha t i t has to be done in a phased manner^ not 
a t one go. The task was to freeze the production of 
nuclear weapons and then to destroy the exis t ing ones. 
Furthermore, India supported the proposals 
presented by the foreign minister of I t a l y , Mr, Fan Fani 
regarding the problem of p ro l i f e r a t i on , he declared: 
"One could imagine tha t the non-nuclear countr ies , in 
pa r t i cu l a r those close to nuclear capabi l i ty , might 
agree to renounce u n i l a t e r a l l y , equip themselves with 
nuclear arms for a pre-deteimined length of time, i t 
being understood of course that i f the i r demands, referred 
to above, were not met during tha t time l imi t they would 
resume the i r freedom of act ion". 
India considered i t a respectable proposal 
ca l l ing a l l non-nuclear countr ies t o u n i l a t e r a l l y decide 
not to produce nuclear weapons for a given period 
1, I b id , , p . 16, 
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of time only and i f the nuclear countr ies do not stop 
the production of nuclear arsenal, everyone should be 
free to produce them at t he i r end. 
On the other hand, the nuclear powers were only 
in t e res t ed in stopping non-nuclear, powers from enter ing 
the nuclear club, without any obligat ion on themselves. 
For example, USA was trying to impress upon others , the 
need to have a t rea ty based on General Assembly reso lu-
t ion 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961, which i s based on 
r e s t r i c t i o n s for non-nuclear countr ies only and says 
nothing about the curbing o£ mul t ip l ica t ion of nuclear 
weapons by the super powers. 
General Assembly adopted on 23 November 1965, 
by 9 3-0 votes, a resolut ion presented by India based 
on the following f ive p r inc ip l e s ; 
1, The t r e a t y should be void of any loopholes which 
might permit the nuclear or non-nuclear powers 
to p r o l i f e r a t e , d i r ec t l y or i nd i r ec t ly , nuclear 
weapons in any form; 
2. The t r ea ty should embody an acceptable balance of 
mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and obl igat ions of the 
nuclear and non-nuclear powers; 
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3. The t rea ty should be a step towards the achieve-
ment of general and complete disarmament and 
more pa r t i cu l a r l y nuclear disarmament; 
4 . There should be an acceptable and workable 
provision to ensure the effect iveness of the 
t r ea ty , and 
5. Nothing in the t r ea ty should adversely affect 
the r igh t of any < r^oup of s t a t e s to conclude 
regional t r e a t i e s in order to ensure the t o t a l 
absence of nuclear weapons in the i r respect ive 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 
India strucX to i t s o r ig ina l stand for equal 
s t a tus of a l l the s t a t e s , nuclear or non-nuclear, same 
r i g h t s and dut ies for a l l . India was asking the nuclear 
s t a t e s to "cut-off* f iss ionable mater ia l production 
for weapons purposes as the f i r s t step towards the 
larger goal of achieving disarmament, i . e . reduction 
or ds t ruct ion of already ex is t ing s tockpi les of 
1. Treaty on the Non-Proli terat ion of Nuclear Weapons (See Appendix I t l , 
1S5 
nuclear a rsena ls . India was t ry ing to inqpress upon the 
world tha t the exis t ing s tockpi les of nuclear arsenals 
was enough for destroying the human race . Therefore, 
i t was not enough j u s t to atop the production of any 
further nuclear weapons, but to reduce the s t o r e s . 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi spoke to Lok SaUia regarding th i s 
on 14 March 1968 in the following words, "Measures 
which do not involve an element of self r e s t r a i n t on 
the pa r t of a l l s t a t e s , nuclear weapon s t a t e s as well 
as non-nuclear weapon s ta tes , cannot form the bas is for 
a meaningful agreeement to promote disarmament", 
Mrs, Gandhi argued that a non-prol i fera t ion 
t r ea ty has a special effect on non-nuclear s t a t e s 
because v*ien one group of s t a t e s continues to p i l e 
up nuclear arsenals i t i s qui te l ike ly that non-nuclear 
s t a t e s f a l l prey to the i r blackmail i f they themselves 
do not manufactiire similar armaments. 
The other face of nuclear power i s the peaceful 
uses of the energy. When a non-prol i fera t ion t r ea ty i s 
being signed t h i s question i s bound to crop-up and create 
1. Foreign Affairs Record January 1968, p , 65. 
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complexit ies. Indian view was made clear on th i s i ssue 
by a statement by Hi. M.C. Chagla in the Lok Sabha of 
Indian Parliament on 17 March 1967. He sa id: 
" I t i s the view of Indian Government that the 
non-prol i fera t ion t r ea ty should be such as not to 
impede the growth of nuclear science and technology 
in the developing countr ies where the need tor such 
development i s g r ea t " . 
Indian opinion was made clear that the use of 
nuclear energy tor peaceful purposes should not be 
denied to non-nuclear countr ies as i t i s a l l the more 
important for them for nat ional progress . Even nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes could be conducted 
and th i s important r i ^h t to them could not be denied 
for the i r speedy development. The contention of nuclear 
powers was that such a use of nuclear energy involves 
the same technology and i t s use for mi l i t a ry purposes 
can not be re jec ted . The Indian reply was that any 
1. ENDC/PV 298, 23 May 1967, p . 10. The speech of 
Mr. M.C. Chagla was quoted by Mr. Trivedi, I n d i a ' s 
Ambassador in the Disarmament Committee. 
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s c i e n t i f i c technology could be used for mi l i t a ry purposes 
and the know-how of nuclear technology can not be denied 
to under developed countr ies or which could prove to be 
very important for the i r progress . Instead, India proposed 
under observance of in te rna t iona l community to ensure that 
i t i s used only for peaceful purposes, India offered her 
services for in te rna t iona l control over non-nuclear 
countr ies using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes 
only,But, in no case, India was ready to surrender the r igh t 
of a l l nations to use t h i s technology for the i r betterment 
and progress . 
The nuclear powers again t r i e d to thwart the attempts 
of non-nuclear countr ies of acquiring nuclear devices for 
peaceful purposes, by offering to desirous s t a t e s nuclear 
explosion services for peaceful purposes, on a charge. 
Nuclear powers wanted a clause to be inser ted in the 
t r ea ty for the same. Ar t ic le V in the draf t s presented 
by USA and USSR proposed the provision of such services 
by nuclear powers to non-nuclear powers for peaceful 
purposes. 
India again opposed t h i s move of the super powers 
on the plea that t h i s wil l c rea te a s i tua t ion where smaller 
s t a t e s wil l be solely dependent on the big powers and a 
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race, to the blocs, wil l begin. Moreover, such dependence 
can not be t h r u s t on sovereign s t a t e s who want to develop 
a technology for peaceful purposes for the i r development, 
India based i t s view on the pleas, of secur i ty of 
non-nuclear s t a t e s and peaceful purposes of nuclear energy 
and on the other hand the nuclear powers were t ry ing, a l l 
along, to thwart such attempts and keep the monopoly with 
themselves, as evident by the draf t t r ea ty submitted by 
the US and USSR on 31 May 1968. 
The question of the non-prol i fera t ion of nuclear 
weapons was included in the agenda of the Assembly's 
twentieth session at the request of the Soviet Union. 
On 24th September 1965 Soviet Union submitted i t s draf t 
t r ea ty to the General Assembly containing the following 
2 
poin ts on non-prol i ferat ion of nuclear weapons. 
(i) Prohibit nuclear powers from t rans fe r r ing nuclear 
weapons d i r ec t l y or i nd i r ec t ly through groupings of S ta tes , 
1, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth 
Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 106, Document A/5976. 
2. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965. United 
Nations Publication, New York, 1967, p . 203. 
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i n to the ownership or disposal of Sta tes or groups of 
s t a t e s not possessing nuclear weapons or from granting 
the aforesaid s t a t e s or group or s t a t e s "the r igh t to 
p a r t i c i p a t e in the ownership, control or use of nuclear 
weapons. 
( i l ) Prohibi t such powers from giving nuclear weapons and 
control over them and over the i r location and use to un i t s 
of the armed forces or to individual members of the armed 
forces of S ta t e s not possessing nuclear weapons; and 
( i i i ) Require powers not possessing nuclear weapons to 
undertake not to create , manufacture or prepare to manufac-
ture nuclear weapons, e i ther independently or j o i n t l y with 
other s t a t e s , and to refuse to be associated with nuclear 
weapons in any form whatsoever d i r ec t l y or i nd i r ec t ly , 
through th i rd s t a t e s or grouping of s t a t e s . 
Although, India praised the draf t t r e a ty proposed 
by the Soviet Union considering i t as a step forward in 
the d i rec t ion of negotiat ing a t r ea ty on non-prol i fera t ion 
of nuclear weapons, and laying to r e s t some doubts in the 
minds of non-nuclear weapons s t a t e s in the present 
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circumstances. The Indian representa t ive , simultaneously, 
f e l t that the draf t was inadequate and fa i led to qualify 
the non-discriminatory t e s t . 
Both the d ra f t s presented by Soviet Union and the 
United Sta tes t r i ed to pro tec t the i r own i n t e r e s t without 
any regard for the i n t e r e s t s of non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s . 
Nor the draf t s t r i ed to h i t the armaments problem on the 
face. The Soviet draf t t r i e d to safeguard i t s own i n t e r e s t s 
by h i t t i n g out a t NATO, equipping West Germany with nuclear 
weapons. The accompanying explanatory memorandum had made 
2 
that point absolutely c l ea r . Both the super powers were 
t ry ing to delink other measures from non-prol i fera t ion 
-ed 
agreement, which na tura l ly was object to by non-nuclear 
weapon s t a t e s and the i r secur i ty problem was not tackled 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y by the d r a f t s . India remarked to t h i s 
aspect of the t r ea ty that a non-prol i fera t ion t r e a ty 
could be successful only i f i t covered a l l aspects of 
1. For I n d i a ' s v iew, see ENDC/PV 240 15 F e b . 1966, p . 15 
2 . ENDC/PV 164, 27 J a n . 1966, pp 2 - 3 . 
191 
disarmament, I n d i a was in favour of a t r e a t y which could 
be endorsed by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community and focussed 
a t t e n t i o n on the p r e s e n t as wel l as fu tu re problems of 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n based on the t e n e t s of e q u a l i t y and mutual 
2 b e n e f i t s . Both t h e super powers, in tu rn , r e s e n t e d t h e 
move of the non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s t o l ink o the r measures 
t o n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n agreement. The General Assembly 
Reso lu t ion 2073 (XX) adopted by 97-0 with f i v e absen t i ons , 
however, v i s u a l i s e d the l inkage between n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
4 
t r e a t y and measures of nuc lea r disarmament" . The Resolu-
t i o n saw the p o s s i b i l i t y of an agreement aimed a t p reven t ion 
of p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuc lea r weapons, e s t a b l i s h i n g a l ink 
between n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n t r e a t y and disarmament. 
The conc lus ion of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n with no nega t i ve 
vo te was seen as a s t ep forward towards the conc lus ion of 
NPT. The per iod 1966, and beginning of 1967 was devoted 
1. Foreign Af fa i r s Record, New Delhi , v o l . XII, n 2, 
8 Feb. 1966, p . 25. 
2. I b i d . , p . 26. 
3 . United Nat ions and Disarmament 1945-70, UN P u b l i c a t i o n , 
New York, 1971, p . 277, 
4 . I b i d . , p . 2 2 8 . 
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to heavy activity among nuclear weapon states in numerous 
meetings, both official and unofficial. The spirit of 
growing friendship and slowing down of cold war was seen 
in the statement made by the then US President, "we must 
also recognise that at the heart of our concern in the 
years ahead must be our relationship with the Soviet Union". 
Theresult of the growing 'detente' was the identical treaties 
n 1 
submit ted by the super powers on 24 August 1967, before the 
ENDC.^ 
Mrs. I n d i r a Gandhi, the then Prime Minis te r of I nd i a 
made a s ta tement in Lok Sabha on November 2, 1966, which 
conta ined t h e need of s t a r t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s among the 
s t a t e s of t he world to safeguard the peace and e x i s t e n c e 
of mankind on e a r t h . But she affirmed the f e a r s of many 
t h a t t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s going on a t p r e s e n t on n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
of nuc lear weapons i s a good sign t o r peace but t h e absence 
of some nuc lear weapon powers from the n e g o t i a t i o n s may 
make i t p a r t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e . She a l s o dec l a r ed her government 's 
1. Arnold Kramish, 'The watched and t h e Unwatched, 
Adelphi Papers* No. 36, London, 1967, p . 3 . 
2 . The US d r a f t t r e a t y t e x t , ENDC/19 2 and Soviet d r a f t 
t r e a t y t e x t , ENDC/193, 24 Aug. 1967. 
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opposition to the point in negot ia t ions tha t nuclear powers 
will continue to manufacture nuclear weapons but the non-
nuclear powers wi l l have no r i g h t "to manufacture or acquire 
nuclear weapons for the i r own defence". 
She also said during her statement in Lok Sabha on 
November 2, 1966, "at the same time, we have s ta ted tha t 
government of India does not propose to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. This i s a decision taken many years ago and i s 
unrelated to the t r ea ty of non-prol i fera t ion d)f nuclear 
weapons. We sha l l continue our e f fo r t s for nuclear disarmament 
because i t i s only through nuclear disarmament that d i s c r i -
mination would be eliminated and equal i ty between nat ions 
re -es tab l i shed" .^ 
About her governments' opposition to the NPT she 
impressed upon the house tha t government i s considering a l l 
the amendments being proposed during de l ibera t ions but India 
"shal l continue t o impress upon the nuclear powers, the 
need for a balanced and non-discriminatory t r e a t y " . 
1. The Times of India. New Delhi, Nov. 3, 1966. 
2. Ib id . 
3. Ib id . 
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The Prime Minister further s ta ted in the house that 
if India abstained from signing NFT, she might face some 
hardships as t h i s act wi l l not be liked by super powers. 
Foreign aid and help may be reduced but the government was 
ready to face any hardships and sac r i f i ce whatever i s 
required to take India to a posi t ion of s trength and self-
sufficiency. Insp i t e of b i t t e r opposition from India the 
t r ea ty did not help in the cause of disarmament and the race 
for nuclear super ior i ty i s speeding up day by day.More and 
more sophist icated nuclear weapons have been developed, 
- l i s s i l e s with multiple war heads, which can pene t ra te the 
a n t i - b a l l i s t i c miss i les defence systems. This kind of 
sophis t icated weaponery has been possible due t o the 
lacunae in the NPT v«*iere non-prol i ferat ion means dif ferent 
th ings for non-nuclear powers and en t i r e ly d i f ferent for 
the club of f ive . The difference i s the same between non-
p ro l i f e ra t ion t r ea ty and the objectives of nuclear 
disarmament. 
The t rea ty i s re la ted t o a n a t i o n ' s secur i ty a l so . 
Security of the nation means that a nation should be free 
to pursue legi t imate i n t e r e s t s without any in ter ference 
from outside and if challenged, pro tec t i t s e l f by war. 
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India was always of the opinion that the causes of insecur i ty 
could be g rea t ly reduced if the nuclear and non-nuclear powers 
agreed not t o p r o l i f e r a t e the arms race . The then external 
Affairs Minister, Swarn Singh speaking in the General Assembly 
in 1967 sa id tha t " I t has long been accepted . . . that i n t e r -
nat ional securi ty l i e s not in armament, but in r e t r a i n t s on 
armaments and in disarmament. 
The Indian representa t ive to the conference declared 
that India has strong objections to the resolut ion tha t the 
nuclear technology wi l l be personal property of a chosen few 
and wil l be denied to other countr ies for even peaceful uses . 
He said that "such arragements were tantamount to surrender 
of nat ional sovereignty by the vast majority of countr ies , 
while enabling a chosen few to effect ively d i c t a t e the 
programme which they deem to be appropriate for the peaceful 
u t i l i s a t i o n of atomic energy in other count r ies . Such measures 
would only contr ibute to a further widening of the technolo-
g ica l gap between the developing and the i n d u s t r i a l l y 
advanced countries and would cons t i tu te a clear v io la t ion 
l.Swaran Singh, Minister for External Affairs , UN General 
Assembly, 22nd Session, 159 2nd meeting, 6 Oct. 1967, p . 9 . 
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of the primary objective of the In terna t ional Atomic Energy, 
namely i t s promotional a c t i v i t i e s . In t h i s context the Indian 
delegate reminded the conference by quoting a document adopted 
by the UN special session to say tha t " a l l s t a t e s should 
also have access to , and be free to acquire technology, 
equipment and mater ia l for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Iden t i ca l Treaty Drafts by USA and USSR 
When on 24 August 1967, USA and USSR submitted 
iden t i ca l t r ea ty draf ts i t , "marked the culifatnation of years 
of pa t ien t e f for t s to narrow and remove differences between 
2 the two powers'*. "The 1968 NPT was nothing but a modified 
form of t h i s draf t with an addit ional compromise between 
the Soviets and Americans or the in t e rna t iona l safeguards 
3 
contained in Ar t ic le I I I of the t r e a t y . The other side of 
the p ic ture was that the t r ea ty fa i led to incorporate the 
s p i r i t of the UN resolut ion 2028 (XA) of 1965. "Though i t 
has been hai led as a turning point in the five years of 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 2 March 1968. 
2. 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 
UN, New York, 1969, p . 19. 
3. For the tex t of the t r ea ty , see Appendix I I I . 
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negot ia t ions on the non-prol i ferat ion t rea ty and as a major 
compromise on t h i s issue, i t could hardly be acceptable to 
the non-nuclear powers", A number of amendments were 
received by the Co-Chairman of the Eighteen National Disar-
mament Committee from many countr ies that did not p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the work of the committee. R.K.Trivedi, I n d i a ' s represen-
t a t i ve , said, refer ing to the US-USSR draf t t r e a t i e s , on 
28 September, 1967, " I t has been the firm in t e rna t iona l 
t h e s i s a l l along that the cessation of production of 
f i ss ionable material for weapon purposes i s the bas is of 
2 
non-prol i fera t ion of nuclear weapons'*. When t h i s approach 
fa i led to achieve the goal to conclude a non-prol i fera t ion 
t r e a t y i t was suggested tha t , "we should discard that 
3 
solution and adopt some other way of obtaining a t r e a t y " , 
Indian representa t ive re jected th i s argument and said, " that 
does not mean we should discard the concept of general and 
complete disarmament under ef fec t ive i n t e rna t iona l control 
and that too in favour of a discriminatory concept of 
1. P.K, Jha, 'The Non-Proliferation Trea ty ' , AICC Economic 
Review, New Delhi, vo l . 19, No. 7, 15 Oct. 1967, p . 12. 
2. ENDC/PV 334, 28 Sept. 1967, p . 5 . 
3. I b id . , 
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monopolistic armament . . . or tha t we should discard the 
concepts underlying various p a r t i a l measures of disarmament 
n 1 
in favour of concepts of graduated and responsive armament , 
India also objected to Ar t ic le I and Ar t i c l e I I of 
the draf t t r ea ty as these a r t i c l e s "purport to deal with, 
two facets ot the problems, that i s of dissemination and 
2 
p ro l i f e r a t i on" . Trivedi, Indian Ambassador, argued that 
these a r t i c l e s did not "deal with the question of the t ransfer 
of nuclear weapons to ftnd the i r s ta t ion ing in the t e r r i t o r i e s 
of other countr ies , or with that of the t r a in ing of the armed 
personnel of non-nuclear nat ions in the use of nuclear weapons". 
Another loophole in Art ic le I was tha t i t did not prevent 
one nuclear weapon s t a t e to a s s i s t , encourage and induce 
another such s t a t e t o manufacture or acquire or control 
4 nuclear weapons. 
India also objected to the provision denying nuclear 
energy for use in peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon 
s t a t e s . In her opinion the nuclear powers want t o become 
1. I b i d . , p . 6 . 
2. I b i d . , p . 11. 
3. Ib id . 
4 . Ib id . , pp. 11-12. 
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s o m e t h i n g l i k e supe r commerc ia l s t a t e s t o s e l l t h e t e c h n o l o g y , 
t o n o n - n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e s , t o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s . "An 
a p p r o p r i a t e d r a f t on n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons 
h a s t o dea l on ly wi th t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons 
and n o t w i th e x p l o s i v e d e v i c e s f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s " . 
R.K. T r i v e d i r e a s s e r t e d I n d i a ' s s t a n d , " I n d i a i s d e v o u t l y i n 
f avour of n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons b u t i s e q u a l l y 
i n favour of p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r t e c h n o l o g y fo r p e a c e f u l 
2 p u r p o s e s " . A r t i c l e I I was c r i t i c i s e d by T r i v e d i a s no t s t r i c t l y 
i n accordance wi th t h e UN r e s o l u t i o n 2028 (XXi, mixed up t h e 
i s s u e s of d i s s e m i n a t i o n and m a n u f a c t u r e of weapons and d i d n o t 
t a k e i n t o accoun t t h e J o i n t S t a t e m e n t on Agreed P r i n c i p l e s of 
3 
September 1 9 6 1 . He d e c l a r e d t h a t A r t i c l e I I " imposes d i s c r i m i -
n a t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n on ly on t h e non-nuc leaJ j weapon s t a t e s and 
g i v e s a l i c e n c e t o t h e n u c l e a r weapon powers t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r 
4 
p r o d u c t i o n and p r o l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons" . 
I n d i a a l s o p o i n t e d ou t t h a t two v i t a l a r t i c l e s were 
m i s s i n g from t h e d r a f t , one r e l a t i n g t o c o n t r o l and t h e 
o t h e r r e g a r d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s t o w a r d n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t . 
1 . I b i d . , p . 12 . 
2 . I b i d . 
3 . I b i d . , p . 1 3 . 
4 . I b i d . 
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India proposed, " that the control provisions should deal with 
the t ransfer and rece ip t of f i s s i l e mate r ia l " . The second 
missing Ar t i c le was regarding ob l iga t ions . India cal led the 
2 draf t t r ea ty as "hal t ing and h e s i t a n t " . India pleaded that 
the th rea t to mankind and nat ions comes from nuclear 
weapon powers, "Our t rea ty would therefore , have to deal 
in a more spec i f ic manner with the t h r e a t which the nuclear 
3 
weapons pose to the insecur i ty of na t ions" , India proposed 
the incorporation in the t r ea ty , "of a separate a r t i c l e 
affirming the solemn resolve of the nuclear weapon powers 
to undertake meaningful measures of disarmament, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
4 
of nuclear disarmament", i f the nuclear weapon s t a t e s are 
re luc tan t to undertake firm measures for disarmament. 
Revised Draft Treaty 
In view of the b i t t e r opposition by India and various 
amendments suggested by many non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s , USA 
and Soviet Union submitted revised but i den t i ca l draf t s on 
18 January 1968 in which agreed safeguard provisions were 
5 incorporated in Ar t i c l e I I I . The major changes incorporated 
1. I b id . , p . 14. 
2. Ib id , , p . 16. 
3. I b id . 
4 . Ibid 
5. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970, o p , c i t . , p . 290, 
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in the revised text pertained to the availability of 
potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to all 
parties, an undertaking to continue negotiations in good 
faith on disarmament to halt the nuclear arms race and the 
affirmation of the rights of states party to the treaty to 
have agreements of nuclear weapon free zones. Some non-
nuclear weapon countries proposed amendments seeking the 
freedom to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
including the nuclear explosive devices, linkage of 
measures of nuclear disarmament/ security assurances/ an 
automatic review conference every five years and twenty 
2 
five years l imit to the duration of the t r e a t y . 
India had played a very ac t ive ro le in gathering 
support of In te rna t iona l Public opinion t o r a l l y around 
the question of the r igh t of non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s to 
use nuclear energy for peaceful pxirposes. 
Draft Resolution on Security Assurances 
On 7 March 1968, the USSR, the United S ta tes and the 
United Kingdom introduced in the ENDC a draf t resolut ion on 
1. Ib id . 
2. K.K. Pathak, o p . c i t . , p . 107. 
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secur i ty assurances which they undertook to submit in the 
securi ty council in connection with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. According to the draf t resolut ion, the securi ty 
council would recognise that aggression with nuclear weapons, 
or threa t thereof, against a non-nuclear s t a t e would c a l l 
for immediate action by the secur i ty council, and above a l l 
by i t s nuclear weapon s t a t e permanent members, in accordance 
2 
with the i r obl igat ions under the cha r t e r . This j o i n t 
resolut ion was adopted by the secur i ty council on 19 June 
196b, tjy ten votes to none, with five absteotbns as, 
resolut ion 255 (1968). India, together with Pakistan, 
Algeria and Brazi l opined tha t the real hope of securi ty 
for non-nuclear s t a t e s lay in nuclear disarmament. India 
held that the proposed guarantees were discriminatory 
as they were applicable only to p a r t i e s to the Treaty 
and f e l l short of assuring guarantees against a l l kinds 
of aggression already contemplated in the char te r . 
Jo in t Soviet and US Draft Treaty 
The USA and the USSR, on 11 March 1968 presented a 
j o i n t revised draft t r e a t y which included some of the 
1. Ib id . 
2 . UN Doc. ENDC/222, 7 March 1968, p . l 
3. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970, o p , c i t . , p . 301 . 
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amendments proposed in the ENDG meetings by non-nuclear 
weapon s t a t e s . I t was submitted to the General Assembly 
on 14 March 1968, together with the complete repor t of the 
were 
EKDC. The three major powers, USA, USSR and UK/pleased 
by the report tor ha l t ing the nuclear arms race and spread 
of nuclear weapons. 
The t r ea ty f e l l short of the expectat ions held by the 
non-nuclear s t a t e s who were contemplating a t r ea ty which 
would r e s t ruc tu re in t e rna t iona l power s t ruc ture , r e f l ec t ing 
post colonial e ra . The nuclear powers i n s i s t ed on keeping 
the nuclear technology to themselves while denying the same 
to have no t s . Ignoring the objections ra i sed by non-nuclear 
s t a t e s , the super powers moved in the twenty second session 
of the General Assembly, the draft t r e a t y . On 12 June 1968, 
4 8 nations moved the r e so lu t ion . I t was carr ied by 95 votes 
to 4 (Albania, Cuba, the United Republic of Tanzania and 
Gambia) with India and twenty other nat ions abs t -a ined. 
The t r e a t y on the non-prol i ferat ion of nuclear 
2 
weapons, and what i t was intended to do. By Ar t i c l e IX(3) 
1. The following countr ies abstained: Algeria, Argentina, 
Brazil , Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, 
Franee, Gabon, Gbinea, India, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Portugal, Ruanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, 
Spain and Uganda. 
2. For fu l l text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty^ see Appendix. 
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i t accomodated both France and China in what i s called the 
non-prol i fera t ion regime. Thus, the five permaraent members 
of the Security Council with ther ight to veto, are the 
five nuclear weapon powers. The t r e a ty closed the doors 
on others to enter what i s cal led the exclusive nuclear 
club with i t s monopoly both of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
explosive technology. 
Alva Myrdal, discussing the s t ruc tu ra l weakness within 
the NET, points out tha t the ru les concerning t ransfer and 
safeguards are extremely unfair t o the non-nuclear powers; 
they are , moreover, indefensible from the point of view of 
disarmament. Those who have already joined the nuclear club 
are free to t ransfer to one another both nuclear weapons 
and the r e l a t ed nuclear explosive devices as well as to 
" a s s i s t , encourage and induce", one another to acquire and 
manufacture machinery for nuclear weapon production. The 
non-nuclear weapon countr ies are not free to do any of these 
th ings . They are also e x p l i c i t l y forbidden to ' receive any 
ass is tance in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices ' 
(Art ic le I and II) .^ 
1. K.K. Pathak, o p . c i t . , p . 108. 
2. Alva Myrdal, The Right to Conduct Nuclear Explosions; 
P o l i t i c a l Aspects and Policy Proposal, Stockho3an, 1975, 
p . 13. 
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India c r i t i c i z e d and objected to the non-Prol i ferat ion 
t r ea ty on three grounds, namely, i t s r e l a t i on t o nuclear 
disarmament, i t s implications on secur i ty and i t s consequences 
on peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Mr. Dinesh Singh, the then Minister of External Affairs 
protes ted against the Treaty f ina l ly approved by the General 
Assembly resolu t ion 2373 (XXVII) by declar ing; "The t r ea ty 
on Non-Prolif erat ion of Nuclear Vi/eapons cannot contr ibute 
in any way to a balanced process ot disarmament. I t seeks 
to bind the hands of the powerless and to l icense , further 
accumulation of armaments . . . which threaten our very 
ex is tence . I t i s for that reason tha t we remain unable to 
sign the t r e a t y " . 
Since the t r ea ty lacked on those counts which India 
was always against , i . e . p ro l i f e ra t ion of arms by nuclear 
powers and enhancement of insecur i ty and tensions due to 
such p ro l i f e ra t ion , India refused to sign the t r e a t y . 
The USA and the USSR have huge p i l e s of ICBMs, long range 
and short range miss i les capable of destroying the world, 
and not providing for any r e s t r a i n t on these nuclear powers 
1, UN General Assembly, F i r s t Committee, 24th Session, 
1775th meeting, 2 Oct. 1969, p . 2, 
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i s a negation of disarmament. The r ea l t h r ea t was from these 
nuclear powers rather than the non-nuclecjr powers t rying to 
enter theclub. India argued that the t r ea ty lacked miserably 
in l imit ing the arsenals of nuclear powers and hence, wil l 
be of no help t o the cause of disarmament. Ambassador Azim 
Kusain made clear the view of the Indian Government in the 
words: 
"The t r ea ty i s e s sen t i a l ly a non-armament measure 
and does not in any way curb yallopiny ve r t i c a l p ro l i f e ra t ion 
Another shortcoming of the t r ea ty was Ar t i c l e I which 
does not prohib i t the t r a in ing of non-nuclear s t a t e s , in the 
use of nuclear weapons, by nuclear powers. This kind of a 
lacunae may, again endanger the cause of disarmament, a 
t ra ined force, in the use of nuclear weapons, will de f in i t e ly 
t ry to acquire such a weapon. 
I n d i a ' s concept of secur i ty was in keeping with the 
foreign policy of non-alignment. I t held theview that i t 
i s not enough for a non-aligned country to be protected by a 
nuclear s t a t e . Instead, the securi ty should come from the 
M 1 
1. UN General Assembly, First Committee, 24th Session, 
1706th meeting, 1 Dec. 1969, p. 2. 
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elimination of nuclear weapons. Since the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty had fa i led in th is - regard , i . e . providing secur i ty 
to non-nuclear s t a t e s by not r e s t r a in ing the nuclear s t a t e 
to p r o l i f e r a t e , India did not sign the NPT. B.R. Bhagat, 
r e i t e r a t e d in the General Assembly tha t , "The problem of 
insecur i ty can not be solved by a rb i t ra ry imposition of 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on those who do not possess nuclear weapons, 
without any corresponding steps to l imit and reduce the 
s tockpi les of a few powers. The slow process of disarmament 
can be set in motion if the nuclear weapon powers undertake 
serious negot ia t ions to l imit and reduce and eventually 
el iminate nuclear armaments". 
India took a serious view of the changed secur i ty 
environment due t o the explosions in space conducted by 
China in t o t a l disregard to Moscow Test Ban Treaty. India 
was facing a serious threa t of a nuclear war by China 
2 
who had grabbed 15000 square miles of land in the 
196 2 war in Ladakh and NEFA areas and was s t i l l demanding 
50,000 square miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y . 
1. B.R, Bhagat, United Nations, Office of Public Information, 
The Nation 's 3peaK, New York, 1968, p . 2 . 
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 
1962, p . 394. 
3. Ib id . 
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Besides, i t was aiding subversive a c t i v i t i e s in 
Nagaland and Mizorara, both economically and m i l i t a r i l y . 
Under these circumstances the pos i t ion of Indian secur i ty 
was grave and the i r was likely-hood of a s l i gh t 
skirmish at the Sino-Indian border escala t ing in to a 
nuclear attack on Ind ia . Ihe posi t ion of Indian Security 
could be improved only when the NPT inse r ted a clause 
ca l l ing upon a l l the nuclear powers to compulsarily reduce 
and ul t imately eliminate nuclear weapons. Instead, the 
t r ea ty gave an impl ic i t l icense to the nuclear club to 
increase t he i r nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s , the i reby ,pu t t ing 
Indian Security in an even t i gh t e r spot . This was a major 
cause why India refrained from signing the t r e a t y . 
Across the border the Chinese leaders were announ-
cing menacing statements l ike the famous quotation by 
Mao-Tse tung that ' p o l i t i c a l power, grows out of the 
bar re l of the gun ' . General Hsiao Husa declared tha t , 
"the t h r ea t s of nuclear war wi l l only scare those who 
possess weak nerves or those who have given up the i r 
revolutionary wi l l , but can never scare our revolutionary 
people". 
1. Sampooran ^ingh, India and the Nuclear Bomb, New Delhi, 
1971, p . 80. 
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Under t h i s kind of a s i tua t ion , the Indian suspicion 
of a threa t from China of a nuclear war was j u s t i f i e d . 
Therefore, India wanted the Nuclear Powers to take in to 
account such a menacing threa t from China while framing 
the NPT.. India held the opinion that such a t r ea ty will 
be meaningless when a nuclear power l ike Cljina i s out of 
i t . This i s dangerous not only for Indian securi ty but may 
also prove to be dangerous for other nuclear powers. The 
argument put forward by the nuclear powers for the protect ion 
of India by nuclear powers in tlie event of a nuclear attack 
by China was termed as unsat is factory by the Indian government. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi said, "We must r e a l i z e in the f ina l 
analysis , the effect iveness of a nuclear shield would 
depend not on the s p i r i t in which non-nuclear weapon powers 
accept the sh ie ld ,but on the nationaland v i t a l i n t e r e s t 
of the g iver . The guarantor ' s i n t e r e s t s might differ vas t ly 
from those of the protected s t a t e " . 
Another i r r i t a n t for India was that the securi ty 
assurance wi l l be given only to those non-nuclear s t a t e s 
who wi l l sign the t r e a t y . Actually, the nuclear powers 
1. The Year of Challenge; Selected Speeches of Smt, Indira 
Gandhi, 1966^1969, Govt, of India, Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, Publications Division, New Delhi, 
1969, p . 373. 
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wanted to take in to the i r fold as many non-nuclear powers 
as was possible so that the i r nuclear blackmail i s on a 
larger sca le . India f e l t that non-nuclear s ta te* should 
examine various aspects of the t r ea ty and then decide 
keeping in view the p r inc ip les of the UN Charter and should 
be free to join the t r ea ty or not to join the t r e a t y . 
The Treaty and i t s Consequences on Peaceful Purposes of 
Nuclear Energy. 
India had shown, throughout, tha t i t was i n t e r e s t ed 
in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. During the Lok Sabha 
debates on foreign a f fa i r s . Prime Minister Lai Bahadur 
Shastr i said that he "is studying a plan for exploring 
pro jec t s connected with peaceful uses of nuclear explo-
s ions" . India r e i t e r a t e d in the world body that i t was 
not prepared to give up i t s basic r igh t of pursuing 
research in peaceful uses of nuclear energy/ necessary 
for i t s speedy development. The technology i t was f e l t 
had become necessary not only for c i v i l engineering 
pro jec t s but a lso in mining non-ferrous metals such as , 
zinc, copper, lead and for exploration of o i l reserves 
and bye-products of petroleum. 
1. India, Lok Sabh Debates, 27 Kov. 1964, Colums, 15712-34 
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In fact , nuclear energy could be used in a wide f ie ld 
of developmental programmes. This stand of India was nothing 
new as i t was made clear during ttie discussion on NPT as to 
how important i t was to develop and use nuclear technology 
for speeding up standards of l iv ing of i t s people. On the 
other hand, nuclear powers were bent upon denying t h i s 
r igh t to non-nuclear nations by put t ing r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
such nations to use t h i s technology through NPT. Under 
these conditions India was r igh t in not signing the dotted 
l i n e . Mr. Swaran Singh, the then Minister of Defence, Steel 
and Heavy Engineering, s ta ted in 1970 tha t , "We can never 
agree to sign the non-prol i ferat ion Treaty which i s^essen t ia l ly^ 
discriminating in character . In the development of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, i t put cons t ra in ts and 
r e s t r a i n t s which are t o t a l l y unacceptable tQ us" . 
The monopoly of nuclear powers over the nuclear 
technology remained i n t a c t through Ar t ic le I I of the NPT 
which "prohibi ts the non-nuclear powers from acquiring 
2 
and manufacturing nuclear explosive devices" . 
I . India , Lok Sabha Debates, 11 March 1970, p . 510. 
2,United Nations, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, New York, 1963, p . 63. 
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India f e l t tha t there wi l l be enhancement of tensions 
and insecur i ty and there can not be any peaceful r e l a t i ons 
among nations i f the technology of nuclear devices remains 
with only a few nat ions and the remaining depend on them 
for help and pro tec t ion . Containment of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 
will lead to mistrust and the cloud of war wi l l be seen more 
often. In the same context I n d i a ' s Chairman of Atomic energy 
Commission said, "knowledge can not for long be containned 
within a r t i f i c i a l boundaries. Those systems that do not 
provide fu l l pa r t i c ipa t ion by a l l nations in a l l aspects 
of technology in which they are competent t o par take, are 
in my humble opinion not sa leable , much less susta inable , 
in the long run. Attempts to promote them merely poison 
in t e rna t iona l r e l a t ions and climate of cooperation", 
A clause was inser ted in the NET by which i t was 
made clear that the nuclear s t a t e s wi l l t ransfer nuclear 
technology on non-discriminatory bas i s to a l l those non-
nuclear nations who want to use the technology for 
peaceful purposes. India again protes ted tha t a few 
nations can not keep hundreds of s t a t e s to ransom by 
1. UN Document A/Conference 34/13, 14 Aug. 1968. 
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monopolising the technology, that technology which i s so 
v i t a l for the developmental programmes of the weaker 
sections, tha t technology which was termed as the "future 
technology". I t was made clear tha t i t was improper and 
unjust, even i f the in ten t ions of nuclear s t a t e s were 
c lear , to keep the en t i r e majority to the mercy of a few. 
I t was a s i tua t ion with a dead end. Either to sign or 
go to the f i r e . Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reacted 
strongly to the s i tua t ion and s ta ted in a press conference, 
"For a country of I n d i a ' s s i ze , in view of the gigant ic 
proport ions of i t s problems, i t i s absolutely necessary 
that we should have as much know-how as possible because 
when i t comes to brass- tacks , no country can r ea l ly help 
2 to solve our problems". 
Moreover, the NPT provided tha t non-nuclear s t a t e s 
could enter in to b i l a t e r a l arrangements with nuclear s t a t e s 
for get t ing themselves, the benef i ts of the nuclear 
technology. This in the opinion of many was not without 
s t r i ngs attached as, Keller , Boilings and Klaff say tha t . 
1. Azim Husain, Ambassador of India, Foreign Affairs Record, 
Sept. 1968, p . 20 2. 
2. Ashwani Kumar Chopta, o p . c i t . , p . 198. 
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"this provision places the executing nuclear weapon power 
in a privileged position to decide on its own, and possibly 
on a basis not entirely free of subjective judgements,which 
solution is to be adopted and executed and such a position 
could afford favouritism and untold opportunities of direct 
and indirect interference in the internal affairs of the 
respectively dependent, yet formally sovereign nations". 
The NPT was the very negation of the UN Charter as 
it vehemently propagated the idea of dependence by a 
majority of nations to a few nuclear states. This treaty 
was against the very concept of sovereignty, as it implicitely 
wanted the states to surrender their sovereignty in favour 
of the nuclear club. It was in other words not an instrument 
of cooperation but of confrontation. It was based on discri-
mination and on unequal footing. India refrained from the 
treaty, and it seems she was right. Then in 1970s and 
1980s, firm proposals were made by India for a convention 
on the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and 
cessation of the production of fissionable materials for 
weapons purposes. Besides, these proposals, India has 
1. Keller, Boilings and Klaff, On the Economic Implications 
of Proposed NPT, Geneva, No.l, 1968. 
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never looked away from the importance of disarmament of 
conventional weapons but pleaded that the order of priority, 
as agreed in 1978 (in the consensus docioment that emerged 
from the first special session of the UN General Assembly 
on disarmament), be kept and conventional armament is not 
to overshadow a far more serious tlireat to human survival 
by nuclear weapons. 
India had a consistent policy on the problem of 
disarmament and continued to maintain its position on the 
established priorities in disarmament - that is, nuclear 
weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, 
conventional weapons and reduction of armed forces. The 
major problem was that super powers were trying to distract 
and disturb priorities from nuclear disarmament to conven-
tional disarmament, from global to regional approaches and 
from substantive issues to confidence building measures. 
India worked hard to keep the conference on the track 
and not to let it be diffused from global problem of 
nuclear disarmament to relatively low matters of priority. 
1, Final Document of the UN General Assembly, Special Session, 
23 May to 1 July 1978, New York, para 45. 
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I n s p i t e of several hurdles India succeeded in maintaining 
the conferences e a r l i e r emphasis on nuclear disarmament/ 
and i t s d ra f t resolut ion ca l l ing for UN study on deterrence 
was adopted by consensus. On conventional disarmament 
also India worked with several other l ike minded countr ies 
to keep the general d i rec t ion in s ight and where regional 
raeasxare had to be considered, "to base *them on the concurrence 
of a l l the s t a t e s concerned". On the question of the draf t 
resolut ion of Pakistan to declare South Asia as a nuclear 
weapon free zone, India maintained i t s stand and voted 
against i t . 
2 India repeated i t s e a r l i e r statement that i t i s 
wedded to the pledge not to manufacture or acquire nuclear 
weapons even i f the whole world goes nuclear and renunciation 
of nuclear explosions. I t proposed that some immediate steps 
should be taken if global disarmament has to be achieved 
namelyj 
^i) a declara t ion that would make,nuclear technology for 
mi l i ta ry purposes i l l e g a l . 
1. T.S. Teja, Ed. Nuclear Disarmament, Year Book on I n d i a ' s 
Foreign Policy, Satish Kumar, 1988, p . 175. 
2. Off icial Records of the General Assembly, 10th Special 
•session. Supplement No. 1, A/S-10/1, vo l . I , 
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( i i ) l imi ta t ions on qua l i t a t i ve and quan t i t a t ive armaments 
and immediate freeze of ex is t ing s tockpi les under 
in te rna t iona l inspect ion . 
( i i i ) f ixat ion of a t ime-l imit not exceeding a decade, for 
gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals with the objective 
of complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons; 
and 
(iv) a comprehensive t e s t ban t r ea ty with provis ions for 
safeguards through independent inspect ion . 
Morarji Desai, the Indian Prime Minister, while 
addressing the SSOD in 1978 said, " i t i s i d l e to talk of 
regional nuclear free zones when there would s t i l l be zones 
which could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. 
Those who have such weapons lose nothing if some d i s t an t 
area i s declared non-nuclear. The nations without nuclear 
capabi l i ty who imagine that t h e i r inclusion in such zones 
affords them securi ty are suffering from a delusion. We 
are convinced that there can not be a limited approach 
to the question of freedom from nuclear t h rea t s and dangers 
but the whole world should be declared as a nucleaj: free zone. 
1. Morarji Desa i ' s Address to the UNSSOD, c i ted in 
S t ra teg ic Digest, vo l .8 . No. 728, July-Aug. 1978, p . 14. 
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India argued that nuclear weapons were more than 
weapons of war, ra ther , they were instruments of mass 
annih i la t ion . Conunenting upon the Final Document of the 
10th Special Session of General Assembly, India explained 
that the document did not r e f l e c t a t a l l the sense of 
urgency to stop the nuclear arms race since i t could not 
formulate a time bound programme for the implementation 
of measures per ta in ing to nuclear disarmament. 
On December 14, 1978, with 34 other countr ies India 
2 
introduced a draft resolution in the United Nations General 
Assembly, stating that (i) use in nuclear weapons would be 
a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity, 
(ii) use of nuclear weapons be prohibited pending nuclear 
disarmament. The resolution called upon all states to submit 
proposals on the method to be used tor the conclusion of a 
treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons, so that the matter 
could be discussed at its 34th session. The draft was adopted 
as resolution 33/7IB by a vote of 103 in favour and France, 
UK and USA and 15 other western countries voting against. 
India again initiated in the 34th Session in 1979, a 
resolution 34/83 G and again in 1980 as resolution 35/153 D 
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a t t h e 35th Ses s ion . The importance of the r e s o l u t i o n s 
could be gauged from the f a c t t h a t in 1981 the General 
assembly adopted t h r ee r e s o l u t i o n s on the i s s u e , 36/100 
' D e c l a r a t i o n on t h e prevent ion of nuc lear c a t a s t rophe* 
36/921, Non-use of nuc lear weapons and p reven t ion of 
nuc lea r war, and 36/81 B preven t ion of nuc lea r war. 
I nd i a emphasized again t h e importance of conduct ing 
n e g o t i a t i o n s under the aeg i s of t he Committee on Disarmament, 
in i t s 1980 Session,. I nd ia r e i t e r a t e d i t s conv ic t ion t h a t 
pending nuc lea r disarmament which alone can remove t h e 
t h r e a t of nuc lea r war, t h e r e should be a t o t a l p r o h i b i t i o n 
of the use of such weapons cover ing both^nuclear weapon 
2 
and non-nuclear weapon , s t a t e s , I nd i a again emphasized 
t h a t i f a nuc l ea r war breaks o u t , c o u n t r i e s in t h e non-weapons 
f ree zones w i l l not be spared i t s ca tac lysmic e f f e c t s . R e g i o n a l 
measures of disarmament would have r e l evance only i f conceived 
wi th in a framework for ach iev ing a genera l and complete 
disarmament. 
1. The UN Disarmament Year Book, o p . c i t . , 1981, p . 101. 
2. I b i d . , p . 162. 
3. UN General Assembly, 36th Session, 1st Committee, 
Sessional fasci)c Corrigendum. 
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India submitted a draft resolution to the 12th 
special session of the General Assembly in 1982 suggesting 
to the General Assembly to call on all nuclear weapon 
states to agree to a treeze on nuclear weapons, providing 
for a total stoppage of the further production of such 
weapons and a complete cut off in the production of 
fissionable material for weapon purposes". 
First Committee of the 38th Session of the General 
Assembly saw India stressing on the point that undue 
importance is being given to lesis urgent and important 
measures like creating NWPZ,with the intention to divert 
attention from nuclear disarmament. India further claimed 
that creation of NWFZ may play some role in the achievement 
of nuclear disarmapient if they are conceived as a part of 
the larger goal. *Vhen it is clearly evident that in the 
event of a war the whole globe will be affected, discussing 
the creation of NWFZ alone is but a measure in futility. 
India considered the regions selected for NWFZ 
as arbitrary selection and thus, not worth supporting. 
1. The UN Disarmament Year Book, op.cit., 1984, p. 154 
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s p e c i a l l y in t h e c i rcumstances at p r e s e n t where nuc lea r 
powers have massive nuclear weapon s t o r a g e . I nd i a c i t e d 
the r epo r t of a group of s c i e n t i s t s who had worked on 
p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of any fu tu re nuc lea r war, of even minimum 
s t anda rds , w i l l lead t o a nuc lea r winter I nd i a expressed 
t h a t i t i s u n r e a l i s t i c t o b e l i e v e t h a t s t a t e s f a l l i n g 
wi th in the l i n d t s of NWF2 w i l l have any sense of s e c u r i t y 
i n the event of such a war, when the nuc lea r weapon s t a t e s 
a re deploying t h e i r nuc lear a rsena ls , , wherever they l i k e . 
I t i s u n r e a l i s t i c to th ink and fee l secure even when 
s e c u r i t y i s a s su red by the nuc lear powers t o non nuc lea r 
weapon s t a t e s , even i f they f a l l wi th in the l i m i t s of a 
NWF2. 
Indian fo re ign m i n i s t e r , S r i Dinesh Singh a t t he 
p r e p a r a t o r y meeting of the iNion-rtliyned Coun t r i e s in Uar -es -
Salaam spoke t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o ensure t h a t agreements 
on disarmament a re adhered t o u n i v e r s a l l y and they do not 
aggravate or p e r p e t u a t e the e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s between 
the haves and havenots , between t h e super powers and o ther 
s t a t e s . He wanted t o emphasize t h e po in t t h a t s e c u r i t y can 
1. Statement by Foreign Min i s t e r , Dinesh Singh a t t he 
Prepara to ry Meeting of the Non-Aligned C o u n t r i e s , 
Dar-es-Salaam, April 16, 1970. 
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come not by depending on others byt by strengthening soc ia l , 
p o l i t i c a l and defence p o t e n t i a l . He r e i t e r a t e d I n d i a ' s policy 
that a l l nations i r r e spec t ive of t he i r s ta tus should be 
allowed to use the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. 
Mrs. Gandhi expressed the opinion a t the inaugural 
session of the 7th NAM Summit tha t t rue secur i ty can come 
only through general and complete disarmament. Like other 
non-aligned countr ies India also supports the use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. She cal led upon nuclear 
weapon powers to give up the use or th rea t of use of nuclear 
weapons under any circumstances, suspend a l l nuclear weapon 
of 
tests and production and deployment nuclear weapons and to 
resume disarmament talks with determination to reach 
agreement. 
Minister of State for External Affairs, Sri Samarendra 
Kundu emphasised at the Non-Aligned countries co-ordinating 
Bureau meeting at Havana to stop stock-piling of nuclear 
weapons with the hope to eliminate them some day. He called 
the use of nuclear weapons as a heinous crime against humanity. 
He requested the nuclear powers to respond in a positive manner 
1. Seventh NAM Summit, Selected Documentg, vol. II, p. 9. 
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in formulating a r e a l i s t i c and time bound programme and to 
tal<;e concrete measures for disarmament without further 
delay. 
2 India had r e i t e r a t ed i t s stand at the UN General 
Assembly in 1977, that i t was against the nuclear weapons 
and had no in tent ion of exercising the nuclear weapon 
option. 
India has always advocated its firm belief that 
International peace and security will remain a far cry 
unless general and complete disarmament is reached and a 
new international economic order is established. This 
goal of complete disarmament could be reached under 
effective international control with the highest priority 
being accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons and 
all other weapons of mass destruction. India suggests that 
this can be achieved in a phased manner by, a cessation 
of the production of nuclear weapons combined with cut-off 
in the production of fissionebt materials for weapon 
purposes and, the conclusion of a comprehensive test 
ban on all testing of nuclear weapons. The linl< between 
disarmament and development should be identified and the 
1. The Hindustan Times, Text of Speech by Samaredra Kundu, 
Minister of State for External Affairs, at the Non-
Aligned Coordinating Bureau Meeting, Havana, New Delhi, 
May 19, 1978. 
2. The United Nation Disarmament Year Book, 1978, p. 180. 
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resources saved from disarmament in the developing countr ies . 
At the same time, India i s committed to the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. This i s the reason India did not sign the 
NPT declaring that i t i s a discriminatory t rea ty which has 
di f ferent ya rd - s t i e s for nuclear haves and non-nuclear have 
no t s . However, the Indian in ten t ions can not be doubted by 
the fact tha t she has signed almost a l l the t reat i ies 
concluded for the purposes of disarmament, nameiy. The 
Geneva Protocol of 19 25, The PTBT of 1963, The Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967, The beabed Treaty of 1971, the Biological 
weapons Convention of 1972, The £^ iMOD Convention of 1977 
and the Inhumane Convention of 1981. 
SpeaXing in the Second Special Session on Disarmament 
of the UN General Assembly in JunS 1982, Mrs. Gandhi, 
r id icu led the theory that nuclear weapons were necessary 
for secur i ty . She also re jected the theory of deterrence. 
She said, "The danger of nuclear war i s inherent in the 
very dynamics of the arms race and in what i s known as 
deterrence" . Mrs. Gandhi called the nuclear war as "new 
2 
barbarism". She further s ta ted tha t the s i tua t ion i s more 
1. G.N. Srivastava, Non~Aliqnroent and Nuclear Disarmament, 
Ed. Indian I n s t i t u t e of Non-Aligned Studies, New Delhi, 
1985, p . 35. 
2. Ib id . 
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grim than in 1978 when the f i r s t special special session for 
DisarmajBent was held and suggested the following points as 
concrete programine of ac t ion. 
(1) The session should negot ia te a binding convention of 
the non-use of nuclear weapons. 
(2) As a f i r s t step towards the eventual elimination of 
ex is t ing s tockpi les , there must be a freeze on nuclear 
weapons, providing for the t o t a l stoppage of any 
further production of nuclear weapons combined with 
a cut-off in the production of f iss ionable mater ia l 
for weapon purposes. 
(3) Immediate suspension of a l l nuclear weapon t e s t s . 
(4) Towards the ul t imate objective of disarmament, 
negot ia t ions must once again rever t t o the task of 
achieving a t rea ty on general and complete d i s . within 
an agreed time frame. 
(5) The United Nations and i t s specia l ised agencies 
should take the lead in educating the public on the 
dangers of nuclear war, on the harmful ef fec ts of 
the arms race, on the world economy as well as the 
pos i t ive aspects of disarmament and i t s link with 
development. 
1. Ib id . 
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Addressing the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit on March 1, 
1983, Mrs. Gandhi r e i t e r a t e d Indian Government's e a r l i e r 
stand that development, peace, independence and disarmament 
are i n t e r - r e l a t e d and as long as there are nuclear weapons, 
there can not be any peace. She highl ighted the fears of 
many that when there i s arms race, there i s bound to be a 
war, sooner or l a t e r . She establ ished the re la t ionsh ip 
between disarmament and development and said tha t one 
nuclear a i r c ra f t ca r r i e r costs $ 4 b i l l i o n which i s more than 
the GNP of 53 countr ies . 
Never before has the inhabi tan ts of earth came so 
and 
close to dea th /des t ruc t ion . The des t ruc t ive power contained 
in nuclear s tockpi les can k i l l human l i f e , indeed, a l l 
l i f e , many times and might well prevent i t s reappearance 
for ages to come. Terrifying, i s the vividness of such 
des t r ip t ions , by s c i e n t i s t s . Yet some statesmen and 
s t r a t e g i s t s act as though there i s not much difference 
between these and ea r l i e r a r t i l l e r y p i eces . The arms race 
continues because of the pursui t of power and des i re for 
upmanship . . . powerful s t a t e s propogate the untenable 
2 
doctrine of de ter rence . 
1. The Hindustan Times, March 8, 1983. 
2, Mrs. Gandhi's inaugural address of the Seventh Non-Aligned 
Summit in New Delhi, March 7, 1983, March 8, 1983, 
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi . 
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"The paradox of our age i s t h a t while weapons become 
i n c r e a s i n g l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d , minds remain imprisoned in 
i d e a s of simpler t i m e s . Techn i ca l l y , the c o l o n i a l age has 
ended. But, the ' wish t o dominate p e r s i s t s " , 
" R e l e n t l e s s search for i n c r e a s i n g l y b a r b a r i c weapons 
systems i s undertaken in the name of s e c u r i t y . I n d i a and 
o ther non-a l igned c o u n t r i e s a r e convinced t h a t only genera l 
and complete disarmament can provid>ereal and enduring 
s e c u r i t y . Nuclear weapon powers owe i t t o humanity to 
renounce the use or t h r e a t of use of nuc lea r weapons in 
any s i t u a t i o n , w h a t e v e r . As a f i r s t s t ep they should resume 
n e g o t i a t i o n s for disarmament and ban t h e p roduc t ion and 
2 
t e s t i n g of a l l nuc lea r weapons". 
Four Cont inent Peace I n i t i a t i v e 1984 
On iMay 23, 1984, Mrs. Gandhi with P r e s i d e n t s , 
Mr. J u l i u s Nyerere of Tanzania and Mignel of Mexico and 
Prime Minis ters^ Palme of Sweden and Papandreou of 
1, The Hindustan Times, March 8, 1983, 
2. Mrs, Gandhi, Chairperaon of i<iAM a t 38th Session of 
UN General Assemoly in New niork on Sept . 28, 1983, 
The Times of I n d i a , Sep t . 29, 1983, 
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Greece, announced a peace i n i t i a t i v e aimed a t reducing t h e peace 
of the arms race between the UO.H and the USSR and save the world 
and humanity from a p o s s i o l e nuc lear ho locaus t and d r i f t t he 
world towards a more peacefu l , prosperous and secure s i t u a t i o n , 
without any t a c t i c s . They addressed t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e to t h e 
nuc lea r c lub to s top " the rush towards g loba l s u i c i d e " . The^r 
appeal s a i d t h a t the nuclear f reeze wi l l be followed ultii .iatel '^ 
by complete and comprehensive disarmament and the reby s t r eng tnen 
t h e UN d o c t r i n e and negotiateca s e t t l e m e n t s which would br ing 
p r o s p e r i t y to a l l the peoples of the world . During t h e e s c a l a t i o n 
of cold war between t h e two super powers, Ind ia was n e g o t i a t i n u 
witi, other non-a l igned na t ions on such a peace i n i t i a t i v e . 
Mrs. Gandhi h i g h l i g h t e d t h e u n i v e r s a l fear of ou tbreaks of a 
n a t i o n s to work for g loba l peace as , "we are a l l neighbours 
of t h i s p l a n e t " . She s t a t e d t h a t " i r any prograrane i s l e f t 
to t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l eve l then i t can oe bogged down in c c t a a J s 
and complex i t i e s , whereas the need i s to r a i s e i t above t na t 
2 t o a l eve l of s ta tesmanship which only t h e l e a d e r s can g i v e " . 
1. S . J .R . u i lg ra ra i . The Ar:: s Race and Disarmament, op. c i t . , p . 108. 
2. M.iJ. Gupta, Indian Foreign i.-olicy: Theory and i-^ractice, 
Y.rC. P u b l i s h e r s , Agra, 1985, p . 109. 
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The idea of the peace i n i t i a t i v e or iginated in 
1983 when a group of Parliamentarians who called themselves 
'Parl iamentarians for the World Order' (PWO) and ' I n t e r -
nat ional Organisation of Leg i s l a to r s ' , lead by Olafur 
Grimsson of Iceland, Douglas Roche of Canada, John 
Milken from the UK and Tom Boney and Berkley from the 
USA, together with other l e g i s l a t o r s from 31 countr ies 
worked t i r e l e s s l y , but sec re t ly , keeping in touch with 
some of the top world leaders, met at Church House London 
to work out plans for a peaceful world devoid of tensions 
and arms race . Their f inal meeting was held a t the Indian 
High Commission in London in February 1984. I t was f e l t 
that the US Psyche was that of a c a p i t a l i s t who wants t o 
gobble-up everything and to sa t i s fy t h i s urge they can do 
anything, des t ruc t or crush anything. On the other hand 
India, a land of peace loving people was a na tura l 
choice to launch t h i s i n i t i a t i v e as Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi 
said that " f i f ty per cent of young Americans bel ieve 
tha t there wi l l be a nuclear war within 20 years . I feel 
th i s a very depressing thought . . . But frankly I am deeply 
d is t ressed and a lso astonished at the apathy which one 
sees, almost resignat ion, acceptance of saoh a norrifyiny 
event . . . I think if our voice i s strong enough, and more 
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and more people join, especially young people, it will 
make a difference ... There is no objection to the nuclear 
weapon states settling this matter. But we are also 
concerned... It is too important an issue to be left to 
them, especially as they are not moving much ... the real 
thing is ... bringing a sense of urgency". 
There are certain advantages of these proposals 
coming from people outside the super powers, from neutrals 
or non-aligned leaders. Whenever, there is some proposal 
addressed to either of the two blocs, it is looked with 
suspicion as the basic element of trust is missing, which 
makes it go waste. These proposals should carry more 
weight as these contain no vested interests and are not 
hedged around with ideological intricacies and complexities, 
they are plain and simple aspirations of the people of 
the Third World. Detailed proposals prepared by experts 
will definitely arouse some hope, in this era of escalating 
risk of nuclear war. 
The vision of Mrs. Gandhi could not be pursued, due 
to her untimely death under most unfortunate circumstances. 
1. M.G. Gupta, opycit., p. 110. 
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The task was pursued by her son Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. He called 
a summit of the six countries in January 1985 which were 
the parties to the 1984 appeal. The Summit came out with, 
what is now called the 'Delhi Declaration'. The 'Delhi Six' 
again stressed the need to focus the attention of the world 
on the nuclear menace and its moral and humane aspects, 
and to persuadethe nuclear weapon powers to come to the 
negotiating table in an atmosphere of trust, and to take 
firm steps towards disarmament. The six offered to show 
the path to the ultimate goal by helping in the first 
and oasic two steps, i.e. (a) a comprehensive test ban 
treaty and, (b) prevention of extension of the arms race 
into outer space. 
The Delhi Six have come out with the initiative 
not because they thought it is good to talk about disarmament 
or that the two super powers should not go to war but the 
reason is that if there is a a^r no one will be able to 
survive. The ever increasing armaments and the advancements 
made duriing the period since the world saw tne second 
world War, there is every possibility that mankind is wiped 
out of the planet earth with only 1/4 of the nuclear weapons 
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used.Today's technology has made it possible to fight the 
war from the space. People are tallying about such a war 
being fought, even unwillingly, by accidental push of 
a button or the computers controlling the nuclear arsenal 
being activated by some unscrupulous computer enthusiast. 
People are also talking about possibilities of limited wars, 
that there could be winnable nuclear wars, that there could 
be 'Strategic Defence Initiative' kind of defence mechanisms, 
Although the costs of SDI is illogically high, about $500 
billion to develop and $50 billion to maintain it annually. 
The advancements made in the field of nuclear weapons 
(whether they are for defence or offence is immaterial) 
makes the Delhi Declaration even more important and worth 
considering. The lethal nature of the weapon and the 
massive destructive capability of SDI is nerve wrecking, 
to the point of insanity, 
"In the Strategic Defence Initiative as is now 
contemplated, full details of an enemy launching of a 
missile would be transmitted to a laser gun station by 
appropriate detection mechanisms. Computers in the station 
in turn would so position the gun that a laser beam fired 
into outer space would be deflated by a satellite mirror 
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so as to destroy the enemy raj.ssiie before its nuclear 
warheads has been activated.... Laser beams meant to be 
used purely as a defensive system so as to destroy an 
offensive enemy missile could also be used to destroy 
any other object. The White House, the Kremlin, the 
Rashtrppati Bhawan or any other building can be an easy 
target after the SDI system has been developed and made 
operational.Can we take such a risk? Have we the right 
to develop a system which has such devastating and 
unmanageable destructive potential?" 
It is due to the American 'Initiative', that the 
i^ elhi Six were motivated to take certain firm initiatives 
to save mankind from extinction. 
The Delhi Declaration highlighted the dangers posed 
by nuclear weapons and their capability to "annihilate not 
only all that man has created through the ages, but man 
2 himself and even life on earth". The leaders of the Summit 
stressed on the right of every nation and every person to 
1. Romesh dhandari, 'Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI): Cost 
and Hazards', in D.R. Goyal, Ed; Nuclear Disarmament, 
Sterling, New Delhi, 1987, p. 21. 
2. For Text of Delhi Declaration, 23 January 1985, 
See Appendix V 
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life, freedom, peace and pursuit of happiness. They condemned 
the use of force or such a threat. They also supported the 
idea that domination of others must be abandoned. The non-
aligned six held the view that arms race, either on each 
or in space is the negation of the popularly accepted theory 
that a nuclear war should never be fought as it can not be 
won. The leaders were speaking for more than one billion 
peoples and urging to free the world of weapons of mass 
destruction^for a peaceful world. The responsibility for the 
safety of mankind is reflected in the principles contained 
in the Delhi Declaration: These are: 
1. Peaceful co-existence must become the universal norm of 
international relations. 
2.Human life must be recognised as supreme, 
3. Non-violence should be the basis of community life, 
4. Understanding and trust must replace fear and suspicion, 
5. The right of every state to political and economic 
independence must be recognised and respected. 
6. Resources being spent on armaments must be channelled 
towards social and economic development. 
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7. Condi t ions must be guaranteed for the i n d i v i d u a l s ' 
harmonious development. 
8 . Mankind's m a t e r i a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l p o t e n t i a l must be 
used t o so lve g lobal problems. 
9 . The ' ba lance of t e r r o r ' must give way t o comprehensive 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . 
10. A nuclear-weapon-free and n o n - v i o l e n t world r e q u i r e s 
s p e c i f i c and immediate ac t ion for disarmament. 
The methods suggested to achieve disarmament were 
through agreements on: 
a) Complete d e s t r u c t i o n of nuc lea r a r s e n a l s before the end 
of t h i s cen tury ; 
b) b a r r i n g of a l l weapons from oute r space , which'i the common 
h e r i t a g e of mankind; 
c) banning of a l l nuc lear weapon t e s t s ; 
d) p r o h i b i t i o n of t h e development of new types of weapons 
of mass d e s t r u c t i o n ; 
e) banning of chemical weapons and d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r 
s t o c k p i l e s ; 
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f) reducing the levels of conventional arms and armed forces. 
India worked closely with Soviet Union in efforts to 
reduce the risk of war. l^S. Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev 
proposed that an international convention banning the use or 
threat of use of the nuclear weapons should be concluded 
immediately, until complete elimination of nuclear weapons 
is achieved. 
An appeal was made, based on the Delhi Declaration, 
to the leaders of the two super powers at the time when 
the two were meeting on the issue in Geneva in 1985. In 
the light of the Principles the Six suggested to consider 
while meeting for disarmament negotiations, in Geneva, 
certain points which could help them trust each other 
more and hence, save the world from the scourge of a 
nuclear holocaust. These were, 
- suspensj-on for twelve montns, all nuclear tests, initially, 
which could be later on turned permanent, 
- work to improve more fruitful agreements, so that new 
more advanced weapons may not be developed. 
« overcoming the problems of verifying of suspensions, and 
to ponsider the good offices of the six for providing 
effective verification arrangements. 
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The reply given by Soviet leader was very encouraging 
and he appreciated the concern shown by the Delhi Six. 
Gorbachev shared the view that Soviet Union also attadies 
all the importance to eliminate nuclear weapons by complete 
and universal ban on nuclear weapon tests. He declared 
that the Soviet Union unilaterally announces a twelve month 
moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons. 
In the case of USA, President Reagan did not pay any 
heed to the request and went ahead with its SDl programme 
ano continued nuclear explosions. He termed the Four Continent 
initiative as 'immpractical and unjust'. 
The leaders of Delhi Six met again in Ixtapa, 
Mexico and reiterated their principles and requested 
the two super powers to retrain from causing more pitfalls 
for mankind/ getting encouraging response from the Soviets 
only. 
The initiative was welcomed through out the world-
including the Soviets. The UN Secretary General has praised 
them no end. He has called the youth to "think globally" 
and "act local^" for this wonderful quest for world peace. 
But President Reagan thought otherwise, and stated-that 
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due to America's leap in the field of nuclear armament, 
the world has become a 'little safer* that it has been in 
in the past. In the face of such statements by world 
leaders India has gone forward and Rajiv Gandhi called a 
six nation summit of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, 
Sweden and Tanzania, in Delhi in January 1985 to discuss 
nuclear disarmament. 
India proposed a freeze on nuclear weapons which 
would provide for a complete stoppage of the production 
of nuclear weapons combined with a simultaneous cut-off 
in the production of fissionable materials for weapon 
purposes. India feels that an issue gs important as the 
arms race is a global problem affecting every one and 
cannot be left in the hands of a chosen few big powers 
and international relations should not be guided by the 
super powers - instead, there should be democratic 
political decision-making which should choose the target 
and the road to approach and achieve the goal. The goal 
is the achievement of world peace through disarmament 
where ideologies have no place. It is the question of the 
survival of mankind and the people of the world themselves 
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take the decision. The movement is taking momentum and larger 
and larger numbers are coming out in the open to speak anc 
fight for their safety, may be in self defence against the 
common enemy. The nuclear arms race, by a conservative estimate 
is, dominated by more than 75;^  by the big powers. This niassive 
expenditure on arms is considered to be the cause of 5 very 
large number of ills and deficiencies, in most part of the worlc, 
including, rising inflation, ill health, poverty, hunger, 
unemployment and a host of other problems. The arms race also 
results in increasing protectionism and has become a hurdle in 
the way of new economic order, growing dependency of under 
developed or developing countries on the major powers and thus 
bringing undue interference in their internal affairs by foreign 
powers and endangering their sovereignty and integrity. India, 
thus, feels that for global peace and security, disarmament is 
a pre-condition. 
C H A P T E R -V 
• IA 'UJLA'O t-Ui-lCY ruA'/^-UJb t-'c^^Cc ^ui^r^d /VXNU iNiUCL£.^ >R wi:.f\tr'Oi\i 
FREE ZC'NES 
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I t was Jawaharlal Nehru who in the ear ly 50s had 
used the term peace zone (PZ), describing s t a t e s which 
had r e l a t i ons with both the power blocs and who through 
the i r n e u t r a l i t y made possible containment of the danger 
of war. I t was through t h i s idea of Jawaharlal Nehru 
that the concept of peace zone was adopted as a candid 
pr inc ip le of Non-Alignment because the fulfilment of t h i s 
concept requires that the t e r r i t o r i e s and t e r r i t o r i a l 
waters of a pa r t i cu l a r area should be closed to the big 
power r i v a l r i e s and conf l ic t ing s i t u a t i o n s . The Indian 
e f for t s succeeded as far back as 1964 \iheri, a t the time 
of 2nd Summit of non-aligned at Cairo, t h i s group had 
condemned the e f for t s of the big powers to : projec t cold 
war r iva l ry in the Indian Ocean region and t h i s move was 
treated as "an unwarranted extension of the policy of 
2 
neo-colonialism and imperialism". Further, the Indian 
e f fo r t s succeeded at 1970 Lusaka Conference of the 
non-aligned where the concept of peace zone was for the 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru, I nd i a ' s Foreign Policy/ selected 
speeches. Govt, of India Publication, New Delhi, 
1961, p . 67. 
2. Ministry of National Guidance, Cairo, 1964, p . 352 . 
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first time formulated and it was declared that armaments 
should be excluded from the entire high sea area of the 
Indian Ocean region within limits to be specified later. 
The Indian concept of peace zone treats a region as 
a geographical area devoid of danger of war because it 
demands: "(1) dismantling of all offensive military and 
naval bases like Diego Garcia in the Indian ^cean, (ii) 
Cessation of the activities calculated to use the Indian 
Ocean as part of the global confrontationist approach or 
regional military alliances or neo-colonialist designs, 
(iii) Stopping of, attempts to thwart liberation movements 
and intimidation to newly liberated countries, (iv) Affir-
mation of respect for the sovereignty, stability and 
security of the littoral states, (v) Abandonment of the 
regime of the gunboat diplomacy and plans for destabili-
zation of legally constituted sovereignties, (vi) Reiter-
ation of respect for the sovereign rights of the people 
2 
to the natural and other resources". 
India has not aimed to equate with super powers but 
her contention is to eliminate the distinction between the 
1. SIPRI Year Book, 19 75, p. 60. 
2. Rasheeduddin Kiian, 'The Context and the Relevance of the 
World Conference on Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", 
Peace and Solidarity, New Delhi, May 1982, pp. 9-11. 
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colonial and cold war issues. The concept was conceived 
as a disarmament and collective security measure . It 
was believed that through regional cooperation Inter-
national Security will be strengthened. 
Indian concept of a peace zone has 5 major elements, 
"(i) The resolution of a nuclear free zone as adopted in 
Lusaka Conference in 1970,and confirmed by United Nations 
General Assembly in 1971,urging the nuclear weapon powers 
to renounce the nuclear build up in the area/ and directing 
the regional countries to ensure that they will not allow 
external powers to build up nuclear bases in their 
territories, (ii) Attempts to halt the escalation and 
expansion of great powers military presence in the region 
of peace zone and elimination of all bases and military 
installations and such other manifestations of great 
powers military presence in the area, (iii) Elimination 
of great rivalries and competition from the peace zone 
region and adoption of political measures to promote 
peace, security and solidarity in the region, (iv) Settlement 
1. K.S. Siddhu, The Indian Ocean; A Zone of Peace, Harnam 
Publications, New Delhi, 1983, pp. 32-33. 
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of regional disputes through peaceful means and mutual 
obl igat ions without external interference,and acceptance 
of the obl igat ions of disarmament alongwith resolving 
in t r a - r eg iona l d isputes , (v) Elimination of colonialism 
and racism". .- 1 
The zone of peace proposed has largely been motivated 
by a common fear that s t r a t e g i c ccxnpetition between the 
super powers in the area would effect regional autonomy, 
independence and cooperation. I t i s generally believed 
tha t the fu l l - t ime presence of external powers in the 
Indian region has contributed to l i t t o r a l fears that the 
in t e rven t ion i s t c a p a b i l i t i e s , which the super powers 
have cons is ten t ly bui l t -up , might encourage mi l i t a ry 
2 
solutions to the local conflicts. 
The Indian Ocean as a zone of peace proposals, 
though subject to different interpretations and emphases 
have been generally accepted with a broader perspective 
of the denuclearisation of the Indian Ocean region and 
1. Ibid. 
2. V.R. Krishna Iyer 'Indian Ocean and Jurisprudence of 
Peace', The Mainstream, New Delhi, Annual, 1982. 
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arms control including the conventional weapons of the 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . 
Encouraged by the prospects of detente, the proponents 
of the peace zone adopted the proposal at the Lusaka 
Conference of the non-aligned nat ions declaring the Indian 
Ocean as a "zone of peace free of nuclear weapons and 
2 great power r i v a l r i e s " , 
Indian Ocean as a 'Peace Zone' 
I nd i a ' s commitment to arms control and disarmament 
i s c l a r i f i ed by her stand on the Indian '-'cean. To make 
her in ten t ions beyond doubt India has proposed the Indian 
Ocean region as a zone of peace. Throughout the h i s to ry 
of India as an independent s t a t e , she has s t r ived to work 
for peace by elimination of arms race and in t e rna t iona l 
r i v a l r i e s , due t o her bel ief that unless these i l l s are 
removed, the progress, economic, p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l , 
cannot be made. This proposal i s not only a measure 
aimed at the goal of disarmament but i t a lso gives a 
fresh impetus t o Afro-Asian s t ruggle against colonialism 
1. Rasul B Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Super Powers, 
Vistar Publicat ions, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 172-73, 
2, Review of In terna t ional Affairs, Belgrade, No, 491, 
"21 Sept. 1970, p , 33, 
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and imperialism. The Indian stand in this regard was made 
clear by the then external affairs minister, Mr. Baliram 
Bhagat, when he said "we believe that the security of 
the countries of the region must rely ultimately on their 
national strength and their willing cooperation as 
sovereign states". Since the early 1950s when the first 
•^ rime Minister of free India, Pandit Nehru, made the 
first statement that India will he working for world 
peace and disarmament which is vital for the development 
of the developing countries. She has never changed the 
course and reiterated time and again, the same view. 
President V.V, Giri in 1972, while addressing the 
Indian Parliament had re-iterated the Indian stand that 
it wanted the Indian Ocean area to be free from power 
rivalries or domination and to develop into an area 
2 
of peace and coordination rather than one of confrontation. 
The same fears were reflected in Mr. Atal Behari 
Bajpayee's statement in the Indian Parliament when he 
1. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean; Big Power Presence and 
Local Response, New Delhi, 1977, p. 219. 
2. K.S. Siddhu, The Indian Ocean; A Zone of Peace, op.cit. 
p. 74. 
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said "the increased mi l i t a ry and naval presence in the 
area and fear of involvement of great powers cannot ease 
but only add to the tensions in t h i s v i t a l region which 
has already seen dramatic upheavals and s t i l l seething 
with tension and xincertainty." 
I t i s not tha t India kept playing i t s tune at home 
only, before the local audience, and did not share i t s 
views or did not t ry to gather support of the countries 
of the region but other likeminded countr ies who saw 
in super power r iva l ry and tension building in the Indian 
Ocean as a danger sign for the whole world. 
The Indian representa t ives did not s i t i d l e in 
relevant in te rna t iona l ffomms to bring more and more 
s t a t e s to r e a l i s e and appreciate i t s stand on the i s sue . 
They Worked even harder and used harsher words t o bring 
home the ser ious consequences of the big power r i va l ry 
in the Indian Ocean. In the United Nations Organisation 
and at various NAM Conferences and Summits, India 
pleaded /<hole-heartedly for the declarat ion of Indian 
1. Lok Sabha Debates, Govt, of India Publication, 
1978. 
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Ocean as a zone of peace, vital, not only from the Indian 
security point of view but also to ease out tensions in 
the region, emphasizing its earlier stand on democracy 
in world forums and the right of the nations of a particular 
region to decide about their own problems, but also to 
reiterate the phased idea of disarmament, starting from 
a region and culminating at the global,general and complete 
disarmament. 
The Indian representative at the First Committee of 
the United Nations, reiterated the Indian point of view 
and said "India together with all the non-aligned countries 
has subscribed to the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace". 
He further added that "this proposal aims at keeping 
the area free zone from great power rivalries and 
2 
confrontation". 
I>ie Indian apprehension about the big powerpresence 
in the Indian waters, naturally, were voiced by the Indian 
representative in the UN General Assembly. India has never 
1. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee Report, 
26th Session (Provisional) A/c 1/PV 1838, 29 Nov. 1971. 
2. Ibid. 
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welcomed any foreign power to bully the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s 
of the region. The same fear was re f l ec ted in the statement 
made by the Indian represen ta t ive . He said "our fear i s 
that any large scale or loud presence of the navy of the 
external powers i s bound t o c rea te problems for l i t t o r a l 
countr ies , the overwhelming majority of which are desirous 
of keeping the Indian Ocean as a zone of t r a n q u i l i t y " . 
The growing super power presence in the Indian Ocean 
was not ta]<en l igh t ly by India and she considered i t as a 
t h r ea t to i t s secur i ty , India objected to the mi l i t a ry base 
in Diego cjarcia and ra ised i t s voice against the Super 
power presence in the region. Other powers in the region 
kept mum on the i ssue but India took up the case in the 
Lusaka iJummit in September 1970/ where India reaffirmed 
i t s fa i th in working for Indian Ocean as a zone of peace 
and got i t approved for introductibon in the United Nations 
General Assembly where i t was subsequently passed as 
Resolution 2832 (XXVI) in December 19 71, in the face of 
b i t t e r opposition not only from major powers but dso by 
regional powers of the area. As events unfolded i t was 
1. United Nations General Assembly, Twenty ^ighth Session, 
Nov. 23, 1973. 
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found that more and more poversare jo ining the movement 
to declare the area as a zone of peace and by 1974, 
excepting a few, a l l the powers of the Indian Ocean 
region voted in favour of the idea . 
The General Assembly also es tabl ished an ad-hoc 
committee on Indian Ocean in 1972. As time passed the 
texture of the ad-hoc committee changed d r a s t i c a l l y and 
those s t a t e s which had voted against the proposal played 
the tune of super powers in the committee and began to 
dcxninate i t s proceedings. 
In the discussions on the issue, in the ad-hoc 
committee on Indian Ocean, the Indian delegate r e i t e r a t e d 
the, "need for informal consul ta t ions among the delegat ions 
to determine acceptable p r a c t i c a l s teps" , for the 
implementation of the proposal . India i n s i s t e d tha t 
while formulating i t s recommendations, the committee 
should know the posi t ion of major powers and the major 
2 
maritime users of the Indian Ocean. 
1. Report of the ad-hoc Committee on Indian Ocean 
A/9029, 1973, p . 29. 
2. I b id . 
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As politics of the proposal deepened, some of the 
littoral states started taking tne side of the super 
powers and three new principles were added to the 
original proposals of 1971, they were: 
(i) Nuclear weapons free zones in the littoral regions 
of the Indian Ocean. 
(ii) Mutual arms reduction among the regional powers. 
Ciii) A built-in mechanism for ensuring regional peace 
and for conflict resolution. 
India objected to these additions branding them as 
a conspiracy against India. The basis of the acceptance 
of Indian Ocean as nuclear weapon free zone tNWFZ) was 
made conditional on the acceptance of complete safeguard 
by the regional powers. India was the main accused in 
the sense that India had developed indigenous nuclear 
technology and had made it clear long back that it was 
not prepared to give up the use of nuclsar technology 
for peaceful purposes. The picture presented by major 
powers presented India as the villain and so was the 
1. K.R. Singh, 'Indian Ocean: Politics of the Peace Zone', 
Indian Ocean; Conflict and Regional Cooperation, Ed. 
Akhtar Majeed, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, 
p. 129. 
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biggest hurdle in the implementation of the proposals, 
and not the super powers. The super powers who have 
nuclear capabi l i ty have scant regard for any kind of 
assurances to regional powers of the region. They have 
taken a stand quite contrary to t h e i r stand in the case 
of I s rae l and South Africa. The USA, UK, France and 
I s r a e l voted against the declarat ion of nuclear <<eapon 
free zone in Africa and Middle East while in the case 
of India these very powers put the condition of fu l l 
safeguard against India . 
India, on the other hand, has been f ight ing against 
the discrimination, between nuclear and non-nuclear powers, 
tha t non-nuclear powers, don ' t have the r igh t to develop 
and own nuclear weapons l e s t they be used i r respons ib j y. 
and the dependence on nuclear powers, i f they surrender 
the i r r ight to have nuclear technology, in exchange with 
p o l i t i c a l assurances tha t they wil l be spardd a nuclear 
a t tack , India i s of the opinion that humanity faces a 
grave danger to i t s very existence i f nuclear weapons 
ex is t on the face of the earth, the danger i s more 
serious i f some powers are nuclear, others are no t . In 
other words, the very concept of creat ing nuclear weapom 
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free zone is misleading as in a nuclear war peace zones 
are very unlikely to be spared the holocaust and to 
save the world, the only guarantee is to eliminate nuclear 
weapons, and all kinds of them, from existence. Otherwise 
it is not proper to keep the technology in the hands of 
only developed countries and creating a vacumn in the 
third world and put the countries to the danger of a 
surprise nuclear attack by a country which may acquire 
them clandistinely like South Africa and Israel who 
are supposed to have joined the nuclear club. 
It was not easy to overcome problems to bring 
success to the informal consultations. The creation of 
ad-hoc committee was not given due respect by the big 
powers, but it nevertheless necessitated their coopera-
tion with its working. Indian intentions of positive 
and logical thinking were again clarified by the 
statement made by the Indian representative. He said, 
"the big powers and maritine users of the Indian Ocean 
should cooperate in the process of constructive dialogue 
between the countries of the region on one hand, and the 
maritime external nations on the other". In the face of 
1. Ibid. 
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some opposition from the big powers recognising the rights 
of the users-of the Indian Ocean, definitely, was a move 
in the right direction, Another problem faced at that 
time was the vested interests of the colonial powers in 
the region. The colonial powers would never like peace 
to be established in the region lest their interests 
are jeopardised. In this context, India forcefully stated 
that a zone of peace cannot be realised unless such 
aggression is removed. 
India suggested again in 19 75 that the big powers 
and other maritime users of the Indian waters should be 
assocaated with the proposed international conference to 
consider the implementation of the United Nations 
resolutiOQ. 
During the deliberations of the First committee at 
the 35th session of General Assembly, India expressed 
the hope that the ad-hoc committee would be in a better 
position to proceed expeditiously towards the transfor-
mation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace as 
originally envisaged in 1971, if permanent members of 
1. K.S. Siddhu, The Indian Ocean: A Zone of Peace, 
op. cit., p. 84. 
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the security council also participate in its working. 
India hoped that such a development would strengthen 
international peace and security and in the long run/would be 
in the interest of the great powers themselves. Tne 
changed objectives of'the adhoc committee were rejected 
by India as "she advocated for the objectives and mandate 
2 
according to or ig inal declarat ion of 1971". A few new 
members were added to the ad-hoc committee since i t was 
o r ig ina l ly const i tu ted and these s t a t e s had become puppets 
in the hands of the big powers as they t r i e d t o divert 
basic issue in to non-issues, which was not welcomed by, 
together with India, many l i t t o r a l and hinter land s t a t e s 
of the region. The ad hoc committee could not go about 
changing i t s mandate, but should have concentrated on 
i t s urgent implementation. The se t t ing of preconditions 
with regard to the harmonization of views or the p o l i t i c a l 
area, were merely pre texts to k i l l the proposal for a 
conference. 
1. The United Nations and Disarmament, vo l . 5, 1980, p . 361. 
2. I b id . , v o l . 6, 1981, p . 312. 
3. Official Records of the General Assembly, 30th Session, 
First Committee, Sessional Fascile, Corrigendum. 
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Till date, India has continued to stress the need 
to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in the 
United Nations as originally envisated in 1971 declara-
tion. India has always opposed any attempt to declare 
an area/zone free from nuclear weapons to the littoral 
countries as a compliment. India has always strived 
that there was a need to examine the question in global 
terms since this was not merely a regional disarmament 
matter. 
Not only in United Nations also in Non-Aligned 
Conferences India has advocated that Indian Ocean be 
declared a zone of peace and elimination of big powers 
from the area, ^ s at the ^^saka Conference of the non-
aligned nations Mrs. Gandhi , the then Prime Minister 
of India,spoke in favour of Indian Ocean as a peace 
2 
zone. 
The Ind ian Foreign Min i s t e r , Mr, Dinesh Singh a l so 
r e f l e c t e d t h e same views in an e a r l i e r meeting (p repara to ry) 
of t he non-a l igned c o u n t r i e s in Dares Salaam on Apr i l 16,1970, 
1. The United Nat ions ancJ Disarmament, Year Book, v o l . 9, 
1984, p . 4 4 . 
2 . Speech of Mrs. Gandhi a t Lusaka Summit Conference of 
Non-Aligned Nat ions , Review of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 
Belgrade, No.491, 21 Sep t . 1970, p p . 21-23 . 
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rie said that dependence on others i s not the safeguard 
for in t e rna t iona l peace and secur i ty but t h i s can be 
achieved, through making, soc ia l , p o l i t i c a l and defence 
po ten t i a l of each country, strong. 
During the Fourth Conference of non-aligned nations 
at Algiers in 1974, Mr. Swar an Singh, the then Foreign 
Minister of India , said that the decision to develop the 
Anglo-American base f a c i l i t i e s in the i s land of Diego 
Garcia was going against the des i re of l i t t o r a l s t a t e s 
of the Indian Ocean, to make i t a zone of peace through 
the great power r i v a l r i e s and tens ions . 
2 
Mrs. Gandhi said tha t "many of our nat ions remain 
p o l i t i c a l l y vulnerable to external pressures . The e f for t s 
to undermine the power of nationalism and p o l i t i c a l 
cohension, to d i sc red i t and remove leaders and governments 
who symDolise indepenaent thinking and self r e l i ance , and 
to i n s t a l l more p l i ab l e indiv iduals and p a r t i e s , i s 
1. Statement by the External Affairs Minister , Mr. Swaran 
Singh at the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, 
Meeting of the Bureau^ Algiers, 19-21 March, 1974. 
2. Prime Minister Mrs. Ind i ra Gandhi's address to the 
Conference of Heads of Sta tes /Govts , of non-aligned 
countries, Colombo, 17 / ^ r i l 1976. 
257 
unabated. Economic explo i ta t ions p e r s i s t , in old and 
new garbs. So, do the technological d i s p a r i t i e s and 
psychological complexes bred by colonialism. All count-
r i e s around the Indian Ocean wish t h i s area t o be a 
zone of peace, are perturbed by the establishment of 
bases and in t rus ion of r i v a l r i e s " . 
Mr. S.N. Mishra,the Indian representa t ive at the 
Havana Summit of the non-aligned countries said that the 
strengthening of the exis t ing mil i tary bases, such as 
DiegoGarcia would further in tens i fy arms race and would 
be an added hurdle in the way of re laxat ion of tension 
in the area. He called on the USA and the USSR to s t a r t 
negot iat ing again on the subject and pleaded that other 
countr ies must cooperate with the ad-hoc committee for 
the achievement of i t s objec t ives . 
Mrs. Gandhi at the 7th NAM Summit gave a c a l l to 
strengthen the movement for convening United Nations 
Conference on the Indian Ocean. She also said that a l l 
the non-aligned nat ions should r e s i s t any >cind of 
intervent ion in the i r in te rna l a f f a i r s . 
1. Seventh NAM Summit: Selected Documents. 
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Indian point of view i s that the developments in 
the Indian Ocean region are linked with Indian Secur i ty , 
kvhen more and more powers es tab l i sh the i r mi l i t a ry bases 
and the area becomes an area of big power r iva l ry , i t 
i s bound to create disturbances in the whole region, 
of which India i s a p a r t . Indian securi ty , then, wi l l 
be in ser ious t rouble . Security has various dimensions, 
such as secur i ty - (a) from mi l i t a ry th rea t s , (b) from 
p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c th rea t s , (c) from threa t to i t s 
economic i n t e r e s t , and (d) against psychological p ressure . 
The d i rec t struggle and competition between the 
super powers r e l a t e s to p o l i t i c a l , economic and mi l i t a ry 
a c t i v i t i e s in the race for the r igh t to impose one's 
2 
wi l l on the o ther . The Indian Ocean has predominant 
3 influence on the Indian destiny, because India has an 
open coas t l ine of about 2000 miles and over 90% of her 
foreign trade i s through t h i s Ocean. Thus, i t i s important 
1. Surendra Chopra, 'Indian Ocean Po l i t i cs - A Challenge 
to I n d i a ' s Diplomacy', in Akhtar Majeed, Ed. Indian 
Ocean; Conflict and Regional Cooperation, ABC Publishing 
House, New Delhi, 1986, p . 83. 
2. <Jasjit oiityh, 'Indiaii ocean in Global St ra tegies* , 
IPSA Journal , 17(4), April-June, 1985, p . 453. 
3. K.H. P.nikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, Bombay, 
1964, p . 14. 
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for India to control and influence the region for her 
sea bcrne trade and for her sovereignty. Thus from 
the very beginning India is working to gather support 
to get this area free from foreign intervention and 
Indian Ocean be declared as a zone of peace in accor-
dance with the 1971 resolution. The same view was 
expressed by Mr. Y.B. Chavan in his General Assembly 
address, "priority attention should be given to mobilising 
the support of the International Community for concrete 
and constructive action for implementing the declaration 
of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace by eliminating 
all military bases conceived in the context of great 
power rivalry and reversing the present trend of 
escalating great power rivalry in the area". 
India has been vehemently opposing the newly 
added proposals aimed to divert the real cause. India 
sees that these proposals are the pretexts to kill the 
2 
objectives of peace and security in the Indian Ocean. 
1. A/fV 2364, 26 Sept. 1975, p, 81. (UN Documents) 
2. The United Nations Disarmament it^ear _Book, vol. 6, 
1981, p. 312. 
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The plea of some of the s t a t e s in the ad-hoc 
committee, to ensure nuclear safeguards, in order to 
play the tune of the super powers i s clear indicat ion 
of the new role played by the big powers in desolving 
the real issue. . Moreover, the developments in China in 
the f ie ld of nuclear weapons after the 1962 Sino-Indian 
conf l ic t was another reason, India does not want to 
commit anything regarding i t s policy on nuclear arms, 
especial ly when she has h o s t i l e r e l a t ions with the new 
member of the nuclear club. Another development in the 
Indian Ocean which has to be kept in mind before the 
new added object ives be accepted by India i s the 
presence of United Sta tes task force at the time of 
India-Pakistan War over Bangladesh in 1971 and then 
again at the time or Arab-Israel i conf l ic t of 1973. 
-This was a clear indicat ion of the role^ 'the US would 
l ike to play in the region, in fu ture . The same may be 
Said about the Soviets presence in the region but India 
takes a softer posture regarding USSR and considers her 
action as a ' r eac t ion ' and 'de fens ive ' . Moreover, India 
1. S.P. Seth, 'The Indian Ocean and Indo-American 
Rela t ions ' , Asian Survey 15 {8), Aug. 1975, p . 645. 
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j u s t i f i e s the Sov ie t ' s presence as a par t of the t r ea ty 
of Friendshing, Peace and Cooperation. Soviet presence 
may be helpful to India in case of a threat to her^ as 
i t happened in 1971. 
At the same time India fully r e a l i s e s the posi t ion 
of the Indian Ocean region and does not t r y to overlook 
the consequences of big power r i va l ry in the region/ as 
they fuel the regional conf l ic t s and i t might r e s u l t 
2 in local wars by proxy. 
Together with t h i s India r e a l i s e s the importance 
to include super powers in the t a lks on the Indian Ocean. 
This i s the reason India has always advocated for the i r 
pa r t i c ipa t ion iii a l l the conterences held so far for the 
purpose. 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones - I nd i a ' s Policy; 
India i s opposed to the concept of nuclear weapon 
free zones. From the very beginning India i s opposed to 
the concept because, in her opinion i t i s discr iminatory. 
1. Surendra Chopra, "Indian Ocean i^ol i t ics: A Challenge to 
I nd i a ' s Diplomacy", in Akhtar Majeed, Ed. Indian Ocean 
Conflict and Cooperation, o p . c i t . , p . 80. 
2. S.P.Seth, The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Relat ions, 
o p . c i t . , p . 649. 
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At the time of NPT also India abstained from signing 
i t due to the same reason. The Indian opposition can 
broadly be narrowed down to two fac to r s . F i r s t l y , i t 
divides the world in to two groups. The nuclear haves 
and the h a v e n o t s . Only the haves would have the r igh t 
to own nuclear weapons and, therefore , to f ight a 
nuclear war. The argument they give i s that the have 
nots are i r respons ib le , as i f r e spons ib i l i t y comes with 
nuclear weapons. Secondly, i t i s a clear in te r ference 
in the r ight of independent nations t o choose the i r 
own ways. The offer of the nuclear weapon s t a t e s i s 
rejected by India, to safeguard the p o l i t i c a l and 
securi ty i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e s i f they surrender 
the i r r ight to own nuclear weapons themselves. " . . . i f 
they surrender thecontrol of the i r nuclear technology 
to the haves, they would be given p o l i t i c a l guarantees 
that would save them from a nuclear devastation even 
.. 2 
if the haves do fight a nuclear war . 
1. K.R. Singh, "Pol i t i cs of the Peace Zone", in Akhtar 
Majeed, Sd. The Indian Ocean; Conflict and Regional 
Cooperation, o p . c i t . , p . 131. 
2. Ib id . 
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India felt that a nuclear weapon free zone wcuic 
not help to combat the nuclear threat to the world at 
large but provide an advantage to the nuclear weapon 
states since nuclear weapons and their delivery systems 
were inter-continental in nature. It argued that the 
nuclear disarmament, like peace could not be geographical 
piecemeal. 
India stated that proposals for nuclear weapon free 
zones can succeed only when nuclear weapon powers also 
agree to denuclearize and nuclear weapons are delegitimised 
3 
by the international community. The Indian representative 
argued, "nuclear weapon free zones constitute only a 
collateral measure , they are not and should not become 
4 
a substitute for nuclear disarmament". India argued that 
nuclear technology can not be confined to a few states. 
'<^Jhen new infiltrators are joining the club there is no 
1. United Nations Disarmament ^^ ear Book, vol.2, 1977, p.180. 
book 
2 . Year of t h e Un i t ed N a t i o n s , 1982, v o l . 36, D e p t t . of 
P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n , U n i t e d N a t i o n s , New York, 1986, p . 6 3 . 
3 . P . S . J aya ramu , "Nuc lea r Weapon F r e e Zone, NPT and South 
A s i a " , i n K.Subramanyam, Ed, N u c l e a r Myths and R e a l i t i e s , 
A3C P u b l i s h i n g House, New D e l h i , 1981, p . 8 4 , 
4 . UN Document A/C 1/PV 2016, Nov. 11, 1974. 
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assurance^Which nations will never become nuclear. It 
is against the very ethics and logic to keep some 
nations away from this technology when others are going 
all out for it. India repeated its pledge not to manuf-
acture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of 
the world did so, and abjure nuclear explosions even 
for peaceful purposes. India suggested some steps, before 
she implements her pledge, for universal disarmament. 
These are, (i) declaration that would outlaw utilization 
of nuclear technology for military purposes; (ii) quali-
tative and quantitative limitations on nuclear armaments 
and immediate freezing of present stockpiles under 
international inspection; (iii) formulation of a time 
bound programme — not exceeding a decade — for gradual 
reduction of stockpiles with a view to achieve total 
elimination of nuclear weapons; and (iv) a comprehensive 
test ban with provisions for safeguards through 
international inspection. 
India was ready to support the concept of nuclear 
weapon free zones, but "India made it clear that the 
1, Official Records of General Assembly 10th Special 
Session, Supplement, No.l, A/3-10/1 vol. 1 
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declarat ion of any pa r t i cu la r region as a nuclear free 
zone did not mean that the nuclear powers had the r ight 
to destroy the areas which were not declared as nuclear 
free zones for some reasons. 
In I n d i a ' s view, the establishment of nuclear weapon 
free zone in any area was possible only i f a l l the count-
2 
r i e s of that area were unanimous about doing so . 
I n d i a ' s Ambassador to the UN s ta ted , "the denuclear-
i za t ion of a region became d i f f i c u l t and even impossible 
when one or more countries in the region were more 
in te res ted in, a l l i e s which possessed or were on the 
way to acquiring nuclear weapons, then in denuclear iza t ion. 
India had the opinion that the countries of the 
region themselves take the i n i t i a t i v e instead of foreign 
powers doing so. She emphasized the importance of voluntary 
nature of the proposal . 
India supported the concept of nuclear weapon free 
zone and expressed i t s happiness about the keen 
1. A.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' s Policy on Disarmament, ABC ^-ublishing 
House, New Delhi, 19 84, p . 129. 
2. I b i d . 
3. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, 20th 
Session, 1391st meeting, 1 Dec. 1965, p. 213. 
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interest shown by the various countries in getting tneir 
areas declared as nuclear weapon free zones. 
An important reason why India felt happy was the 
successful application of the concept of nuclear weapon 
free zones in certain areas could pave the way for 
achieving the goal of making the world free from nuclear 
weapons. At the sametime India felt and emphasised the 
need to bring voloritary acceptance of denuclearization 
of a region by the states of that region. The element 
of coercion was considered to be a negative force in 
pursuit of denuclearization. The initiative should 
come from the countries of the region themselves. India 
also felt that the areas intended to be denuclearised 
should be large enough to satisfy the security consider-
ations of states of the region. A small area being 
denuclearised will be ineffective. Moreover, India 
emphasized the need on the part of nuclear states to 
cooperate and respect the denuclearised area. Even one 
1. A.K. Chopra, India's Policy on Disarmament, op.cit. 
pp. 28-29. 
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single nuclear power not respect ing the denuclearized 
area wi l l mean breaking up the whole system. Kegardiny 
th i s I n d i a ' s Ambassador, Husain, said, "arguments on 
denuclearized zones would also require tha t nuclear 
weapon powers undertake to respect the s ta tus of such 
zones andlend the i r fu l l cooperation in implementing 
arrangements concerning the i r establishment. Unless 
the areas are respected by nuclear powers, any t rea ty 
in t h i s regard wil l be meaningless. They should not in 
any case i s o l a t e the peace of that area by keeping or 
conducting nuclear t e s t s in the area . 
India was opposed to the idea tha t non-nuclear 
countr ies should be prohibi ted to use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes even i f the countries wece s i tua ted 
in a denuclearized zone. Because the Indian stand from 
the very beginning was for the use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes as i t i s considered to be the 
newest technology, so v i t a l for the economic aevelopment 
and progress . Indian representa t ive in very clear terms 
said, "the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
1. Foreign Affairs Record, Sept. 1968, p .201. 
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including explosive devices, should not be prohibited 
by any treaty". 
The first proposal to establish a nuclear weapon 
free zone was initiated by the Soviet Union in March 1955 
to the sub-committee of disarmament commission. They 
proposed the declaration of a nuclear weapon free zone 
in Europe, with both the Germanys and the countries 
adjacent to them as parties. It was proposed that "the 
stationing of atomic and military formations and the 
locations of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any kind 
2 in the zone shall be prohioited". Other proposals 
for establishing nuclear weapon free zones in Central 
Europe, including the two Grrmanyi Czechoslovakia and 
r-oland including the Gomulka I'lan of 2 October 1957, 
is often called the Rapacki Plan. The two plans suggest 
steps to create a nuclear threshold, to prevent premature 
use of nuclear arms, to reduce the tensions on the 
lines of NATO and Warsaw Bacts. 
Romania had submitted a proposal for a nuclear 
weapon free zone in the Balkans in 1957 and a similar 
1. United Nation General Assembly, First Committee, 
22nd Session, 1510th Meeting, 31 Oct. 1969, p.6. 
2. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, 
Supplement for 1958, Document DC/83, Annexure 5, 
DC/SC 1/4 1. 
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proposal was submitted by USSR in 1959 for Balkans and 
the Adriatic. Then again in 1963, Soviet Union submitted 
a proposal for Mediterranean.on the other side of Europe, 
Ireland suggested on 23 September 1959, a nuclear weapon 
free zone. All these proposals failed to gather support 
due to the US suspicion that the proposals are to break 
up the NATO unity and security. 
In<3ian Stand on Antarctica Treaty 
The Antarctica Treaty is considered to be the first 
treaty establishing a demilitarized zone. This treaty 
prohibits the use, storage, production or any other kind 
of use of nuclear weapons. In 1959, the representatives 
of Argentina, Australia, aelgium, C3^ile, France, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Soviet Union, UK and 
USA met in Washington i>.C. to discuss the issue of 
Antarctica being declared a denuclearized and demilita-
rised zone and to ensure the use of the area entirely 
for peaceful purposes. The treaty of Antarctica was 
signed on 1 December 1959. The treaty was intended to 
ensure the access to all the regions of Antarctica by 
maintaining the status quos in regard to the territorial 
claims. 
1. UN Document on Disarmament 1957-59, vol. II, No. 13, 
p. 1020. 
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Art ic le I of the Antarctica Treaty says that 
Antarctica shal l be used for peaceful purposes only and 
p roh ib i t s i n t e r - a l i a , any measure, of a mi l i t a ry nature 
li}<e establishment of mi l i ta ry bases, carrying out of 
mi l i ta ry manoevres and the t e s t ing of any type of weapons. 
The introduction and tes t ing of nuclear weapons in Antarc-
t i ca would f a l l within the scope of the prohibi t ion 
contained in Ar t i c le I . 
The conclusion of the Treaty of Antarctica was 
welcomed by Ind ia . Ambassador Lall communicateu I n d i a ' s 
happiness over the conclusion of the t r e a t y in the United 
Nation General Assembly. 
Indian Support for Tlatelolco Treaty 
The t rea ty of Tla te lolco for the prohibi t ion of 
nuclear weapons in Latin America was signed on 14 February 
2 1967. This i s "the only instrument concluded so far, 
es tabl ish ing a nuclear weapon free zone in a densely 
3 populated area" . The idea originar-ted in the thick of 
1. Nuclear vVeapon Free Zones Study NO»l , p . 10. 
2. United Nations Treaty Ser ies , vo l . 634, no. 9068, p.326 
3. Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Study No. 1, p . 13. 
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the cold war, at t h e time of Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s , by 
1 n. 
on iirazil in 1962 and then by Mexico in 1963., Tnen 
April 29, 1963 the Heads of Governments of Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Equador and Mexico issues a Joint 
Declaration which said, "their governments were willing 
to sign a Latin American multilateral agreement by which 
they would undertake not to manufacture, store or test 
nuclear weapon or devices for launching nuclear weapons . 
The 'Joint Declaration' countries with Costa Rica, 
EI Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, fanama and Uruguay, submitted 
a draft resolution which was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 27 Kovemoer 1963, as Resolution 1911 
(XVIII), in which the General Assembly welcomed the 
Joint Declaration. The United Nations General Assembly 
also requested the Secretary General to extend to the 
concerned countries "such technical facilities as they 
may require in order to achieve the aims set forth in 
4 
the present resolution". 
1. Calderon, No. 2, p. 259. 
2. Alfonso Garcia - Robles, "The Lat in American Wuclear 
Weapon Free Zone", Joseph Goldbla t and Akssandro 
P a s c o l i n i , Ed. The Arms Race At a Time of Decis ion, 
MacmiUan Press , London, 19 84, p . 213, 
Assernb] y 
3. UNGAOR, General/Aesolution, 1911, XVIII, 27 Nov. 1963 
4. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, 1977, 
New York, 1978, vol. II, p. 161. 
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India again welcomed the t r ea ty of T la te lo lco for 
the prohibi t ion of nuclear weapons in Latin America. 
I n d i a ' s Ambassador G. Parthasarthy s ta ted , "The Indian 
delegation expresses i t s profound g ra t i f i c a t i on at t h i s 
achievement. The t r ea ty in our view, should help in 
redaction of in t e rna t iona l tens ion . '"*e hope that the 
conclusion of t h i s t rea ty wi l l encourage the nuclear 
powers to make serious e f for t s to work towards general 
and complete disarmament, more pa r t i cu la r ly , nuclear 
disarmament. 
This stance taken by India was in keeping with the 
e a r l i e r Indian stand on the question of reducing the 
dangers of nuclear war. I n d i a ' s view was that these kinds 
of t r e a t i e s would ul t imately oring in some sense in the 
nuclear powers and they would r e a l i s e the f u t i l i t y of 
arms race and ul t imately, moresuch agreements wil l be 
concluded, leading to disarmament. India was pa r t i cu l a r ly 
happy as the Latin American t r e a t y was concluded by the 
countries of the region and without outside pressures . 
iMoreover, the region declared as a nuclear weapon free 
zone was a large area which made i t more viable 
1. United Nations General Assembly, F i r s t Committee, 
22nd Session, 1510 Meeting, Oct. 27, 1969. 
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and e f fec t ive . There was another reason why India was 
happy and welcomed the t r e a t y . I t was due to the fact 
that the balance and respons io i l i ty was maintained in 
the t r e a t y . The t r ea ty called on the s t a t e s of the 
region to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes 
and at the same time i t cal led on the nuclear powers to 
' respect , fully, the denuclearization of Latin America 
and refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear 
weapons against the countr ies of the region". "Thus 
es tabl i sn ing a balance of mutual r e s p o n s i o i l i t i e s and 
2 
obligat ions between the nuclear and non-nuclear powers". 
India declared that establishment of nuclear weapon 
free zone would be meaningless where even one nuclear 
nower does not respect i t . Nuclear weapon free zone, 
without a mutual balance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and 
obl igat ions on the par t of nuclear and non-nuclear 
powers would become a nuclear zone. India welcomed, the 
declara t ion of the UK to accede to the t r ea ty in the 
fo i l wing words, "the obligation of the nuclear powers, 
in t h i s area i s of paramount importance to the success 
1. Nuclear weapon Free Zone otudy, o p . c i t . , p . 15. 
2. A.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' s Policy on i-)is armament, c p . c i t . 
p . 135. 
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of the t r ea ty , anc we welcome the statement of the 
representa t ive of the United Kingdom, made at the 150th 
meeting, in wl'.ich he announced h is government's decision 
to accede to i t " . 
On the other hand, India also welcomed the clause, 
'nuclear energy for peaceful purpose' , as i t was in 
accordance with Indian policy to free access of non-nuclear 
powers to use nuclear energy for developmental purposes 
and for the welfare and well being of mil l ions of people 
in the developing count r ies . India was ful ly aware of 
the al legat ion by nuclear powers that the technology used 
in nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes i s the same 
as in that of weapon purposes. The Brazil ian representa t ive 
said "Art ic le 18 of the t r ea ty allows the signatory s t a t e s 
to carry out with the i r own means or in associat ion witr. 
th i rd pa r t i e s peaceful nuclear explosions which may involve 
2 devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons. 
Ambassador Parthasarthy expressed sa t i s f ac t ion of 
the Indian government and said "we are most g ra t i f i ed at 
the explanation given by the i i razi l ian delegation and 
3 
congratulate tr.em on this aspect of the treaty". 
U United Nation General Assembly, First Committee, 22nd 
Session, 1510th meeting, 13 Oct. 1967, p. 6. 
2. Ib id . 
3. j^bid.1510 meeting, Oct. 1967, p . 7 . 
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To conclude we can say t h a t t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of 
La t in America as a nuclear weapon f r e e zone was in 
complete accord with p r i n c i p l e s advocated by Ind ia 
for such t r e a t i e s . 
I n d i a ' s Pol icy on Outer ^ipace Treaty 
The t r e a t y on p r i n c i p l e s governing the a c t i v i t i e s 
of s t a t e s in the Explora t ion and use of ou te r space , 
i nc lud ing the moon and other c e l e s t i a l bod ies , (commoijly, 
known as the uuter Space Treaty) was approved by the 
General Assembly as r e s o l u t i o n 2222 (XXI) on 19 December 
1966. The t r e a t y came i n t o force on 10 October 1967. 
I nd i a be l ieved t h a t t h e idea of peaceful uses of outer 
2 
space was l inked with t h e problem of disarmament. 
I n d i a ' s argument was t h a t t h e t ime has come, 
where s c i ence and technology has made i t p o s s i b l e , 
t h a t outer space may be used for t h e emplacement 
of nuclear weapons and t h e i r d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s , 
embassador Lai 1 sa id " I t seems to us t ha t t h e r e i s a 
1. United Nation Treaty S e r i e s , v o l . 610, no . 8843. 
2. A.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' s Pol icy on Disarmament, o p . c i t . , 
p . 146. 
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complex of problems d i r ec t l y connected with the securi ty 
of a l l nat ions and man's a b i l i t y to send vehic les in to 
outer space, which forms a c r i t i c a l background for the 
consideration of many other i s sues . For example, iCBMs 
sometimes reach a height of 600 miles above the ea r th . 
I t appears too tha t a time might come when advances in 
space technology would permit s a t e l l i t e s with nuclear 
warheads to be launched secre t ly and to be maintained 
on d i s tan t o r b i t s u n t i l recal led for use against t a rge t s 
on ear th . This crucia l aspect of the problem namely, 
the control of such non-peaceful uses of outer space, 
i s e s sen t i a l ly a par t of the problem of world pqace 
tha t i s disarmament. 
In view of the dangers that might a r i se frcxn the 
use of outer space for mi l i ta ry purposes, India argued 
that the US and USSR hav- a special responsibility to 
2 
ensure against the military uses of outer space. India 
viewed that the question of outer space could be solved 
through an agreement between the United States and the 
1. 2NDC/PV 37, 15 May 1962, p . 14 . 
2. A.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' s jPolicy on Disarmament, o p . c i t . , 
p . 144. 
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Soviet union because they were capable of the misuse 
of outer space for mi l i ta ry purposes. 
Indian representa t ive drew the a t tent ion of the 
members by saying, "the two super powers could ar r ive 
at an agreement for the purpose. If the US and USSR 
had signed an agreement to keep the Antarctica free 
from mi l i t a ry bases and nuclear dxperiments, s imi la r ly , 
2 
they could sign an agreement on outer space". 
I nd i a ' s Ambassador Lal l r e i t e r a t ed , " there should 
- fu l 
be in te rna t iona l cooperation in the peac^uses of outer 
space. I t might be said that t h i s i s not d i r ec t l y a 
disarmament measure, but we think i t i s closely 
connected with disarmament and we would be happy to 
see such an idea included in the disarmament plan as 
an anc i l l i a ry to the actual disarmament measures. 
Keeping in view, these p r inc ip les , India supported 
the Outer Space Treaty and signed the t r ea ty on 3 March 
1967. 
1. Ib id . 
2. ^NDC/PV 37, 15 May 196 2, p . 15 . 
^' ^ b i d . , p . 14 . 
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Indian E f f o r t s on 5ea-bed T rea ty 
The t r e a t y on t h e P r o h i b i t i o n of the Emplacement 
ot Nuclear Weapons and Other w^  apons of Mass Des t ruc t ion 
on the Sea-bed and t h e Ocean-floor and in the Sub - so i l 
t he reo f (comiiohly known as the Sea-bed Trea ty ; was 
commended by the General Assembly on 7 December 1970. 
The t r e a t y came i n t o force on 18 May 1972. 
Ind ia being aware of the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t nuc lea r 
weapons could be s to red in t h e sea-bed, t h e Ocean-floor 
2 
and the sub-soil had warned against these. 
India supported the concept of making the Ocean 
floor an area out of bounds for storage of nuclear 
weapons. India had realised long ago that advances in 
Science would make it possible to store weapons of mass 
destruction on sea bed, thus, endangering an area so 
vital for the well being of mankind. 
India knew that exploration of Ocean floor had 
so much promise for mankind. She supported the idea of 
the exploration of sea-bed only for peaceful purposes, 
1. UNGAOR, General Assembly, Resolution 2660 (AAY) , 
Annex, 7 Dec. 1970. 
2. United Nation General Assembly, First Committee, 
22nd Session, 1530th meeting, Nov.16, 1967, p. 1. 
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and believed that a world body like the United Nations 
could become the guiding light in this regard. Thus, 
India supported the action of the General Assembly in 
reserving the sea-bed and the Ocean floor beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, and for peaceful 
purposes only and expected the appropriate body to 
coordinate in respect of exploration and exploitation 
of immense wealth on the sea bed, wants the UN to 
Safeguard the interests of the nations, especially of 
the developing countries. At the same time India was 
also aware of the possibility of the Ocean floor being 
exploited by nuclear powers and warned the world against 
any possible rivalries on theuse, rather misuse, of 
ocean floor. Indian Ambassador suggested, 'first, the 
sea bed and the ocean floor should not be subject to 
the sovereignty of any nation. Secondly, their resources 
should be considered the common heritage of mankind and 
thirdly, that the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be 
reserved for peaceful purposes. 
1. United Nation General Assem.bly, First Committee, 
22nd Session, 1530th meeting, 16 Kov.1967, p. 1. 
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India suggested these principles entirely on 
considerations of humanitarian principles and inter-
national peace, and wanted to keep the territory 
outside the sovereignties of nations to keep rivalries 
away from this region and to chec)< arms race in that 
area. 
India was determined to do all it could to ensure 
that the fears and tensions prevailing on tne iano surface 
were not injected into this new area. It called upon the 
nuclear powers to change their motive of seeing everything 
from the strategic military angle. It proposed signing 
of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the 
2 
sea-bed, on the ocean f loor and s u b - s o i l t h e r e o f . 
Ind ian Ambassador, Azim Husain, said, " the proposed t r e a t y 
would be based on the g u i d e l i n e s l a i d down by General 
Assembly Reso lu t ion 2467 (XXIII) and which l a i d down t h a t 
the sea-bed beyond the l i m i t s of p r e s e n t n a t i o n a l j u r i s -
d i c t i o n should be re;^erved e x c l u s i v e l y for peacefu l 
3 p u r p o s e s . 
* 
1. A.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' Pol icy on Disarmament, o p . c i t . , 
p . 14 2. 
2 . I b i d . 
3. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, 23rd 
Session, 1591st meeting, 30 Oct. 1968. 
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Thus, India supported the Sea-bed Treaty prohibi t ing 
nat ions emplacing nuclear weapons on the sea bed, without 
in te r fe r ing with the legi t imate r i g h t s , of maritime nat ions, 
in respect of communication linl<s, navigation e tc . India 
signed the t r ea ty on 20 July 1973. The t r e a ty was a major 
effor t towards stopping the p ro l i f e ra t ion of nuclear weapons 
in the area of deep sea and fo r e s t a l l i ng r i v a l r i e s among the 
big powers. The t r ea ty , in respect , made the deep sea a 
denuclearized area . 
Indian Support for Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Africa 
India supported the e f fo r t s of the African countr ies 
t o get t he i r continent declared as a nuclear weapon free 
zone. The i n i t i a t i v e for such a move came from the African 
countr ies themselves. Thus, India supported ' a s a matter 
of p r i n c i p l e ' , Indian stand on the i ssue was made clear by 
the stand taken py Ambassador, Trivedi, who while addressing 
the p o l i t i c a l Committee of the General Assembly said, "India 
agreed en t i r e ly with the object ives of denuclearizat ion 
pursued by the African countr ies . . . i t i s hoped tha t the 
1. A.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' s Policy on Disarmament, op. c i t . 
p, 143, 
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endeavours of the African countries would be successful 
in the very near future". 
The proposal from the African countries was mooted 
with the aim to keep Africa away from arms race and also to 
declare that nuclear powers are not welcome, to indulge in 
manufacture or storage of nuclear weapons or installation 
of military bases or launching sites for their weapons in 
the continent of Africa. Moreover, the situation in Africa 
was ideal for such an agreement because no country in the 
continent had tested any nuclear weapon. The condition, 
therefore, were quite conducive to the establishment of 
Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone. Another important 
factor was that there was no military alliances between 
any African country and a super power, and the African 
states were^  largely, truely non-aligned at that time. The 
conditions were, in a way, ideal for the conclusion of a 
treaty for nuclear weapon free zone. Ambassador Trivedi, 
expressed India's support by saying, "The Indian delegation 
wishes to emphasize that countries belonging to their 
1. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, 
20th Session, 1391 meeting, 1 Dec. 1965, p. 213. 
283 
cont inents were in accord with the object ives, of non-aligned 
nat ions of Africa, The debates on the present item had i t s 
relevance to areas other than the African countr ies and i t s 
adjacent waters and i s l ands . 
The aim of the African s t a t e s was to keep the i r 
continent free of-.nuclear weapons, thus enable the i r 
developing countr ies to devoting more energies in the areas 
of development and progress as the countr ies of the continent 
were largely backward. The diversion of resources would be 
poss ible i f nuclear race i s not s t a r t ed in the area. India 
had no option to t h i s great idea and supported 
the African move thinking tha t i t wi l l Decotne a precedent 
for other continents to follow. 
India voted in favour of General Assembly Resolution 
1562 (XVI) for the consideration of Africa as a denuclearized 
zone. I n d i a ' s fu l l support tor the resolut ion i s evident 
from the statement of Ambassador Trivedl, "The Indian 
delegation watched with the i n t e r e s t , sympathy and 
admiration, the e f for t s of African S ta tes for denuclear-
iza t ion of the i r continent . I t considered tha t the peace 
1. Ib id . 
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proposition of these sovereign states deserved the full 
support of all members of the world body". 
Although, India was in agreement with the aims of 
the resolution, but it did not play a direct and active 
role in the deliberations on the declaration of Africa 
as a nuclear weapon free zone. Since, the proposals were 
in accord with the Indian policy of 'live and let live*, 
it took keen interest in the development of the proposal. 
India happily and readily voted in favour of General 
2 
Assembly Resolution 2033 (xx) of 3 December 1965, which 
declared Africa as a nuclear weapon free zone. 
Indian Policy Towards Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia 
The proposal for nuclear weapon free zone in South 
Asia was given by Pakistan as an alternative to NPT For an 
attempt to make the region tree of nuclear weapons. After 
the nuclear explosion by India at Pokhran in 1974, Pakistan 
raised the question in the General Assemoly of the United 
Nations pleading that, "The States of the South Asia tegion 
1. Ibid. 
2. The United Nat ions and Disarmament, 1945-65, o p . c i t . , , 
p . 215. 
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have a r igh t t o harness nuclear energy for peaceful 
appl ica t ion" . 
The Pak resolut ion also wanted the nuclear weapon 
s t a t e s to assure that nuclear weapons wi l l not be used 
against any s t a t e in the region, fak proposal wanted to , 
"prohibi t the t e s t i ng , use, production, acquis i t ion or 
storage of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices 
2 by the Sough Asian Sta tes . . . " 
The Indian opinion was d i t fe ren t as she wanted the 
South Asian Region Countries to find the i r own dest iny. 
The Indian representa t ive s ta ted tha t t h i s region can not 
f i t in a proposal l ike that ot Pakistan, as t h i s region 
i s par t and parcel of Asian and pac i f ic region and i s 
surrounded by nuclear weapon powers. I t i s en t i r e ly a 
d i f ferent kind of a region and r i a t e l c o type of t r ea ty 
can not be concluded here . India expressed i t s opinion 
that the i n i t i a t i v e to have t h i s kind of a t r ea ty should 
come ffom the countr ies of t h i s region and not from outside 
powers. The same opinion India expressed through i t s 
1. United Nations Document, A/C 1, pp. 2022, p.210 (A/C l/L 682) . 
2, K.R. Singh, Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia, 
' India Quarter ly ' , Ju ly-Sept . 1976, p . 291. 
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representative in the UN, B.C^ Mishra, on 18 Novemoer, 1965 
when he saia "If any particular country feels that it is 
in its interest to declare itself a nuclear weapon free 
zone or a part of such a zone, we shall be the last to 
object to that. Each country has to decide for itself. We 
would not like to impose our views upon anyone, however, 
small or Pig that country might oe. But at the same time, 
we will not accept the imposition of a concept from anyone". 
India, no doubt, supported the moves of Latin American 
and African countries to get their regions declared as 
nuclear weapon free zones but it opposed Pakistan's proposal 
to the General Assembly to 'declare and establish a nuclear 
weapon free zone in south Asia. 
This was, seemingly, because of two important factors. 
Indian opposition to the Pakistani proposal was on two 
counts firstly, the conditions in the region should be 
conducive for such a move and, secondly, the move must be 
initiated by the countries of the region themselves. Moreover, 
the United Nations* policy had been of not to act unless 
1. United Nations Document A/C 1/PV 2022, pp. 12-16. 
2. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, 29th 
Session, 2002 meeting, 28 Oct. 1974, p. 46. 
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the countries of the region come to an agreement' . This 
was t rue in the case of Latin America, and Africa a l s o . 
Ambassador Mishra opposed the t 'akistani proposal in the 
following words, "We would not l ike to impose our view 
on any one, however, small or big that country be. At the 
same time, we cannot accept imposition of a concept from 
any one. That i s a matter of p r inc ip les ; tha t i s a matter 
of sovereign equal i ty of s t a t e s represented here . I am 
afraid, I must say with humili ty and with a l l respect 
that concepts are acceptable to us i f there i s mutual 
agreement which has arisen from mutual consul ta t ions but 
not otherwise. 
India opposed the ir'akistani proposal as a matter 
of p r inc ip le as i t pleaded tha t the move must be i n i t i a t e d 
by the countr ies of the region and forcing the opinion on 
unwilling sovereign s ta tes i s against the p r inc ip les of 
in t e rna t iona l law. 
India opposed the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone 
in South Asia as contained in operative para 2 of the 
resolut ion in the following words, "Our view i s tha t South 
1. United Nations General Assembly, F i r s t Conunittee, 29th 
Session, 2Q22nd meeting, 18 Nov. 1974, p . 12. 
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Asia i s an in tegra l pa r t of a larger region and i t i s not 
possible for us to agree to the endorsement of the concept 
of a nuclear free zone merely in South Asia, even though 
that may be so in p r i n c i p l e . This tex t , py endorsing the 
concept, places some of us, who are for negot ia t ions and 
for agreement to a larger region, at a disadvantage". 
India considers South Asia as a par t of a larger 
area of Asia and the Pacific and considering the area in 
i so l a t ion i s improper, any endorsement of a demand for the 
denuclearizat ion of South Asia would, India warned, 
cons t i tu te a se t back for the e f for t s of some of the 
countr ies of South Asia towards creat ing a larger nuclear 
. , 2 
free zone m the area. 
The United Nations General Assembly invi ted a l l 
s t a t e s of the South Asian region and in te res ted neighbour-
ing non-nuclear weapon s t a t e s for necessary consul tat ions 
and to refra in from any action which goes against the 
3 
achievement of such objec t ives . 
1. I b id . , 2025th meeting, 20 Nov. 1974, p . 8. 
2. A.K. Chopra, I nd i a ' s Policy on Disarmament, o p . c i t . , 
p- 138. 
3 . United Nation, Year Book, 1977, o p . c i t . , p . 20. 
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I n d i a r e a c t e d s h a r p l y t o t h i s and t h e I n d i a n 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a i d , 'we do n o t o e l i e v e t h a t i t i s t h e 
f u n c t i o n of t h e Gene ra l Assemoly t o i n v i t e s t a t e s i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n t o e n t e r i n t o (such) c o n s u l t a t i o n s , 
i^ e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e i n v i t a t i o n of such c o n s u l t a t i o n , i n 
f a c t t h e v e r y i n v i t a t i o n of an i d e a of n u c l e a r weapon f r e e 
zone, must oe from t h e s t a t e s of t h e r e g i o n — must f low 
from agreement w i t h i n t h e r e g i o n " . 
The I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a l s o r i d i c u l e d P a k i s t a n ' s 
p r o p o s a l and s a i d 'we have s u p p o r t e d such zones whenever 
i t h a s been d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e r e i s an ag reemen t t o 
r e g a r d t o them i n p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n s . T h i s h a s meant p r i o r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s and agreement among t h e s t a t e s of t h e 
u 2 r e g i o n . 
India opined that all states whether big or small 
possess the right of equal stjtus under international law 
and were entitled to reject any concept being imposed on 
3 
them a g a i n s t t h e i r w i s h e s . 
1 . U n i t e d i- .at ions Document A/L 1/PV 2025, 20 Nov. 1974. 
2 . U n i t e d N a t i o n s Gene ra l Assemoly, F i r s t Commit tee , 29th 
S e s s i o n A/C 1/P/ 2002, p . 7 6 . 
3 . i-i.K. Chopra, I n d i a ' s P o l i c y on Disarmament , o p . c i t . , 
p . 137. 
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I n d i a m a i n t a i n e d t h a t South As i a was a s u b - r e g i o n 
and an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Asia and t h e p a c i f i c . I t a l s o t o l d 
t h a t oou th Asxan s t a t e s were s u r r o u n d e d by n u c l e a r weapon 
s t a t e s or c o u n t r i e s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e i r a l l i a n c e s " . 
I n d i a a rgued t h a t P a k i s t a n had d e l i b e r a t e l y i g n o r e d 
s e c u r i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e r e g i o n by s u g g e s t i n g an s m a l l 
a r e a for n u c l e a r weapon t r e e z o n e . I t p l e a d e d t h a t t h e 
p r e s e n c e of China i n t h e e a s t and e x i s t e n c e of b i g powers 
i n t h e South of South Asian r e g i o n and i t s i m p a c t on 
s e c u r i t y of t h e r e g i o n canno t be i g n o r e d . A c t u a l l y , I n d i a 
accused P a k i s t a n of i t s d o u b l e - c r o s s i n g and c o l l a b o r a t i v e 
r o l e wi th wes t e rn powers t o f u r t h e r s u b j u g a t e t h i r d wor ld 
c o u n t r i e s t o b i g power s . I n d i a a l s o a c c u s e d P a k i s t a n of 
2 
p l a y i n g i t s t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t , a s i t s 
p r o p o s a l d i d n o t i n c l u d e China , a n u c l e a r weapon p o s e r . 
I n d i a r e j e c t e d P a k i s t a n ' s p r o p o s a l on t h e above 
g rounds and on t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n c e by I n d i a t h a t n u c l e a r 
weapons , by n u c l e a r power c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d when t h e same 
i s b e i n g d e n i e d t o n o n - n u c l e a r p o w e r s . 
1. P . 3 . J aya ramu , "NVVFZ, NPT and South A s i a " in K.Subrahmanyam, 
ed . N u c l e a r N y t h s and R e a l i t i e s , o p . c i t . , p . 8 2 . 
2 . I b i d . 
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India also presented a draft resolut ion regarding 
the nuclear weapon free zone to United nations General 
Assembly. Mr. Singh presented the Indian draft Resolution 
A/C 1/C 681 on 15 November 1974. Presenting the Resolution, 
the Indian representa t ive said tha t Pakistan had presented 
her draft without any consul tat ions with Ind ia . 
But he added the India was s t i l l prepared to find a 
way out and present a draf t after consulting each other 
beforehand. He added that the Indian draft i s baSed on the 
concept of creat ing nuclear weapon free zone in different 
areas after conculting countries of the region. However, 
i t avoids any prejudgement concerning the concept, feature 
or del ineat ion of the zones, as these matters can be sorted 
out during consult.^tion ;= and eventual agreements among 
in te res t ed p a r t i e s . He fur ther , made declara t ions that 
India wil l pursue i t s nuclear programme for peaceful 
purposes only butwil l object to any in ten t ions to impose 
any resolut ion, on Ind i a ' s nuclear programme, which i s not 
universal and non-discriminatory or to which India i s not 
a pa r ty . He r e i t e r a t e d that South Asia can not be separated 
from larger area and i s different from Africa or Latin 
America. India cannot give the same treatment to the zone 
as there are securi ty implicat ions due to the fact that the 
region i s surrounded by nuclear powers. 
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Pakistan introduced the draft resolut ion A/C 1/L 
682 on 15 November 1974 c r i t i c i s i n g the Indian draf t 
containing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I t oDJected 
to I n d i a ' s nuclear programme and considered i t unfeasiole 
as at that time i t was uncertain and wanted the r e s u l t s 
of the tecnnical committees to come out . I t c i t ed the 
assurances given cy France and China as examples, for not 
at tacking a non-nuclear weapon power. 
i:ioth the draf t s were discussed in the f i r s t committee 
and the Sri Lankan representa t ive oDjected to the Indian 
draft on the count that i t did not contain any concrete 
proposals for i t s operat ion. He rejected the argument of 
having pr ior consul tat ions necessary for the said objective 
as General Assembly had endorsed the p r inc ip le of creation 
of nuclear weapon free zones. 
The Indian representa t ive said in the F i r s t Committee 
2 
of the UN^  as regards the creation of a nuclear weapon free 
zone, i t was the prac t ice of the United Nations that no 
1, K. k. Singh, Indian Ocean: The Big Power Presence, And 
Local Response, o p . c i t . , p . 246. 
2. A/C 1/PV 2027, pp. 12-16. 
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action was taken by the General '^ssemDly without the 
agreement of the states concerned. He argued that "sometimes, 
in any particular region, there might be some states which 
wanted to move faster on certain proposal whereas others 
might prefer to take gradual steps^ and each step by agreemebt, 
in order that the end product might be acceptable to all. 
He cautioned against hasty action. 
After deliberations on both the drafts, attempts were 
made in the First Committee to make the two nations compromise 
on a joint draft. But the stance taken by the two countries 
were so different that the matter was dropped. Again, some 
states tried to get both the drafts passed. Jut India 
rejected the move on the ground that it fan not compromise 
on something which is basically against the very principles, 
India is fighting for, all along, AS a last resort both the 
resolutions were put to vote of the committee. The Pakistan 
draft resolution got eighty tour votes in favour, two, 
India and Bhutan, against, and thirty six abstentations. 
The Indian draft resolution got ninety votes in favour with 
2 
no negative votes and thirty two abstentations. Both the 
1. A/9911 (XXIX) Report of First Committee, Agenda Item, 107 
2. A/C 1/L 681, 2024th meeting, 20 Nov. 1974. 
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dratts were then sent to the General Assembly so that 
voting may take place there. There were ninety six in 
favour. India and Bhutan again voting against it and 
there were thirty six abstentations for Pakistan draft 
resolution 3265(B). The Indian resolution fared a little 
better with 104 in favour, twenty seven abstentations and 
only one against, Dahomey. 
The stand taken in the Indian resolution was that 
procedure establishing a nuclear weapon free zone differed 
from one zone to another. It reiterated its earlier policy 
that the initiative to create a nuclear weapon free zone 
must come from the states of the region, with due consider-
ations of its special features and geographic location. 
Considering the strategic location of this region and 
security perspectives of the states of the zone, it is 
not possible to isolate South asia from its larger entity. 
The principle of nuclear energy tor peaceful purposes 
was accepted by Pakistan, but with that it also expressed 
the fear that such a use of nuclear energy, at a time of 
crisis, may be diverted for military purposes. It further 
1. A/PV 2309. 
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said that the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone must 
be accompanied by a sense of commitment on the par t of 
s t a t e s using nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes. 
There should be firm assurances to prevent the t e s t i n g , 
use> manufacture, production, acquis i t ion or storage of 
nuclear weapons or launching devices. I t should also be 
accompanies by an equitable and non-discriminatory system 
of ve r i f i ca t ion and inspection to make sure tha t the concerned 
p a r t i e s are not misusing i t s nuclear devices and fu l f i l l i ng 
t ne i r commitments. The p a r t i e s to the agreement should also 
give firm assurances and guarantees tha t i t wi l l never use 
nuclear weapons against the s t a t e s of the region and also 
wi l l not even threaten to use the nuclear weapons. I t also 
wanted the s t a t e s to immediately s t a r t negot ia t ions with 
other s t a t e s t o t h i s end so t h a t the creat ion of a nuclear 
weapon free zone may not be threatened, and should also not 
act in a manner which may jeopardise the achievement of the 
Objective. 
India had c lear ly voted against the Pakistan Resolution 
in both the ins t ances . India voted against the resolut ion 
arguing that she does not fee l bound by the terms and 
conditions incorporated in the reso lu t ion . 
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While explaining I n d i a ' s voting against the 
Pakistan resolut ion on 20 November 1974, in the F i r s t 
Committee, Ambsassador, B.C. Misra, c l a r i f i ed h i s country 's 
object ions . He c i ted both the preamble and operat ive 
in p a r t s of the Pakistan resolut ion which were not accordance 
with the policy of India on the matter . 
He f e l t that nuclear p ro l i f e ra t ion cannot 'be stopped 
by j u s t what i s given in the fourth paragraph of the preamble, 
tha t to create a nuclear weapon free zone. In i t s opinion, 
Misra, f e l t , j u s t to curb the r igh t s of the non-nuclear 
weapon s t a t e s t o use the nuclear technology, and placing 
no obl igat ions on nuclear weapon s t a t e s was not enough, 
rie attacked the seventh preamoular paragraph also, which 
provides for the inspection and ve r i f i ca t ion system and 
said tha t India favoured Universal, functional and non-
discriminatory safeguards applying to nuclear s t a t e s and 
non-nuclear s t a t e s equally in a l l the nuclear programmes. 
In t h i s connection, Misra said, " i t i s not poss io le tor us 
1. VC 1/W 2025, pp. 7-12. 
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to agree to a system of verification and inspection which 
would be applicable to the peaceful activities of non-
nuclear weapon states only, or at best, applicable to the 
peaceful activities of all states while leaving open the 
military activities of nuclear weapon states". 
Attacking the first paragraph of the operative parts 
of the Pakistan resolution which contained the assurances 
of the states of the region not to acquire or manufacture 
nuclear weapons, India felt, were of unilateral nature. 
ne argued that the government of India was not in favour 
of entering into any such international commitment without 
firm basis. 3o, India rejected the operative paragraph, one. 
The endorsement of the principle of establishing a nuclear 
weapon free zone by operative paragraph 2, India telt, is 
the negation of its often repeated stand that oouth Asia 
can not be isolated from Asia. He pleaded that India can 
not possibly think of South Asia in separation from the 
larger area, reiterating again that this endorsement will 
be a serious setback for those who are working for creating 
a nuclear weapon free zone in the larger area. India 
rejected the proposal contained in operative paragraph 5, 
1. K.R. Singh, The Indian Ocean; Big Power Presence and 
Local Response, op.cit., p. 249. 
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that the Secretary General should ca l l a meeting with the 
objective of consul tat ions as suggested in paragraph 3^ I t 
repeated i t s stand that the Secretary General i s not meant 
for much jobs and the i n i t i a t i v e must come from the s t a tes 
of the region. 
The USA and France abstained from both the reso lu t ions , 
since a compromise formula has f a i l ed . 
Bangladesh, the USSR and Bhutan s ta ted tha t they 
would not support the Pakistani resolbt ion as the countr ies 
of the region must have consultat ions among themselves 
f i r s t , on questions concerning the nuclear weapon t ree zone, 
2 before seeking the endorsement of the Assembly. 
The th i r t een th session of the UN in 1975 again 
discussed the question of es tabl ish ing a nuclear weapon free 
zone in South Asia. The Secretary General in his report , 
IJocument A/10325 (XAA) said that he had consulted the s t a t e s 
in the south Asia region and fe l t tha t there were sharp 
differences on the question of the establishment of a nuclear 
weapon free zone in South Asia and hence, he did not cal l 
1. Year Book of United Nation, 1977, o p . c i t . , p . 2 1 . 
2. Ib id . 
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a m e e t i n g of t h e s o u t h - A s i a n r e g i o n s t a t e s . The a d - h o c 
group of q u a l i f i e d g o v e r n m e n t a l e x p e r t s a l s o d i s c u s s e d 
t h i s i s s u e and a g r e e d on t h e b a s i c t h i n g t h a t t h e i n i t i a t i v e 
fo r t h e c r e a t i o n of such zones s h o u l d come from a l l t h e 
c o u n t r i e s of t h e r e g i o n and t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n must be 
v o l u n t a r y . 
I n d i a , a p a r t i c i p a n t of t h e g roup welcomed t h e 
r e p o r t in t h e F i r s t Committee on 14 November 19 7 5 . 
I n d i a a g a i n s u b m i t t e d a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n A/C 1/L 
730 t o t h e F i r s t Committee f o l l o w e d by a s i m i l a r a c t i o n 
by P a k i s t a n A/C 1/L 7 3 3 . 3o th t h e d r a f t s were a d o p t e d by 
F i r s t Committee w i t h o u t v o t i n g . R e s o l u t i o n 34 76 (x;o:) 
on 11 December 19 7 5 . 
The I n d i a n d r a f t k e p t i t s e a r l i e r s t a n c e unchanged 
wi th t h e a d d i t i o n of welcoming t h e r e p o r t of t h e a d - h o c 
g roup of > jua l i f i ed Governmenta l E x p e r t s . 
The o p e r a t i v e p a r t of t h e P a k i s t a n ' s h a l f of t h e 
R e s o l u t i o n 34 76^3 (xxx) , n o t e d t h e r e p o r t of t h e S e c r e t a r y 
G e n e r a l and p o i n t e d ou t t h a t i n t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of h i s 
1. CCD/4 76, C h a p t e r I I I , p a r a 9 , quo ted i n A/C 1/PV 2088, 
14 Nov. 19 75 , p . 3 7 . 
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annual repor t , on the work of the organisat ion, the 
Secretary General had urged that the in te res ted s t a t e s 
of different regions should consult together with the 
motto of the creat ion of additional nuclear weapon free 
zones. The Pakistani Resolution cal led upon the South-
Asian Sta tes to continue t h e i r e f for t s to es tab l i sh a 
nuclear weapon free zone in South " s i a in accordance 
with Resolution 3265B (XXix) and to de s i s t from any 
action endangering th i s ob jec t ive . 
The representa t ive of Pakistan expressed the 
opinion that a l l the South Asian region s t a t e s should 
jo in the group for making the region a nuclear weapon 
2 free zone but he also said, tha t such a group could be 
formed only by non-nuclear s t a t e s . 
The Indian representa t ive strongly rejected the 
argument and said that there would be negot ia t ions or 
3 
consul tat ions on t h i s i s s u e . 
1. A/10001/Add. 1, p . 9 . 
2 . A/C 1/PV 2102, 2 Dec. 1975, p . 4 1 . 
3 . A/C 1/FV 2074, 21 O c t . 1975, p . 6 3 . 
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During the debate on disarmament in the Assembly's 
First Committee, in 1975, China and Bangaldesh expressed 
their support for the creation of nuclear weapons free 
zone in South Asia. Bangaldesh was of the opinion that 
there must be consultations, cooperation and consent among 
countries of the region for the purpose of establishing a 
nuclear weapon free zone in south Asia. China took the side 
of Pakistan on the issue of the drafts presented by India 
and Pakistan. Bhutan again supported India and expressed 
its view that without agreement among member states of the 
region, it would be futile to establish nuclear weapon 
tree zone and therefore, it will oppose Pakistan if it 
2 had to vote". 
The United States expressed its opinion by opposing 
Doth the resolutions on the ground that two different 
approaches have been chosen. It explained its opinion 
that US's attitude towards any particular nuclear weapon 
tree zone agreement would be based on whether such an 
arrangement effectively prohibited the indigenous develop-
ment of any nuclear explosive capability, tor whatever the 
3 
purpose might be". 
1. A/C 1/PV 2102 Dec . 2, 1975, p . 5 1 . 
2 . Year Book of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 1978, p . 4 3 . 
2 . I b i d . 
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Vvhile the debate on the i s sue was going on, India 
again s t ressed on the point of agreement i . e . the s t a t e s 
of the region must have pr ior consul ta t ions and de l iber -
at ions among themselves only then the matter should be 
brought before the United Nations. Unless the i n i t i a t i v e 
i s local i t i s not prac t icaole to get an area or region 
declared a nuclear weapons t ree zone. 
Pakistan explained that in i t s opinion the s t a t e s 
of the region agree on the basic and most fundamental point 
of creating a nuclear weapon free iione in isoutii •'^sia. I t 
also added tha t i t was prepared to s t a r t negot ia t ions and 
that i t has an open mind tor de l ibe ra t ions . IV>ey can 
consider the points ra ised oy the Indian representa t ive 
but r e i t e r a t e a t ha t a l l the s t a t e s of the region agree on 
the oasic i ssue of not acquiring or developing nuclear 
weapons. 
Tne Ui)rt voted in ravour of the d r a t t resolu t ion or 
2 the f i r s t committee adopted by General Assemoly as resolut ion 
3 2/83 ca l l ing for a nuclear weapon free zone in South r^sia. 
I t supported the resolut ion on two grounds, f i r s t l y , the 
1. Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty F i r s t 
Session, F i r s t Committee, A/C 1/31/PV, pp. 20-52. 
2. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vo l . 2, 1978, 
o p . c i t . , p . 180. 
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creat ion of nuclear weapon free zone wouid mean secur i ty 
for the s ignator ies and secondly, the creat ion of such a 
zone would mean the extension of NFT in regions or on 
regional bas i s , liut the opinion of the UoA also expressed 
that the question of agreement among the s t a t e s must be 
solved before any s t a te could be expected to undertake any 
corami trrient regarding the i s sue . 
.t the United Nations General Assembly in 1977, 
India recal led i t s ea r l i e r stand tha t i t was against 
the nuclear weapons and the i r use and had no inc l ina t ion 
of manufacturing or acquiring a nuclear weapon. But at 
tne same time, i t also r e i t e r a t ed tha t India was ful ly 
in accord with the opinion that i t was in te res ted in 
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and would not 
surrender i t s r igh t of making use of the technology. As 
was evident from Ind ia ' s not joining NPT, i t would again 
oppose any such t rea ty which was discr iminatory. I t will 
continue to make use of nuclear technology unless 
the whole world i s free from nuclear weapons. India 
added that sub-regionalism in th is matter was. not going 
to solve the problem. By making th i s a regional i ssue, 
the global problem will convert into a regional problem. 
1. Ib id . 
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India further explained that by establishing a nuclear 
weapon free zone in a region would in no way combat the 
threat of nuclear weapon to the whole world. In a way it 
will not help nuclear weapon states to keep on going 
vertically, as nuclear weapons or warheads are not regional. 
Their range is intercontinental. India expressed that it 
does not agree with Pakistani proposal and would abstain 
from voting if South Asia is made a nuclear weapon free 
zone. 
Pakistan introduced a draft resolution on the subject 
in the 33rd Session of the General Assembly in 1978, and 
expressed the opinion that the creation of a nuclear 
weapon free zone in South Asia is realistic and desirable 
and added further that in south Asia conditions were 
conducive to create such a zone. The First Committee 
approved the draft and was adopted by United Nations 
General Assembly as resolution 33/65 on 14 December 1978. 
xndia maintained its opposition and said that it 
did not regard South Asl;^  as either appropriate or adec^uate 
for the purpose and it could not equate with regions such 
2 
as Latin America, 
1. Year Book of United Nations, vol. 31, 1980, op.cit •, p.81 
2. Ibid. 
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The Secretary General reported to the General 
Assembly on 4 October 1979, that none of the s t a t e s had 
come forward for h is ass is tance from South Asia whereas 
ir-akistan again pleaded that iouth Asia was r ipe for the 
creation of a nuclear weapon free zone. Pakistan was 
ready to accept the fu l l scope of IAEA safeguards on a 
reciprocal basis and to explore other ways and means of 
mutually reassuring s t a t e s in oouth Asia against the 
danger of p ro l i f e ra t ion of nuclear weapons. 
"India voted against the draft in 1979 and maint-
ained i t s posi t ion that while it; did not oppose the concept 
of nuclear weapon free zones, the i n i t i a t i v e tor t he i r 
establishment should derive voluntar i ly trom a l l the s t a tes 
of the region concerned avoiding pre-judgement to the concept^ 
features and de l inea t ion . South Asia i s a sub-region and 
an in teg ra l par t of the region of Asia and pac i f i c , which 
could not be t rea ted in i so l a t i on , had to be taken in to 
account. A genuine nuclear weapon free zone in tha t region 
could only be establ ished in th.e t o t a l absence of nuclear 
weapons in the region of Asia and the pacif ic and the 
presence of foreign mi l i t a ry a c t i v i t i e s and the bases in 
1. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, 1979, o p . c i t . 
pp. 181-82. 
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Indian Ocean complicated the securi ty environment of the 
region and made the s i tua t ion in-appropr ia te tor the 
establishment of a nuclear weapon t r ee zone in South Asia". 
Pakistan has been r e i t e r a t i n g , time and again, the 
necessi ty tor the creation ot a nuclear weapon t ree zone in 
oouth Asia and expressing the opinion that the conditions 
are conducive for such a aone in the region. India , on the 
other hand changed her stance a oi t as rar as creat ion of a 
nuclear weapon t r ee iione with the consent of the regional 
s t a t e s i s concerned. In 1982, ±n the Ui\bSOD-II, India said 
tha t i t could not suoscribe to the idea of a nuclear weapon 
t r ee zone in bouth Asia unless there are nuclear powers in 
the world, unless there i s glooal disarmament, India will 
not sign any t r ea ty on disarmament on regional oas i s , Inaian 
Foreign Minister in SSOD-II said, "We can not suDscribe to 
the leg i t imiaa t ion ot the posse;:iSion of nuclear weapons oy 
a tew powers oy agreeing to l ive under the i r protect ion 
in the form of nuclear weapon free zones. Reacting to 
another draf t resolut ion in the F i r s t Committee of General 
1. I b i d . , p . 132. 
2 . The UN and Disarmament 1945 - J985 , UK P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
New York, 1985, p . 102. 
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Assembly, India expressed the view that a draft resolution 
on nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia had become annual 
and pointless ritual for the First Committee. 
In 1935, India declared that it had gone along with 
proposal for nuclear weapon free zones in certain regions 
because they enjoyed the support of all states of those 
regions, although it had, at the same time, expressed 
reservations about the efficiency of such partial nuclear 
disarmament measures, particuldfly in the context of the 
findings of *nuclear winter". 
India criticised the proposals to create a nuclear 
weapon free zone in South Asia on principle and practical 
considerations. India also criticised Pakistan proposals 
for the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in South 
Asia on the point that it did not adhere to the basic 
principle for such zones that prior consultations were 
never held among the states of tlie region, before bringing 
the matter to the United Nations. One more arg-.ment was 
that South Asia is not the appropriate region for the 
creation of such a zone, -iesides, that India felt that 
1. The UN Disarmament Year Book, 19 86, op.cit., p. 280, 
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these proposals are being mooted by Pakistan to create 
r e s t r i c t i o n s and obstructions in the way of I n d i a ' s nuclear 
programme for peaceful purposes, and the dangers posed by 
non-inclusion of China was another reason why India did not 
support the move of Pakistan. 
India never wanted to become an a l ly of any foreign 
country and joining a p ro tec to ra te by surrendering i t s 
r igh t , to develop nuclear technology for the welfare of 
the people, in the hands of nuclear weapon s t a t e s i s 
nothing but endangering our sovereignty. Moreover, in the 
event of any c r i s i s , a l l zones, peace or otherwise are 
going to be affected unless the whole world becomes nuclear 
weapon free, any ta lk of nuclear weapon free zone i s 
f u t i l e and u n r e a l i s t i c . 
India saw in r^akistan pri,>posal, clear indica t ions 
of attempts to weaken Indian secur i ty . India also argued 
tha t the Pakistani proposal i s a p o l i t i c a l react ion to 
I n d i a ' s explosion in 1974, at Pokhran and hence smells 
of i n s i n c e r i t y . Indian objections since the negot ia t ions 
for >^P^  remained the same that nuclear p ro l i f e ra t ion would 
contain at the same speed and declaring South Asian as a 
nuclear weapon free zone wil l not affect i t s pace in any 
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manner. Ind ian s e c u r i t y was a l so sa id to be endangered as 
irakistan was supposed to he gi)lti ; ahead with i t s Kahuta 
enrichment p l a n t near 1 s lan;-^'.jad. .^inother Ind ian ob jec t ion 
v.as t h e recen t developments due t o Afghan c r i s i s which 
made United S t a t e s Congress t o send more arms to suppor t 
Afghan i'luj ah ideens . Ind ia thouqht t h a t t he arms may be 
d i v e r t e d aga ins t her in the wake of any c r i s i s and t h u s , 
i t was not o o s s i b l e for Ind ia to s top ha l f way in i t s 
r esea rch on nuclear technology, x-ioreover, Ch ina ' s nuc lear 
c a p ^ o i l i t y and development or ICui-is and i t s i n c r e a s i n g 
f r i endsh ip and c o l l a b o r a t i o n v'ith Pak i s tan w i l l make 
nuc lear f ree zone in South Asia, a mere f a r c e . I t i s 
need less t o say here^ tha t in t h e face of so many ob jec -
t i o n s by I n d i a , success of (^  nuc lear weapon free zone in 
South Asia i s a remote [)Ossibi l i t y . 
C 0 N C L U o O N 
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Ever since the nuclear bombs were dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nat ions nave been t rying to put 
curbs on the i r use . The aim i s t o free the world from 
the Scourge of a th i rd world war which would be, def in i -
t e ly , a nuclear one. There should be no doubt of the 
seriousness of our commitment, as a nation, to take up 
the ro le of the leading nations in pursu i t of peace 
through disarmament and arms con t ro l . The s t ruggle in 
which we are engaged in these times i s world-wide, and 
the out-come of disarmament and arms control over the 
coming years wil l depend on many things, on developments 
of the mind and of the s p i r i t , perhaps as much as on 
decisions of the public pol icy. Yet, the idea of disarma-
ment los t may mean a world lo s t , af ter the experience 
of the world war, few can deny, the special s ignif icance 
of the challenge in the f i e ld of disarmaments, 
Confrontiag a s i tua t ion of recurring cold war, 
: our government has sought, by a var ie ty of 
means to safeguard peace and to advance the i n t e r e s t s 
of mankind. In t h i s age of nuclear arms race no nation Can 
remain aloof or unconcerned about the growing dangers 
to mankind. Moreover, the nuclear arms p ro l i f e ra t ion 
'had brought to the world, a s i tua t ion where nat ions had 
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to join either of the two super powers. Ahother creation 
of this bipolar world is the tendency of the nuclear haves 
to deny access to the knowhow ol nuclear energy to have-
nots, giving the excuse for such a policy as a measure 
to save the world from further nuclear arms proliferation. 
India under such circumstances had to develop a 
policy towards either joining one of the two worlds on the 
one hand, to decide to remain a non-nuclear weapon state 
or to go nuclear, on the* other. 
Indian policy towards disarmament and arms control 
has been, since independence^ of considerable caution and 
balanced approach. India neither joined either of the 
super powers nor did she join non-proliferation treaty, 
nor went nuclear herself.. 
She has been following the initial policy announcement 
by Pandit-ji of minimising the chances of war and bringing 
closer the rivals in an atmosphere of trust and faith. By 
and large India has diverted very little from the initial 
policy announced by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, that India 
was not interested in making combs even if she had the 
capacity to do so. But at the same time she did not commit 
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not to use and develop nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. 
The time of Ind i a ' s independence and the cold war 
coincided and i t was jus t r ight for Ind i a ' s f i r s t Prime 
i-iinister to choose the path for a l l future governments 
of the country. Not only that India has always been a 
peaceloving nation but the newly acquired freedom cal led 
for development and progress which was poss ible only when 
there was world peace. The world hss sVirunk and war in 
one area affects other na t ions . 
The Indian policy on Disarmament and Arms Control 
was largely shaped by iMehru's vision and thinking and h i s 
resolve to make India s e l f - r e l i a n t and independent through 
progress in science and technology. He considered i t 
doubly important because wnen India woke up as an indepen-
dent nat ion, the world was already divided in to two 
halves and i t was important for India to quickly stand 
on i t s feet , without supports;, through oro-jress and 
advancement in science aiid technology. Nehru rea l i sed 
the l imi t l e s s possioi l i t i e s nuclear technologies could 
be used for the development of the na t ion . He had qui te 
a different vision of the atom trom the one proved by 
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the USA in Hiroshima and .Naga«f»ki,. Nehru wanted to harness 
i t for peacetul purposes. The pofJt-partit ion economic 
condition of India pointed to the necessi ty of put t ing 
to use modern and l a t e s t s c i e n t i t i c and technological 
d iscover ies . The nation was lacking in toodgrains, pulses 
ediole o i l s and other things of common needs. This was 
largely due to poor i n d u s t r i a l condit ion. The problems 
were too many and the population too massive. These coula 
oe tackled only through some d r a s t i c measures. Nehru 
thought that quick i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was necessary for 
a l l t h i s , for which power generation was the u a s i c . 
requirement. So, i t was in the context of power generation 
that the use of the atom was given the f i r s t p r i o r i t y . 
Dr. Bhabha rea l i sed the inadequacy of hydro-e lec t r i c 
power and conventional fuels, s t ressed the need for 
developing the atom for t h i s purpose. I n d i a ' s react ion 
to the various versions of the Jaruch plan for the 
in te rna t iona l ownership of atomic raw mater ia ls was 
inspired by her basic desire to develop and progress 
in order to improve the economy and improvement of 
l iv ing standards of the people. From the very beginning 
Aehru s t ressed the need to put nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes only, and that too for the whole world,with no 
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monopoly of a few na t ions . .Nehru supported President 
Eeenhower's proposal for the establishment of an I n t e r -
notional Atomic Energy Agency which could devise methods 
to a l loca te the f iss ionable iiiaterial to serve the peaceful 
pursu i t s of mankind. 
Lai liahadur Shastr i , our second rrime .-.inister 
was a great supporter of the policy laid down by Kehru, 
lie also v isual ised and accepted the close re la t ionsh ip 
of nuclear energy with economic oettermenj: of the people 
and renounced the use of nuclear energy for the des t ruc t -
ion of mankind and refused to enter in to an arms race witn 
other na t ions . 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who succeeded her father and 
Mr. Shas t r i , continued to s t r e s s the policy of her 
predecessors. Her posi t ion was di f ferent from them as 
there was a lobby working within the country for a 
change in the policy and to opt for nuclear weapons. 
i-irs. Indira o'andhi was caught b* tween the policy 
foundations la id down by her ^jredecessors, and the growing 
witn 
nuclear capabi l i ty of a h o s t i l e China, combined/ the 
pressures from the super powers to join the non-prol i fer-
ation Treaty, on the i r terms and condi t ions . The vision. 
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farsightedness and c l a r i t y of ceiuse of Mrs. Gandhi's 
leadership made her stuck to the policy of peaceful uses 
of nuclear power without bowing e i ther to i n t e rna l pu l l s 
or to a forced push in to the NPT. She stuck to the 
resolve strongly that exploi t ing the atom for furthering 
socio-economic growth of India was basic for a nation 
struggling to l i be ra t e herself from the shackles of 
poverty and to use the strength and bounty of modern 
science. The perspective of modernising the Indian 
economy through the l a t e s t technology determined I n d i a ' s 
a t t i t u d e towards the 2^on-Proliferation Treaty. Cn the other 
hand Mrs. Gandhi also rea l i sed , l ike her fa ther , that the 
economic condition of India can not improve unless nuclear 
arms race i s slowed down and ul t imately Wr. eliminated, 
and the huge resources be diverted to development. She 
recognised the vision of Nehru, wth even more c l a r i t y 
tha t disarmament i s a must not only for development and 
progress but also for the survival of mankind. India was 
for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that too 
freely by a l l nations^ equally, wheras the nuclear powers 
t r i ed to stop non-nuclear powers from entering the 
nuclear club, without obl igat ions on themselves but 
r e s t r a i n t s on the have nots , dut ies for developing 
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nations and only rights for the haves. India wanted equal 
status of all states. Mrs. Gandhi very clearly stated that 
unequal rights and duties can not form the basis for any 
meaningful agreement to promote disarmament. When nuclear 
weat-on states held the opinion that developing nations 
with nuclear technology could not be relied upon and may 
act irresponsibly ' , Mrs. Gandhi had the guts to say 
daringly^ that when one group of states continues to pile-
up nuclear arsenals, it was quite likely in the same vein 
that the have nots may fall prey to blackmail by nuclear 
powers in a moment of crisi.s. The denial of nuclear 
technology to developing nations would definitely impede 
aevelopment. i:-ven nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes 
could be conducted^ was amply proved by Mrs. Gandhi with 
the event at Pokhran in early seventies. The contention 
of the supporters of NPT that nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes could be turned to weapons development 
in the times of need was nullified by Mrs.. Gandhi coming 
out with the statement that any scientific technology 
could be used for military purposes. 3he was even ready 
for international inspection of her nuclear programme, 
but on the condition that same is done in the case of 
other povTers also, on equal tooting. But in no case, she 
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was ready to give up and surrender the r i gh t to use 
nuclear energy tor peaceful purposes. The contention 
of the super powers to t ransfer nuclear technology to 
non-nuclear s t a t e s on a charge was rejected by India 
for fear of v i r t u a l surrender of sovereignty by weaker 
s t a t e s , and considered i t against tne very e th ics or 
the policy of non-alignment, of which India has always 
been the torch bearer. India has been for t o t a l disarma-
ment but not the supporter of any monopolistic designs 
of super powers. India was a non-s tar ter as far as any 
i s 
thing which fa i led the non-discriminatory t e s t / considered.She 
had no sympathy tor any t r ea ty which gives the r igh t s 
to nuclear powers to continue arming themselves with 
more of such weapons but denying a similar freedom to 
non-nuclear s t a t e s to develop such weapons for the i r 
defence. At the same time the i-r inie Minister r e i t e ra t ed 
Ind i a ' s resolve not to produce and manufacture nuclear 
weapons. There has been a basic difference between the 
Indian policy and the policy of nuclear powers. I t i s the 
opinion of most major powers that nat ional secur i ty can 
be assured through arms races, while the Indian opinion 
i s j u s t the reverse, i . e . securi ty l i e s in reduction and 
elimination of armaments. Our policy has been consistent 
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a l l tnrough, that India favours disarmaunt and believes 
that the grea tes t th rea t to mankind i s posed by nuclear 
powers. This was the major reason why India refused to 
be a party to NPT, as i t did not safeguard the i n t e g r i t y 
and corresponding r igh t s to dovf?loping nat ions for the 
use of nuclear energy, and she considered the t r ea ty to 
be a non-disarmament measure as i t does not curb the 
galloping v e r t i c a l p r o l i f e r a t i o n . 
India has advocated the policy that global disarma-
ment i s a necessi ty for the survival of humans on the face 
of earth and has been holding the view point tha t i f a 
nuclear war breads out, any regional measure for 
disarmament will become ine f fec t ive , ^t the same time, 
India argued that any regional measures for disarmament 
should be supported by a l l the nations of the region as, 
i f one nation of the region remains nuclear or does not 
become a party to such a t rea ty , then the very concept 
of nuclear weapon free zone i s defeated, i^ioreover, in 
such a s i tuat ion,non-nuclear s t a t e s of the region will 
always face the danger from the regional nuclear power. 
The stance taken by India reg^irding the i ssue of peace 
zones i s that the area .';liould be free from the dangers 
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of war, by working effectively to dismantle all military 
machinery, curbing colonial d&signs of super powers, 
support for democratic movements and to respect sovereign 
rights of the people. India con.siders, as essential, not 
only cessation of arms bulla up oy regional powers but 
also not to allow external powers to have bases in the 
region and to eliminate military presence of great powers 
from the area and to establisli peace by resolving disputes 
through peaceful means without any interference from the 
external powers. 
The stand taken by India with regard to creation ct 
Indian Ocean as a peace zone, clarified her policy on 
disarmament and arms control. The policy did not change 
even during the brief period Janata Party was in power 
at the centre. i4r. Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Foreign 
'•'inister very clearly took a stand similar to that of the 
previous governments and urged the super powers to desist 
from creating tensions in the Indian Ocean region by 
their presence. This was important not only from the 
Indian security point ol view but also as a partial 
measure in pursuit of the larger goalof disarmament. 
While India vehemently supports the idea of a peace 
zone in the Indian Ocean, she rejects the idea of. a N»vFZ 
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in South Asia. Considering our geographical situation 
and the security scenario in the face of hostile nuclear 
powers as neighbours, it is but natural that a peace zone 
can not be created in the region. This policy has been 
very religiously followed since the time deliberations 
for NPT started. The same reasons are given for not 
supporting the idea of a NWF2 in South asia, as were 
presented for not signing the tUTr - discriminatory 
nature ancl a policy of monopolising the nuclear power 
in the hands of a few powers already possessing nuclear 
weapons. 
•The valid argument given by India is that the focus 
in such a proposal is unsound as it does not aim to 
denuclearise the area, and instead, gives exclusive 
rights to nuclear states to proliferate both horizontally 
and vertically. Moreover, the Indian stand has been 
consistent from the very beginning that the initiative 
should come from the states of the region themselves 
instead of proposals from foreign powers. It is to be 
marked that creation of such zones in other areas has 
been supported by India. It is indicative that India is 
not opposed to the concept itself but tl»e emphasis should 
be on disarmament, not to create a discriminatory situation 
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of unequal r igh t s and s t a t u s . India never supported the 
idea of such a denuclearized region where nuclear energy 
could not be used even tor peaceful purposes. This was the 
reason why India supported the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 
Latin America, a similar zone in i^frica, the sea-bed t r ea ty 
and the Outer Space Treaty, as they were measures aimed at 
creat ing conditions for disarmament but keeping the option 
tor peaceful uses of nuclear energy, open. Moreover, the 
proposals were prevented i-.y the concerned p a r t i e s themselves, 
The 1984 Peace Ini t i<i t ive by Mrs. Indi ra Gandhi 
together with a few other leaders of non-aligned world, 
was a clear indicat ion of the consistency and keen resolve 
of the Government of India in pursuing r e l e n t l e s s l y the 
goal of disarmament through which the world and humanity 
could be saved, with tne change of leadership due to 
Mrs. Gandhi's death, t h i s resolve was further strengthened 
by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi who even more strongly, fought and 
worked for the goal . 
B I a L I O 1! Y 
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APPENDIX I 
ANTARCTICA TREATY 
The Governments of A r g e n t i n a , A u s t r a l i a , Belgium, 
C h i l e , t h e F rench R e p u b l i c , J a p a n , New Zea l and , Norway, t h e 
Union of South A f r i c a , the Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t 
R e p u b l i c s , t h e Un i t ed Kingdom of G r e a t B r i t a i n and N o r t h e r n 
I r e l a n d and t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s of Amer ica . 
R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t i t i s i n t h e i n t e r e s t of a l l mankind 
t h a t A n t a r c t i c a s h a l l c o n t i n u e f o r e v e r t o be used e x c l u s i v e l y 
f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s and s h a l l n o t become t h e s c e n e or 
o b j e c t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s c o r d ; 
Acknowledging t h e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o s c i e n -
t i f i c knowledge r e s u l t i n g from i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n i n 
s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n A n t a r c t i c a ; 
Convinced t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a f i r m f o u n d a t i o n 
fo r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n and deve lopmen t of such c o o p e r a t i o n on 
t h e b a s i s of freedom of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n A n t a r c t i c a 
a s a p p l i e d d u r i n g t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l G e o p h y s i c a l Year a c c o r d s 
w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of s c i e n c e and t h e p r o g r e s s of a l l mankind; 
Convinced a l s o t h a t a t r e a t y e n s u r i n g t h e u s e of 
A n t a r c t i c a f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s o n l y and t h e c o n t i n u a n c e 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l harinony i n A n t a r c t i c a w i l l fur ther t h e 
p u r p o s e s and p r i n c i p l e s embddieA i n t h e O i a r t e r of t h e 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s : 
Have a g r e e d a s f o l l o w s : 
A r t i c l e I 
1. Antarctica shal l be used for peaceful purposesonly. 
There shal l be prohibi ted, in te r a l i a , any measures of a 
mi l i t a ry nature, such as the establishment of mi l i t a ry bases 
and f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , the carrying out of mi l i t a ry manoeuvers, 
as well as the t e s t ing of any type of weapons, 
2, Ihe present Treaty sha l l not prevent the use of 
mi l i t a ry personnel or equipment for s c i e n t i f i c research for 
any other peaceful purpose. 
Ar t ic le I I 
Freedom of s c i e n t i f i c inves t iga t ion in Antarctica 
and cooperation towards that end, as applied during the 
In te rna t iona l Geographical year, sha l l continue, subject 
to the provisions of the present Treaty, 
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A r t i c l e I I I 
1. In order to promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l coopera t ion in 
s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n in A n t a r c t i c a , as,.:provided for in 
A r t i c l e I I of the p r e s e n t Trea ty , tiie Con t rac t ing P a r t i e s 
agree t h a t , to the g r e a t e s t f e a s i b l e and p r a c t i c a b l e : 
a} informat ion rega rd ing p l ans for s c i e n t i f i c programines 
in A n t a r c t i c a s h a l l be exchanged to pe rmi t maximum 
economy and e f f i c i e n c y of o p e r a t i o n s ; 
b) s c i e n t i f i c pe rsonne l s h a l l be exchanged in An ta r c t i c a 
between exped i t i ons and s t a t i o n s ; 
c) s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n s and r e s u l t s from An ta r c t i c a 
s h a l l be exchanged and made f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e , 
2. In implementing t h i s A r t i c l e , every encouragment s h a l l 
be given to the e s t ab l i shmen t of coope ra t i ve working r e l a t i o n s 
with those Spec i a l i zed Agencies of the United Nat ions and 
o ther I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s having a s c i e n t i f i c or 
t e c h n i c a l i n t e r e s t in A n t a r c t i c a . 
A r t i c l e IV 
1. Nothing conta ined in the p r e s e n t T r e a t y s h a l l be 
i n t e r p r e t e d a s : 
a) a r e n u n c i a t i o n by any c o n t r a c t i n g Par ty of 
p r e v i o u s l y a s s e r t e d r i g h t s of or c la ims to 
t e r r i t o r i a l sove re ign ty in A n t a r c t i c a ; 
b) a r e n u n c i a t i o n or diminut ion by any Con t rac t ing 
Par ty of any b a s i s of c laim t o t e r r i t o r i a l sover-
e ign ty in A n t a r c t i c a which i t may have whether as 
a r e s u l t of i t s a c t i v i t i e s or those of i t s 
natiJonals in A n t a r c t i c a , or o the rwi se ; 
c) p r e j u d i c i n g the p o s i t i o n of any c o n t r a c t i n g Par ty 
as r ega rds i t s r e c o g n i t i o n or non - r ecogn i t i oo of 
any o ther S t a t e ' s r i g h t of or claim or b a s i s of 
c laim to t e r r i t o r i a l sove re ign ty in A n t a r c t i c a . 
2. No a c t s or a c t i v i t i e s taking p l ace while the p r e s e n t 
Treaty i s in fo rce s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a b a s i s for a s s e r t i n g , 
suppor t ing or denying a c laim to t e r r i t o r i a l sove re ign ty 
in A n t a r c t i c a or c r e a t e any r i g h t s of sove re ign ty in 
Antarc t ica ,No new cla im, or enlargement of an e x i s t i n g 
c la im, to t e r r i t o r i a l sove re ign ty in A n t a r c t i c a s h a l l be 
a s s e r t e d while the p r e s e n t Trea ty i s in f o r c e . 
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Art ic le V 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal 
there of rad io-ac t ive waste material sha l l be prohibi ted . 
2. In the event of the conclusion of in t e rna t iona l 
agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, includin*^ 
nuclear explosions and the disposal of rad io-ac t ive waste 
mater ia l , to which a l l of the contracting Par t i es whose 
representa t ives are en t i t l ed to p a r t i c i p a t e in the meeting 
provided for under Ar t ic le IX are p a r t i e s , the ru l e s es tab-
lished under such agreements sha l l apply in Antarc t ica , 
Ar t ic le VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to 
the area south of 60° South Latitude, including all ice 
shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice 
or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the 
rights, of any State under international law with regard 
to the high seas within that area. 
Article VII 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensures the 
observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each 
contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of 
the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to 
carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article, 
Observers shall be nationals of the contracting Parties 
which designate them. The names of observers shall be 
communicated to every other contracting party having the 
right to designate observers, and like notice shall be 
given to the termination of their appointment, 
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have 
complete freedom of access at any time or all areas of 
Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, 
installations and equipment within those areas, and all 
ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking 
cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all 
times to inspection by any observers designated in accor-
dance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
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4. Aerial observation may be car r ied out a t any time 
over any or a l l areas of Antarctica by any of the contrac-
t ing Par t i es having the r i g h t to designate observers . 
5. Each contract ing Party sha l l , a t the time when the 
present Treaty enters in to force for i t , inform the other 
Contracting Pa r t i e s , and thereafter shal l give them notice 
in advance, of 
(a) a l l expeditions to and within Antarct ica, on the 
p a r t of i t s ships or na t iona ls , and a l l expeditions 
to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from i t s 
t e r r i t o r y ; 
(b) a l l s t a t ions in Atarct ica occupied by i t s 
na t iona l s ; and 
(c) any mi l i t a ry personnel or equipment intended to 
be introduced by i t into Antarctica subject to 
the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of 
Ar t ic le I of the present Treaty, 
Ar t ic le VIII 
1, In order to f a c i l i t a t e the exercise of the i r functions 
under the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the 
respect ive posi t ions of the Contracting Par t i es r e l a t i ng to j u r i s d i c t i o n over a l l other persons in Antarctica, observers 
designated under paragraph I of Ar t ic le VII and s c i e n t i f i c 
personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph I (b) of Art ic le I I I 
of the Treaty, and members of the s taff accompanying any 
such persons, sha l l be subject only to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
the Contracting Party of which they are na t ionals in 
respect of a l l ac ts or omissions occurring while they are 
in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising the i r functions. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
t h i s Ar t i c l e , and pending the adoption of measures in 
pursuance of sub-paragraph 1(e) of Ar t ic le IX, the Contrac-
t ing Par t ies concerned in any case of dispute with regard 
to the exercise of j u r i sd i c t ion in Antarctica sha l l immediately 
consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable 
so lu t ion . 
Ar t ic le IX 
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in 
the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of 
Canberra within two months after the date of entry intoforce 
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6f the Treaty, and thereaf ter a t su i table i n t e r v a l s and 
places, for the purpose of exchanging information, 
consulting together on matters of common intjerest 
per taining to Antarctica, and formulating and consider-
ing, and recommending to the i r Governments, measures in 
furtherance of the p r inc ip les and object ives of the Treaty, 
including measures regarding: 
Ca) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes oniy; 
(b) f a c i l i t a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c research in Antarct ica; 
(c) f a c i l i t a t i o n of in t e rna t iona l s c i e n t i f i c coopera-
t ion in Antarct ica; 
(d) f a c i l i t a t i o n of the exercise of the r i g h t s of 
inspection provided for in Ajtticle VII of the 
Treaty; 
(e) questions r e l a t i n g to the exercise of j u r i s d i c t i o n 
in Antarctica; 
(f) preservation and conservation of l iv ing resources 
in Antarct ica; 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the 
present Treaty by accession under Ar t ic le XIII sha l l be 
e n t i t l e d to appoint representa t ives to p a r t i c i p a t e in the 
meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Ar t i c l e , 
during such time as tha t Contracting Party demonstrates i t s 
i n t e r e s t in Antarctica by conducting subs tan t ia l s c i e n t i f i c 
research a c t i v i t y there, such as the establishment of a 
s c i e n t i f i c s ta t ion or the despatch of a s c i e n t i f i c 
expedit ion. 
3 . Reports from the observers refer red to in Ar t ic le 
VII of the present Treaty sha l l be transmitted to the 
represen ta t ives of the Contracting Par t i es pa r t i c ipa t ing 
in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present 
Ar t i c l e . 
4 . Ihe measures referred to in paragraph 1 of t h i s 
Ar t ic le sha l l become effect ive when approved by a l l the 
Contracting p a r t i e s whose represen ta t ives were e n t i t l e d 
to p a r t i c i p a t e in the meetings held to consider those 
measures. 
5. Any or a l l of the r i gh t s es tabl ished in the present 
Treaty may be exercised as from the date of entry into 
force cf the Treaty whether or not any measures f a c i l i t a t i n g 
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the exercise of such r i g h t s have been proposed, considered 
or approved as provided in t h i s A r t i c l e . 
Ar t ic le X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to *xert 
appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any 
activity ih Antarctica contrary to the principles or 
purposes of the present Treaty. 
Article XI 
1. If any dispute a r i s e s between two or more of the 
Contracting Par t i es concerning the in t e rp re t a t ion or 
application of the present Treaty, those contract ing 
Par t i es sha l l consult among themselves with a view to 
having the dispute resolved by negot ia t ion, inquiry, 
mediation, conc i l ia t ion , a r b i t r a t i o n , j u d i c i a l set t lement 
or other peaceful means of the i r own choice. 
2. Any dispute of th i s character not so resolved s h a l l , 
with the consent, in each case, of a l l p a r t i e s to the 
dispute, be referred to the In te rna t iona l Court of Jus t i ce 
for sett lement, but f a i l u r e to reach agfeement on reference 
to the Ib te rna t iona l Court sha l l not absolve p a r t i e s to 
the dispute from the' r e spons ib i l i t y of continuing to seek 
to resolve i t by any of the various peaceful means referred 
to in paragraph 1 of t h i s A r t i c l e . 
Ar t ic le XII 
1, (a) the present Treaty may be modified or amended 
at any time by unanimous agreement of the contract ing 
Par t ies whose representa t ives are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the meetings provided for under Ar t ic le IX. Any such 
modification or amendment shal l enter into force when tiie 
depositary Government has received not ice from a l l such 
Contracting Par t i e s tha t they have r a t i f i e d i t . 
(b) Such modification or amendment shal l thereafter 
enter in to force as to any other Contracting Party when 
not ice of r a t i f i c a t i o n by i t has been received by the 
depositary Government. Any such Contracting Party frora 
which no not ice of r a t i f i c a t i o n i s received within a 
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period of two years from the date of entry into force of 
the modification or amendment in accordance with the 
provisions of sub-paragraph 1 (a) of th i s Ar t i c le sha l l 
be deemed t.o have withdrawn from the present Treaty on 
the date of the expirat ion of such period, 
2. (a) If af ter the expirat ion of t h i r t y years from 
the date of entry in to force of the present Treaty, any of 
the Contracting Par t ies whose represen ta t ives are en t i t l ed 
to pa r t i c ipa t e in the meetings provided for under Ar t ic le 
IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary 
Government^ a Conference of a l l the contract ing Par t i es 
shal l be held as soon as prac t icable to review the operation 
of the Treaty. 
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present 
Treaty which i s approved at such a Conference by a majority 
of those whose represen ta t ives are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the meetings provided for under Ar t i c le IX, sha l l be 
communicated by the depositary Government to a l l the 
Contracting Par t i e s immediately after the termination of 
the Conference and sha l l enter in to force in accordance 
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present A r t i c l e . 
(c) If any such modification or amendmeat has not 
entered in to force in accordance with the provisions of 
sub-paragraph 1 (a) of th i s Ar t i c le within a period of two 
years af ter the date of i t s communication to a l l the 
Contracting Par t ies , any Contracting Party may a t any 
time after the expiration of tha t period give not ice to 
the depositary Government of i t s withdrawal,from the 
present Treaty; and such withdrawal sha l l take ef fect 
two years af ter the rece ip t of the not ice by the depositary 
Government. 
Art ic le XIII 
1. The present Treaty sha l l be subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n 
by the signatory S t a t e s . I t shal l be open for accession 
by any Sta te which i s a Member of the United Nations, or 
by any other Sta te which may be invi ted to accede to the 
l^eaty with the consent of a l l the Contracting Par t ies 
whose representa t ives are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e in the 
meetings provided for under Ar t i c le IX of the Treaty. 
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2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty 
shall be effected by each State in accordance with its 
constitutional processes. 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Government of the 
United States of America* hereby designated as the 
depositary Government. 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each deposit of an 
instrument of ratification or accession, and the date cf 
entry into force of the Treaty and of any modification or 
amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification 
by all the signatory States, the present Treaty shall 
enter into force for those States for States which have 
deposited instruments of accession. Ihereafter the Treaty 
shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the 
deposit of its instrument of accession. 
6. Ihe present Treaty shall be registered by the 
depositary government pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Article XIV 
•nie present Treaty, done in the English, French, 
Russian, and Spanish languages, each version being equally 
authentic , sha l l be deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the United Sta tes of America, which shal l 
transmit duly c e r t i f i e d copies thereof to the Governments 
of the signatory and acceding S t a t e s . 
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipoten-
t i a r i e s , duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty. 
Done a t Washington th i s f i r s t day of December, one 
thousand nine hundred and f i f t y - n i n e . 
For Argentina; 
AdoIfo Scilingo For New Zealand 
F. Bello G.D.L. White 
3 54 
APPENDIX - I I 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tes t s In the Atmosphere^ 
i.n Outer Space and Under Water s igned a t ^^o3cow on 
5 August 1963 by t h e uaSR, the United Kingdom and"the 
United S t a t e s . 
The Governments of t h e United S t a t e s of America, the 
United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n andNorther I r e l a n d , and the 
Union of Sov ie t S o c i a l i s t Republ ics , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d 
to as the "Or ig ina l P a r t i e s " . 
Proclaiming as t h e i r p r i n c i p a l aim the s p e e d i e s t 
p o s s i b l e achievement of an agreement on genera l and complete 
disarmament under s t r i c t i n t e r n a t i o n a l , c o n t r o l in accordance 
with the o b j e c t i v e s of the United Nations which would p u t an 
end to the armaments r ace and e l i m i n a t e the i n c e n t i v e to the 
p roduc t ion and t e s t i n g of a l l k inds of weapons. Inc lud ing 
nuc lea r weapons. 
Seeking to achieve the d i scon t inuance of a l l t e s t 
exp los ions of nuc lea r weapons for a l l t ime, determined to 
con t inue n e g o t i a t i o n s to t h i s end, and d e s i r i n g to p u t sa 
end to the contaminat ion of man's environment by r a d i o a c t i v e 
subs tances . 
Have agreed as fo l lows : 
A r t i c l e I 
1. Each of the P a r t i e s t o t h i s Treaty under takes t o p r o h i b i t , 
t o p reven t , and no t t o car ry o u t any nuc lear weapon t e s t 
exp los ion , or any o the r nuclear exp los ion , a t any p l a c e under 
i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n or c o n t r o l : 
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond i t s l imi t s , including outer space; 
or under water, including t e r r i t o r i a l waters or high seas; or 
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioact iv 
debris to be present outside the t e r r i t o r i a l l imi t s of the s t a t e 
under whose j u r i s d i c t i o n or control such ejqplosion i s conducted. 
Off ic ia l Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 
January to December, 1963, document DC/208, annex 1, section E 
(ENDC/lOO/Rev 1) and United Nations Treaty Series , vol . 480, 
1963, no. 6964. 
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I t i s understood in t h i s connection tha t the provisions 
of th i s subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion 
of a t r ea ty r e su l t i ng in the permanent banning of a l l 
nuclear t e s t explosions, including a l l such explosions 
underground, the conclusion of which, as the Pa r t i e s 
have s t a r t ed in the Preamble to t h i s Treaty, they seek 
to achieve. 
2, Each of the Par t i e s on t h i s Treaty undertakes fur ther-
nore to re f ra in from causing, encouraging, or in any way 
pa r t i c i pa t i ng in , the carrying out of any nuclear weapon 
t e s t explosion, orany other nuclear explosion, anywhere 
which would take place in any of the environments described 
or have the ef fect to , in paragraph 1 of t h i s A r t i c l e . 
Ar t ic le I I 
1. Any Party may propose amendments to t h i s Treaty, Ihe t ex t 
of any proposed amendment shal l be submitted to the Deposi-
tary Governments which sha l l c i r c u l a t e i t to a l l Par t i es to 
t h i s Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third 
or more of the Par t i e s , the Depositary Governments shal l 
convene a conference, to which they sha l l i n v i t e a l l the 
Par t i es , to consider such amendment. 
2, ^y amendment to t h i s Treaty sha l l be approved by a 
majority of the votes of a l l the Pa r t i e s to t h i s Treaty, 
including the votes of a l l of the Original P a r t i e s . Ihe 
amendment sha l l enter i n to force for a l l Pa r t i e s upon tiie 
deposit of instruments o«f r a t i f i c a t i o n by a majority of 
a l l the Par t ies , including the instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
of a l l of the Original Pa r t i e s . 
Ar t ic le I I I 
1. This Treaty sha l l be open to a l l S ta tes for s ignature . 
«ny Sta te which does not sign t h i s Treaty oefore i t s entry 
in to force in accordance with paragraph 3 of t h i s Ar t ic le 
may accede to i t a t any time. 
2. This Treaty sha l l be subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n by signatory 
s t a t e s . Instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n and instruments of 
accession sha l l be deposited with the Governments of the 
Original Par t i es - the United Sta tes ot America, the 
United Kingdom of Great Bri tain and Northern Ireland, and 
the Union of Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republics - which are hereby 
designated the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty sha l l enter in to force after i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n 
by a l l the Original Par t i es and the d§posit of the i r 
instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
4 . For Sta tes whose instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n or accession 
are deposited subsequent to the entry in to force of t h i s 
Treaty, i t sha l l enter in to force on the date of the deposit 
of their instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n or accession. 
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5. The Depositary Governments sha l l promptly inform a l l 
deposited subsequent to the entry Into force of th i s Treaty 
i t sha l l enter in to force on the date of deposit of each 
instrument of r a t i f i c a t i o n of and accession to t h i s Treaty, 
the date of i t s entry in to force, and the date of r ece ip t 
of any requests for conferences or other no t i ces , 
6. This Treaty sha l l be reg is te red by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Ar t i c le 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Ar t ic le IV 
Ih is Treaty sha l l be of unlimited durat ion. 
Each Party sha l l in exefcising i t s na t ional sovereignty 
have the r i g h t to withdraw from the Treaty if i t decides that 
extraordinary events, r e l a t ed to the subject matter of t h i s 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme i n t e r e s t s of i t s 
country. I t sha l l give not ice of such withdrawal to a l l other 
Par t i es to the Treaty three months in advance. 
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts 
are equally authentic shal l be deposited in the archives 
of the Depositary Governments, Duly c e r t i f i e d copies of 
t h i s Treaty sha l l be transmitted by the Depositary Government 
to the Governments of the signatory and acceding S ta te s . 
IN WIINESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, 
have signed t h i s Treaty. 
DONE in t r i p l i c a t e a t the c i ty of Moscow the f i f th 
day of August, one thousand nine hundred and s i x t y - t h r e e . 
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APPENDIX - I I I 
Text of Treaty on the Non-P ro l i f e r a t i on of Nuclear Weapons 
1. The s t a t e s concluding t h i s T rea ty , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d 
to as the " P a r t i e s t o the Trea ty" , 
2. Consider ing the d e v a s t a t i o n t h a t would be v i s i t e d upon 
a l l mankind by a nuc lea r war and the consequent need to 
ma}<e every e f f o r t to a v e r t the danger of such a war and 
to take measures to safeguard the s e c u r i t y of peoples / 
3 . Bel ieving t h a t the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuc lea r weapons, 
would s e r i o u s l y enhance the danger of nuc lear war, 
4 . In conformity with r e s o l u t i o n s of the United Nat ions 
General Assembly c a l l i n g for the conclusion of an agreement 
on the p reven t ion of wider d i s semina t ion of nuc lea r weapons, 
5 . Undertaking to coopera te in f a c i l i t a t i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on 
peacefu l nuc lear a c t i v i t i e s , 
6 . Expressing t h e i r suppor t for r e s e a r c h , development and 
o t h e r e f f o r t s to fu r the r the a p p l i c a t i o n , wi th in the 
framework of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency 
sageguards system, of the p r i n c i p l e of sa feguard ing 
e f f e c t i v e l y the flow of source and spec i a l f i s s i o n a b l e 
m a t e r i a l s by use of ins t r i iments and o t h e r t echn iques a t 
c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c p o i n t s , 
7 . Affirming the p r i n c i p l e t h a t the b e n e f i t s of peacefu l 
a p p l i c a t i o n of nuc lear technology, i nc lud ing any 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l by p roduc t s which may be de r ived by nuc lear 
weapons S t a t e s from the development of nuc lea r exp los ive 
dev ices should be a v a i l a b l e for peacefu l purposes to a l l 
P a r t i e s to the Treaty , whether nuclear-weapon or non-
nuclear-weapon S t a t e s , 
8. Convinced t ha t , i n fu r the rance of t h i s p r i n c i p l e s , 
a l l P a r t i e s to the Trea ty are e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e exchange of s c i e n t i f i c informat ion 
for , and to c o n t r i b u t e alone or in coopera t ion with o ther 
s t a t e s to , the fu r the r development of the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
atomic energy for peacefu l purposes . 
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9, Declaring thei r in tent ion to achieve a t the e a r l i e s t 
poss ible date the cessation ot the nuclear arms race and 
to undertake effect ive measures in the di rect ion of 
nuclear disarmament,. 
10, Urging the cooperation of a l l S ta tes in the attainment 
of t h i s object ive, 
11, Recalling the determination expressed by the Par t ies 
to the 1967 Treaty banning nuclear-weapon t e s t s in the 
atmosphere, in outer space and under water in i t s Preamble 
to seek to achieve the discontinuance of a l l explosions 
of nuclear weapons for a l l time and to continue negot ia t ions 
to th i s end, 
12, Desiring to tu r ther the easingof in te rna t iona l tension 
and the strengthening of t r u s t between Sta tes in order to 
f a c i l i t a t e the cessationof the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the l iquidat ion of a l l the i r ex is t ing s tockpi les , and the 
elimination from nat ional arsenals of nuclear weapons and 
the means of the i r delivery pursuant to a t rea ty on general 
and complete disarmament under s t r i c t and effect ive 
in te rna t iona l g:ontrol, 
13, Recalling that , in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, S ta tes must r e t r a i n their in te rna t iona l 
r e l a t i ons from the th rea t or use of force against the 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t eg r i t y or p o l i t i c a l independence of any 
State , or in any other manner incons is ten t with the purposes 
of the United Nations, and tha t the establishment and 
maintenance of in terna t ional peace and securi ty are to be 
promoted with the l e a s t diversion of armaments of the 
world 's human and economic resources. 
Have agreed as follows* 
Art ic le I 
Each nuclear-weapon Sta te Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any rec ip ien t whatsoever 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
control over such weapons or explosive devices d i r ec t ly , 
or i nd i r ec t ly ; and not in any way to a s s i s t encourage, 
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices. 
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Art ic le I I 
Each non-nuclear-weapon Sta te Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the t ransfer from any transferor 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive 
devices d i r ec t l y or i nd i r ec t ly ; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance 
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices . 
Art ic le I I I 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon Sta te Party to the Treaty 
undertakes to accept safeguards, as se t forth in an 
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the In t e r -
nat ional Atomic Energy Agency in accordance and the Agency's 
safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of ve r i f i ca t ion 
of the fulfilment of i t s obl igat ions assumed under t h i s 
Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear 
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards 
required by t h i s a r t i c l e sha l l be followed with respect to 
source or spefclal f i ss ionable raatprial whether i t i s being 
produced, processed or used in any pr inc ipa l nuclear 
f a c i l i t y or i s outside any such f a c i l i t y . The safeguards 
required by th i s a r t i c l e shal l be applied on a l l source 
or special f i ss ionable mater ia l in a l l peaceful nuclear 
a c t i v i t i e s within the t e r r i t o r y of such Sta te , under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , or carr ied out under i t s control anywhere. 
2. Each Sta te Party to the Treaty undertakes not to 
provide: (a) source or specia l f i ss ionable mater ia l , or 
(b) equipment or material especia l ly designed or prepared 
for the processing, use or production of special f i ss ionable 
mater ia l , to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful 
purposes, unless the source or special f i ss ionable material 
sha l l be subject to the safeguards required by t h i s a r t i c l e . 
3. The safeguards required by th i s a r t i c l e sha l l be 
implemented in a manner designed to comply with a r t i c l e IV 
of t h i s Treaty, and to avoid hanpering the economic or 
technological development of the Par t i e s or in te rna t iona l 
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cooperation in the f ie ld of peaceful nuclear a c t i v i t i e s , 
including the in terna t ional exchange of nuclear material 
and equipment for the processing, use or production of 
nuclear mater ia l for peaceful purposes in accordance with 
the provision of t h i s a r t i c l e and the pr inc ip le of safe-
guarding se t forth inthe Preamble of the Treaty. 
4 , Non-nuclear-weapon States far ty to the Treaty shal l 
conclude agreements with the In te rna t iona l Atomic Energy 
Agency to meet the requirements of th i s a r t i c l e e i ther 
individual ly or together with other S ta tes in accordance 
with the Sta tute of the In te rna t iona l Atomic Agency. 
Negotiation of such agreements sha l l commence within 180 
days from the o r ig ina l entry in to force of th i s Treaty. 
For S ta tes depositing their instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
or accession after the 180 days period, negotiat ion of 
such agreements shal l commence not la te r than the date 
of such deposi t . Such agreements sha l l enter in to force 
not l a te r than eighteen month after the date of i n i t i a t i o n 
of negot ia t ions . 
Ar t ic le IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as 
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to 
the Treaty to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimina-
tion and in conformity with Articles I and II of the 
Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, 
and have the right to participate in, the fullest passible 
exchange of equipment/ materials, and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall 
also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other 
States or international organizations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of 
non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, with 
due consideration for the needs of the developing areas 
of the world. 
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Art ic le V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate 
measures to ensure tha t , in accordance with th i s Treaty, 
under appropriate in te rna t iona l observation and through 
appropriate in te rna t iona l procedures, po t en t i a l benefi ts 
from any peaceful applic-jtions of nuclear explosions wi l l 
be made avai lable to non-nuclear-weapon o ta t e s Party to 
the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and tha t the 
charge to such Par t ies for the explosive devices used 
wil l be as low as possible and exclude any charge for 
research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party 
to the Treaty sha l l be able to obtain such benef i t s , 
pursuant to a special in te rna t iona l agreement or agreement^, 
through an appropriate in t e rna t iona l body with adequate 
representat ion (sic) of non-nuclear weapon S t a t e s . Negotiations 
on th i s subject shal l commence as soon as poss ib le after the 
Treaty enters in to force. Non-nuclear-weapon S ta tes Party 
to the Treaty so desir ing may also obtain such benefi ts 
pursuant to b i l a t e r a l agreements. 
Ar t ic le VI 
Each of the Par t ies to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negot ia t ions in good fa i th on ef fec t ive measures 
r e l a t i n g to cessat ion of the nuclear arms race a t an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a t rea ty on general 
and complete disarmament under s t r i c t and ef fec t ive 
in terna t ional con t ro l . 
Ar t ic le VII 
Nothing in t h i s Treaty affects the r i g h t of any 
group of S ta tes to conclude regional t r e a t i e s in order 
to assure the t o t a l absence of nuclear weapons in the i r 
respect ive t e r r i t o r i e s . 
Ar t ic le VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to 
t h i s Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shal l be 
submitted to the Depositary Governments which sha l l c i r cu la t e 
i t to a l l Par t i es to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to 
do so by one th i rd or more of the Par t ies to the Treaty, 
the Depositary Governments sha l l convene a conference to 
which they sha l l inv i te a l l the Par t i e s to the Treaty, to 
consider such an amentflment. 
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2. Any amendment to th i s Treaty must be approved by 
a majority of the votes of a l l the Par t i es to the Treaty; 
including the votes of a l l nuclear-weapon Sta tes Par t i e s 
to the Treaty and a l l other Par t i es which, on the date the 
amendment i s c i rcula ted , are members of the Board or 
Governors of the Intenat ional Atomic Energy Agency. The 
amendment sha l l enter in to force for each Party tha t 
deposi ts i t s instrument of r a t i f i c a t i o n of the amendment 
upon the deposit of such instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n by 
a majority of a l l the Par t ies , including the instruments 
of a l l nuclear-weapon Sta tes Party to the Treaty and a l l 
other Par t i es which, on the date the amendment i s c i rcu la ted 
are members of the Board of Governors of the In te rna t iona l 
Atomic Energy Agency, Thereafter, i t shal l enter in to force 
for any other Party upon the deposit of i t s instrument of 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of the amendment, 
3. ixve years af ter the entry in to force of th i s Treaty, 
a Conference of Par t ies to the Treaty sha l l be held in 
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operat ion 
of th i s Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes 
of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being 
r ea l i zed . At i n t e rva l s of f ive years thereaf ter , a maj'^rity 
of the Par t ies to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a 
proposal to t h i s effect to the Depositary Governments, the 
convening of further conferences with the same objective 
of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. 
Ar t ic le IX 
1. This Treaty sha l l be open to a l l S ta tes for s ignature . 
Any Sta te which does not sign the Treaty before i t s entry 
in to force in accordance witJi paragraph 3 of th i s a r t i c l e 
may accede to i t s a t any time. 
2. This Treaty sha l l be subject to r a t i f i c a t i o n by 
signatory S t a t e s . Instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n and i n s t ru -
ments of accession sha l l be deposited with the Government 
of the Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United S ta tes of America, which are hereby designated the 
Depositary Governments. 
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3. This Treaty shal l enter in to force af ter i t s 
r a t i f i c a t i o n by the States , the Governments of which 
are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty 
other S ta tes signatory to th i s Treaty and the deposi t 
of the i r instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n . For the purposes 
of t h i s Treaty, a nuclear-weapon Sta te i s one which 
has manufactured and exploded a nuclear-weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 
4 . For Sta tes whose instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry in to 
force of th i s Treaty, i t shal l enter i n to force on the 
date of the deposit of their instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n 
or accession. 
5. The Depositary Government shal l promptly inform 
a l l signatory and acceding Sta tes of the date of each 
s ignature , the date of deposit of each instrument of 
r a t i f i c a t i o n or of accession, the date of the entry into 
force of th i s Treaty, and the date of r ece ip t of any 
requests for convening a conference or other n o t i c e s . 
6. This Treaty sha l l be reg i s t e red by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to a r t i c l e 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Ar t ic le X 
1. Each Party sha l l in exercising i t s na t ional 
sovereignty have the r igh t to withdraw from the Treaty 
if i t decides that extraordinary events r e la ted to the 
subject matter of th i s I'reaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme i n t e r e s t s of i t s country. I t snai l give not ice 
of such wit)idrawal to a l l other Par t i es to the Treaty 
and to the United Nations Security Council three months 
in advance. Such notice sha l l include a statement of the 
extra-ordinary events i t regards as having jeopardized 
i t s supreme i n t e r e s t s . 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry in to force of 
the t rea ty , a conference shal l be convened to decide 
whether the Treaty, shal l continue in force indef in i te ly , 
or shall be extended for an addi t ional fixed period or 
per iods . This decision sha l l be taken by a majority of 
the Par t i e s to the Treaty. 
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A r t i c l e XI 
This t r e a t y , the Chinese, Engl i sh , French, Russian 
and Spanish t e x t s of vrfhich a r e e q u a l l y a u t h e n t i c , s h a l l 
be depos i ted in the a rch ives of the Deposi tary Governments. 
Duly c e r t i f i e d cop ies of t h i s Treaty s h a l l be t r a n s m i t t e d 
by the Depos i ta ry Governments to the Governments of the 
s i g n a t o r y and accedding S t a t e s . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the unders igned, duly au thor ized , 
have s igned t h i s T r e a t y . 
Signed a t London, Moscow and Washington on 1 J u l y 1968, 
Entered i n t o force oh 5 March 1970. 
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APPENDIX r / 
December 1971 UN Reso lu t ion on Ind ian Ocean 
The General Assembly, 
Conscious of the de te rmina t ion of the peop les of 
the l i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d S t a t e s of the Ind ian Ocean to 
p re se rve t h e i r independence, sovere ign ty and t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y , and to remove t h e i r p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
s o c i a l problems under c o n d i t i o n s of peace and t r a n s q u i l i t y . 
R e c a l l i n g the Dec la ra t ion of the Third Conference of 
Heads of S t a t e s or Government of Non-Allgned C o u n t t i e s he ld 
a t Lusaka in September 1970, c a l l i n g upon a l l S t a t e s to 
cons ider and r e s p e c t the Indian Ocean a s a zone of peace 
from which g r e a t power r i v a l r i e s and compet i t ion as wel l 
as bases conceived in the c o n t e x t of such r i v a l r i e s and 
compet i t ion sbould be excluded and d e c l a r i n g t h a t the 
a rea should a l s o be f r e e of nuc lea r weapons. 
Convinced of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of ensur ing the main t -
enance of such c o n d i t i o n s in the a rea by means o the r than 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , as such a l l i a n c e s e n t a i l f i n a n c i a l and 
other o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t c a l l for the d i v e r s i o n of the l i m i t e d 
r e s o u r c e s of these S t a t e s from the more compell ing and 
p roduc t ive task of economic and s o c i a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and 
could f u r t h e r invo lve them in the r i v a l r i e s of power b locs 
in a manner p r e j u d i c i a l to t h e i r independence and freedom 
of ac t ion , thereby Inc reas ing i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s , 
Cdncerned a t recen t developments t h a t po r t end the 
ex tens ion of the arms r a c e i n t o the Indian Ocean a rea , 
thereby pos ing a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to the maintenance of such 
cond i t i ons in the a r e a . 
Convinced t h a t the e s t ab l i shmen t of a zone of peace 
in the Indian Ocean would c o n t r i b u t e towards a r r e s t i n g 
such developments, r e l a x i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s and 
s t r e n g t h e n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . 
Convinced fu r the r t h a t the e s t ab l i shmen t of a zone 
of peace in an ex t ens ive geograph ica l area i n one reg ion 
could have a b e n e f i c i a l i n f l uence on the e s t ab l i shmen t of 
permanent u n i v e r s a l peace based on equal r i g h t s and j u s t i c e 
for a l l , in accordance with the purposes and p r i n c i p l e s of 
the Char ter of the United N a t i o n s . 
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1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within limits, 
to be determined, together with the air space above and the 
Ocean floor sujacent thereto, is hereby designated for all 
time as a zone of peace; 
2. Calls upon the great powers, in conformity with tliis 
Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the 
littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to: 
a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of 
their military presence in the Indian Ocean; 
b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, 
military installations, logistical supply 
facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons 
and weapons of mass destruction and any manifes-
tation of great power military presence in th*» 
Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great 
power rivalry; 
3. Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the 
Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council 
and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean in 
pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of 
universal collective security without military alliances 
and strengthening international security through regional 
and other cooperation, to enter into consultations with a 
view to the implementation of this Declaration and such 
action as may be necessary to ensure that: 
a) warships and militaryaircraft may not use the 
Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integirt^ or independence 
of any littoral or hinterland State ofthe Indian 
Ocean in contravention of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 
b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and 
principles of international law, the right to 
free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels 
of all nations is unaffected; 
c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect 
to any international agreement that may ultimately 
be reached for the maintenance of the Indian 
Ocean as a zone of peace; 
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4 . Requests the Sec re ta ry -Genera l t o r e p o r t to the 
General Assembly a t the twenty-seventh ses s ion on the 
p rog re s s t h a t has been made to the iinpleqientation of 
t h i s D e c l a r a t i o n ; 
5 . Decides to inc lude the i tem e n t i t l e d "Dec la ra t ion 
of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" in the p r o v i s i o n a l 
agenda of i t s twenty-seventh s e s s i o n . 
Recorded Vote: 
In Favour; Afghanis tan, A lge r i a , Bhutan, Burma, Burundil 
Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Egypt, E l sa lvador , E q u a t o r i a l Guinea, E th iop i a , 
Ghana, Guinea, Gyane, I ce l and , Ind ia , Indones ia , I r a n , 
Japan, Jordan,Kenya, Khmer Republ ic , Kuwait, Laos, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Maur i tan ia , Mexico, 
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua ( l a t e r advised the S e c r e t a r i a t 
i t had in tended to a b s t a i n ) , N ige r i a , Pak i s t an , Panama, 
watar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Swazoland, 
Sweden, Syr ia , Togo, Tr in idad and Tobago, T u r n i s i a , Ugenda, 
United Republ ic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, 
Zambi a . 
To ta l ; 62 
Agains t : None 
Abs ta in ing ; Argent ina , A u s t r a l i a , Aus t r i a , Belgium, Bol iv ia , 
B r a z i l , Bulgar ia , Byeloruss ia , Canada, C e n t r a l African 
Republ ic , Chi le , Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, 
Domiricen Republ ic , F i j i , F in i l and , France, Greece, 
Guetemala, H a i t i , Honduras, Hungary, I r e l a n d , I s r a e l , I t a l y , 
Ivory Coast , Jamaica, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Mongolia, Ne ther lands , New Zealand, Norway, P e o p l e ' s 
Republic of Yemen, Peru, P h i l i p i n e s , Poland, Por tuga l , 
Rwanda, sengea l , Singapore, Turkey, Ukraine, USSR, UK, 
USA, Upper Vol ta , Venezuela, Z a i r e . 
T o t a l ; 55 
Absent; Albania, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Ecuador, Gobon, 
Gambia (Later advised the Secretariat it had intended tovote 
in favour), Iraq, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritius, Niger, Oman, 
Paraguay, Sierra, Leone, United Arab Emirates. 
Total; 16 
368 
APPENDIX -V 
Text Of Delhi Declarat ion, 28 January, 1965 
Today humanity stands a t a crucia l turning point in 
h i s t o r y . Nuclear weapons threaten to annih i la te not only a l l 
that man has created through the ages, but man himself and 
even l i f e on ear th . In the nuclear age, humanity must evolve 
a new p o l i t i c a l thinking, a new concept of the world that 
would provide credib le guarantees for humanity's s u r v i v a l . 
People want to l i v e in a safer and a more j u s t world. Humanity 
deserves a bet ter fa te than being a hostage to nyclear terror 
and despair . I t i s necessary to change the e x i s t i n g world 
s i t u a t i o n and to bui ld a nuclear weapon-free world, f ree of 
v io l ence and hatred, fear and susp ic ion . 
The world we have inher i ted belongs to present and 
future generations and t h i s demands that primacy be given to 
un iversa l ly accepted human v a l u e s . The r i g h t of every nation 
and ievery person to l i f e , freedom, peace and the pursuit of 
happiness must be recognised. Ihe use or threat of use of 
force must be abandoned. The r i ^ t of every people to make 
their own s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and ideo log ica l choices must be 
respected. P o l i c i e s that seek to e s t a b l i s h domination of some 
over others must be renounced. The expansion of nuclear 
arsenals and the development of space weapons undermine the 
universa l ly accepted convict ion that a nuclear war should 
never be fought and can never be won. 
On behalf of the more than one b i l l i o n men, women and 
chi ldren of our two fr iendly countr ies who account for one-
f i f t h of mankind, we c a l l upon the peoples and leaders of a l l 
countries to take urgent action that would lead to a world 
free of weapons of mass destruct ion, a world without war. 
Conscious of our common r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the d e s t i n i e s 
of our two nat ions and of mankind, we hereby s e t forth the 
fol lowing p r i n c i p l e s for building a nuclear-weapon free and 
non-v io lent world: 
1. Peaceful coexis tence must become the universal norm of 
in ternat ional r e l a t i o n s ; 
In the nuclear age i t i s necessary that internat ional 
r e l a t i o n s are restructured so that confrontation i s replaced 
by cooperation, and c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s reso lved through 
peaceful p o l i t i c a l means, not through mi l i tary means. 
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2. Human l i f e must be recognised as supremet 
I t i s only man's creat ive genius that makes progress 
and development of c i v i l i z a t i o n pos s ib l e in « peaceful 
environment, 
3 . Non-violence should be the bas i s of community l i f e t 
Philosophies and p o l i c i e s based on v io l ence and in t imi -
dation, inequal i ty and oppression and discrimination on the 
bas i s of race, r e l i g i o n or colour, are immoral and impermissible, 
ihey spread into lerance , destroy man's noble asp irat ions and 
negat ive a l l human va lues , 
4 . Understanding and t r u s t must replace fear and suspic ion; 
Mistrust, fear and suspicion between nat ions and peoples 
d i s t o r t perceptions of the real world, They engender tensions 
and, in the f i n a l ana lys i s , harm the en t i re internat ional 
community. 
5 . Ihe r i g h t of every s t a t e to p o l i t i c a l and economic independence 
A new world order must be b u i l t to ensure economic j u s t i c e 
and equal p o l i t i c a l secur i ty for a l l n a t i o n s . An end to the arms 
race i s an e s s e n t i a l prerequ i s i t e for the establishment of such 
an order. 
6 . Resources being spent on armaments must be channelled towards 
s o c i a l and economic development: 
Only disarmament can r e l e a s e the enormous addi t ional 
resources needed for combating economic backwardness and poverty. 
7. Conditions must be guaranteed for the ind iv idua l ' s harmonious 
development; 
All nat ions roust work together t o so lve urgent humanitarian 
problems and cooperate in the areas of cu l ture , the a r t s , s c i e n c e , 
education and medicine for the al l -round development of the 
ind iv idua l . A world without nuclear weapons and v io l ence would 
open up v a s t opportuni t ies for t h i s . 
8. Mankind's material and i n t e l l e c t u a l po tent ia l must be used 
to solve global problems; 
Solut ions must be found to global problems such as 
shortage of food, the growth of populations, i l l i t e r a c y and 
environmental degradation through the e f f i c i e n t and appropriate 
uses of the resources of the earth . The world's oceans, the 
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ocean floor as well as outer space are the conunon her i t age of 
mankind. A termination of the arms race would c rea te be t te r 
conditions fof t h i s pxarpose." 
9, The "balance of t e r ro r " must give way to comprehensive 
in te rna t iona l secur i ty ; 
The world i s one and i t s secur i ty i s i n d i v i s i b l e . East 
and West, North and South regardless of soc ia l systems, 
ideologies, r e l ig ion or race must join together in a common 
commitment to disarmaant and development. 
In terna t ional securi ty can be guaranteed through the 
adoption of in tegra ted measxires in the f i e ld of nuclear d i sa r -
mament using a l l avai lable and agreed measures of ve r i f i ca t ion , 
and confidence building; j u s t p o l i t i c a l set t lement of regional 
con f l i c t s , through peaceful negot ia t ions ; and cooperation in 
the p o l i t i c a l , economic and humanitarian spheres. 
10. A nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world requires 
spec i f ic and immediate action for disarmament: 
I t can be achieved through agreements on: 
_ complete destruct ion of nuclear arsenals before the end of 
t h i s century; 
_ barring of a l l weapons from outer space, which i s the common 
her i tage of mankind; 
_ banning of a l l nuclear weapons t e s t s ; 
_ prohibi t ion of the development of new types of weapons of 
mass destruct ion; 
- banning of chemical weapons and destruct ion of the i r stock-
p i l e s ; 
- reducing the levels of conventional arms and armed forces . 
i^ending the elimination of nuclear weapons, the iioviet 
Union and India propose tha t an in te rna t iona l convention banning 
the use or threa t of use of the nuclear weapons should be 
concluded immediately. This would cons t i tu te a major concrete 
step towards complete nuclear disarmament. 
Building a nuclear-weapon free and non-violent world 
requi res the revolutionary transformation of outlook and the 
education of people and nations for peace, mutual respect and 
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to lerance . The propaganda of war, hatred and v io lence should 
be forbidden and h o s t i l e perceptions with regard to other 
nations and peoples abandoned. 
Wisdom l i e s in preventing the accumulation and aggrava-
t ion of global problems which, i f not solved today, would 
require even greater s a c r i f i c e s tomorrow. 
The danger that threatens mankind i s grave. But mankind 
has the power to prevent a catastrophe, and to pave the way 
to a nuclear-weapon-free c i v i l i z a t i o n . The gathering strength 
of the c o a l i t i o n for peace embracing the e f f o r t s of the Non-
Aligned Movement, "the s i x - n a t i o n f i ve - cont inent i n i t i a t i v e 
for peace and disarmament" a l l peace- loving countr ies , p o l i t i a l 
p a r t i e s and publ ic organisat ions give usreason for hope, and 
optimism. The time for d e c i s i v e and urgent act ion i s now. 
M.S. Gorbachev, Rajiv Gandhi 
General Secretary of the Prime Minister of 
CPSU Central Committee the Republic of 
India 
New Delhi 
November 27, 1986 
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APPENDIX VI 
Message of the Leaders of the Delhi Six da ted 24 October 1985 
to the General Sec re t a ry of the CPSU Cent ra l Committee Mikhail 
Gorbachev and US P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan. 
The w o r l d ' s h i g h e s t e x p e c t a t i o n s a r e focussed on yovxr 
ineeting in Geneva nex t month. Al l peop les and governments nope 
t h a t you w i l l be able to s top the deepening of t e n s i o n s of the 
l a s t y e a r s , open an e r a of peace and s e c u r i t y for humanity. 
You know, as we do, t h a t the growing s t o c k p i l e s of 
nuc lea r weapons, i f used, even though by acc iden t or by 
m i s c a l c u l a t i o n , w i l l engulf us a l l in complete d e s t r u c t i o n . 
No i n t e r e s t can j u s t i f y t h i s t h r e a t to the p r e s e n t and f u t u r e 
g e n e r a t i o n s . Hence the p reven t ion of nuc lea r war i s a key 
I s sue not only for your peoples and t h e i r d e s t i n i e s but for 
a l l peop les on every c o n t i n e n t . Since t h e c i t i z e n s of a l l 
n a t i o n s a re equa l ly t h r ea t ened by the conseqxaences of nuc lea r 
war, i t i s of utmost importance to us a l s o t h a t your meeting 
should c r e a t e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n d i t i o n s and produce conc re t e 
s t e p s towards disarmament and p e a c e . 
The t ragedy of our time i s t h a t , mainly due to mutual 
d l s t r u c t , so far i t has been i n p o s s i b l e t o end the nuclear 
arms r a c e . For your own s e c u r i t y and t h a t of a l l n a t i o n s and 
human beings and in order to ensure the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the 
p l a n e t we a l l sha re , i t i s of paramount inpor t ance to b u i l d 
mutual conf idence . 
Your meeting o f f e r s a h i s t o r i c opportxinity to s t e p 
boldly out of the v i c i o u s c i r c l e of the e s c a l a t i n g arms r a c e . 
We hope t h a t through the demonstra t ion of w i l l to e s t a b l i s h 
mutual confidence by overcoming d i f f e r e n c e s , new impetus w i l l 
be imparted to your b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s and a l s o to m u l t i -
l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna. 
We recognize as a p o s i t i v e development t h a t dur ing the 
p r e s e n t year your governitients have i n i t i a t e d in Geneva 
n e g o t i a t i o n s cover ing both space and nuc lear arms to be 
cons idered in t h e i r i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p . We a r e concerned 
t h a t such n e g o t i a t i o n s have not y e t produced r e s u l t s . We f e l l , 
however, t h a t va r ious r e c e n t p r o p o s a l s and developments seem 
to o f fe r new hope t h a t both deep c u s t in the a r s e n a l s of 
nuc lear weapons and e f f e c t i v e measures for the p reven t ion of 
an arras r a c e in ou t e r space wi l l not be s e r i o u s l y considered 
in the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s in Geneva in conformity with the 
conclus ions we expect you to reach a t your meet ing . 
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In our Delhi Declaration o£ January t h i s year, we c a l l 
for a complete h a l t in the t e s t ing , production, and deployment 
of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles , and of space weapons, 
to be immediately followed by subs tant ia l reductions in nuclear 
forces . This would f a c i l i t a t e the task of preventing an arms 
race in space and terminating i t on earth, ul t imately elimina-
t ing nuclear arms everywhere. 
Since January, some of us have had the p r iv i l ege of 
discussing our proposals with you in person, as well as witi'i 
the leaders of the other nuclear weapon s t a t e s . One suggestion 
which we pa r t i cu l a r l y emphasized in our message from Delhi was 
for a h a l t to a l l nuclear weapons tes t ing and the early 
conclusion of a comprehensive t e s t ban t r e a t y . In the l i gh t 
of these valuable discussions, we have decided to put forward 
some ideas for consideration a t your meeting in Geneva. 
We propose that you suspend a l l nuclear t e s t s for a 
period of twelve months. Such a suspension could be extended 
or made permanent. We expect tha t the other nuclear weapon 
s t a t e s also should take corresponding ac t ion . 
We believe tha t t h i s would improve great ly the prospects 
for substantive agreements andwould r e s t r a i n the development 
of new, fas te r and more accurate weapons, which continues 
unabated even while negotiat ions are underway. 
The problems of verifying the suspension we propose 
are d i f f i c u l t , but not insurmountable. We believe tha t you 
yourselves could find a solution sa t i s fac tory to both. If 
you could consider i t helpful , we are ready to offer our good 
offices in order to f a c i l i t a t e the establishment of effect ive 
ve r i f i ca t i on arrangements. 
Third party ve r i f i ca t ion could provide a high degree 
of ce r ta in ty that t e s t ing programmeshave ceased. We propose 
to es tab l i sh ve r i f i ca t ion mechanisms on our t e r r i t o r i e s to 
achieve t h i s ob jec t ive . 
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The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y e n t r u s t e d to you i n i n d e e d awesome. 
We a r e conv inced t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l commvmity w i l l s u p p o r t 
you i n your e n d a v o u r s . For our p a r t , we r e i t e r a t e our r e a d i n e s s 
t o work t o g e t h e r w i t h you f o r t h e common s e c u r i t y and s u r v i v a l 
of h u m a n i t y . 
Raul ALFONSIN 
P r e s i d e n t of A r g e n t i n a 
Miguel de la MADRID 
President of Mexico 
Olaf PALME 
Prime M i n i s t e r o f Sweden 
R a j i v GANDHI 
Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a 
J u l i u s ifYERERE 
P r e s i d e n t of Tanzan i a 
Andreas PAPANDREOU 
Prime M i n i s t e r of Greece 
